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Abstract 
 
Contemporary ecological concerns are addressed in a wide range of disciplines, including 
Christian theology. This task is addressed especially in Christian ecotheology which may be 
approached from within all the traditional theological sub-disciplines. This research project 
will contribute to discourse in Christian systematic theology where various aspects of the 
Christian faith are revisited in the light of ecological concerns. One such aspect is the 
Christian doctrine of sin (hamartology) with specific reference to an understanding of the 
nature of sin. In ecotheology sin is re-described in various innovative ways, for example in 
terms of anthropocentrism, domination in the name of differences of species, consumerist 
greed and the alienation of humans from the earth community. This project will investigate, 
more specifically, the contribution made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer to a Christian understanding 
of the nature of sin. The question that will be addressed here is how Bonhoeffer‟s position 
may be assessed in the light of contemporary Christian discourse on hamartology and 
ecology. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Contemporary ecological concerns are addressed in a wide range of disciplines, including 
Christian theology. This task is especially addressed in Christian ecotheology, which may be 
approached from within all the traditional theological sub-disciplines. This thesis will 
contribute to discourse in Christian systematic theology where various aspects of the 
Christian faith are revisited in the light of ecological concerns. One such aspect is the 
Christian doctrine of sin (hamartology), with specific reference to an understanding of the 
nature of sin. In ecotheology, sin is re-described in various innovative ways, for example in 
terms of anthropocentrism, domination in the name of differences of species, consumerist 
greed and the alienation of human beings from the earth community. In this study I 
investigate, more specifically, the contribution made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer to a Christian 
understanding of the nature of sin. The question that is addressed here is how Bonhoeffer‟s 
position may be assessed in the light of contemporary Christian discourse on hamartology 
and ecology. 
1.2 Context and relevance 
1.2.1 Christian discourse on ecology  
There is no need to focus here on the gravity of the environmental crisis. There is widespread 
consensus that environmental problems such as climate change, toxic pollution, over-
population and a loss of biodiversity have become more ominous than the initial concerns 
over “limits to (economic) growth” as expressed in the report to the Club of Rome in 1972.1  
The environment is a theme that is addressed in almost all disciplines, including the 
humanities and social sciences and clearly requires a multi-disciplinary approach. 
In Christian theology there has been a long-standing interest in studying the so-called “book 
of nature”. Contemporary debates in the field of ecological theology, however, were 
prompted especially by the famous essay of the American historian Lynn White on “The  
                                                 
1
 This report conveyed the first reservations pertaining to the feasibility of sustained economic growth. It 
explored energy availability, non-renewable-resource utilization and human population growth (Meadows et 
al 1972).  
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historical roots of our environmental crisis” (1967). In this essay White argued that 
Christianity “bears a huge burden of guilt” for the ecological crisis, given the underlying 
anthropocentrism of much of (Western) theology, rendering religious support to the notion 
that the world has been created primarily for the benefit of human beings. Many Christian 
theologians responded to such accusations by retrieving the ecological wisdom embedded in 
the biblical roots of Christianity, its subsequent history, Christian doctrine, the liturgy and 
Christian praxis. Others have acknowledged that the legacy of Christianity is far more 
ambiguous than such apologies may suggest.
2
 On this basis, some have called for an 
“ecological reformation” of the Christian tradition. James Nash (1996), for example, suggests 
that an ecological reformation of Christianity implies that there are significant flaws in the 
Christian tradition – otherwise a reformation would not be necessary. It also implies that 
these flaws can be corrected – otherwise a reformation would not be possible. 
Conradie (2006:63) observes that this task of an ecological reformation of Christianity is 
addressed in all the traditional sub-disciplines of Christian theology, including biblical 
studies, biblical hermeneutics, the history of Christianity in its many traditions and forms of 
expression, Christian doctrine, Christian virtues and values, the liturgy and worship, 
preaching, ministry, pastoral care, Christian education, Christian mission and a theology of 
religions. This thesis contributes to such discourse through a reinterpretation of Christian 
doctrine and more specifically, the doctrine of sin. 
There is certainly a need to revisit Christian doctrine from the perspective of Christian 
ecotheology. Obviously, the focus is often on creation theology and especially a theological 
understanding of the relationship between human beings and nature. Many other themes have 
been explored in the light of ecological concerns, however, including the trinity, God as 
Father, humanity, sin, providence, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, salvation, the church, the 
sacraments and Christian hope. 
In several contributions,
3
 Conradie has identified four especially crucial areas where an 
understanding of the Christian faith continues to undermine an ecological ethos, spirituality 
and praxis, namely a worldless notion of God‟s transcendence, dualist anthropology, a 
personalist reduction of the cosmic scope of salvation and an escapist eschatology. Conradie 
                                                 
2
 See Santmire (1985). 
3
  See, for example, Conradie (2006).  
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suggests that any ecological theology will remain shallow unless an adequate response to 
these four problems can be provided. 
An additional aspect that necessitates further reflection is the Christian notion of sin, 
reinterpreted in the light of ecological threats. A common assumption, at least in Christian 
environmental discourse, is that the environmental crisis may be understood in terms of the 
structural impact of human sin. Alternatively, one may suggest that the Christian doctrine of 
sin offers a re-description of the roots of the crisis that may also be described in terms of 
historical, sociological and economic variables. Either way, this raises numerous further 
questions both inside and outside of the Christian tradition. Is the language of sin appropriate 
in (secular) environmental discourse? Exactly how is the concept of sin understood? In what 
manner should sin be re-described within the context of ecological destruction? That such a 
reinterpretation would be required should be obvious, given the cultural tendency to avoid or 
trivialise language about sin and the predominance of a personalist reduction of sin, 
particularly in evangelical circles. 
Such an ecological reinterpretation of the Christian notion of sin would require an 
understanding of the traditional Christian doctrine of sin, especially the nature of sin, and a 
survey of recent contributions to an ecological reinterpretation of the Christian notion of sin 
in literature on ecotheology. The objective of this research project is to contribute to such 
literature by retrieving insights from the work of the famous 20
th
 century German theologian 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945). 
1.2.2 The Christian doctrine of sin 
The Christian doctrine of sin is of course highly complex, given the long tradition of 
reflection on an understanding of sin. It would be impossible to offer a history of 
interpretation or a detailed survey of the available literature of the last century on the doctrine 
of sin. Instead, I hereby offer a very brief sketch of the main historical developments in this 
regard, drawing on some standard textbooks in the field.
4
 Then, drawing from the work of 
Jaap Durand (1978), who taught systematic theology at UWC in the 1970s and 1980s, I 
identify and briefly describe six themes that are typically addressed in Christian literature on 
                                                 
4 Textbooks and chapters: Durand (1978), Hodgson and King (1985); Berkouwer (1971); Brunner (1952); 
Berkhof (1976); Cumberlege (1955); Anderson (2009); McFarland (2009); Hampson (2007:479-482); 
Williams (1985:194-219); Veldsman (1998:49-79); König (1998:81-109); Maimela (1998:111-119); Keane 
(1998:121-135), Herholdt (1998:215-229) and Hick (2007). 
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sin. 
a) Historical development 
The Christian doctrine of sin, including the notion of the fall, gradually developed over time. 
St. Augustine‟s work was the first to significantly contribute to its development. Augustine 
had a pessimistic anthropological view of sin and supported the concept of original sin. He 
believed that humans are originally created good, and that sin is a defection from the natural 
order of creation, which takes the form of a self-imposed bondage of the human will. 
Pelagius on the other hand, maintained that the notion of original sin has no scriptural basis. 
In his opinion, sin is a purely deliberate, conscious choice to do evil. Although it is pervasive 
in nature it is not a universal condition. Augustine‟s response to this claim is that the bondage 
of sin implies a bias toward evil that dominates conscious and deliberate choices. 
Furthermore, he interprets the fall as an historical event, which corrupts both Adam and his 
offspring. 
Regardless of minor differences, Thomas Aquinas (in the Catholic tradition), agreed with 
Augustine‟s literal historical interpretation of Genesis 2-3: Human beings are inherently 
sinful because of original sin transmitted by Adam and Eve. In Aquinas‟ view, sin is formally 
the privation of original righteousness and habitual grace, and materially concupiscence or 
unrestrained desire into which humanity is plunged, through the fall, from grace. The 
Protestant tradition, following Luther and Calvin, views sin as more than a mere defect. 
Building on the Augustinian idea of concupiscence, sin is eventually understood as a 
corruption of the entire human nature, expressed in the notion of “total depravity”.  
During the time of the Enlightenment, the doctrine of sin was attacked, given that it 
contradicts two fundamental modern convictions – essential human goodness and the 
supreme value of human freedom and autonomy. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, 
acknowledges this contradiction and argues that if original sin is not regarded as an essential 
part of human nature and thus, not outside the sphere of human responsibility, how can it be 
an inherited corruption and inevitable? Although sin is universally present among humans, it 
is not natural in the sense of being necessary. Because of such contradictions in the doctrine, 
it became virtually superseded by the modern secular view that evil is embedded in 
institutional and social structures.  
Regardless of the weighty criticism faced during the Enlightenment period, a number of 
Christian theologians continued to engage in discourse on the doctrine of sin. In the 20th 
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century, the Christian understanding of sin was shaped by the various theological schools that 
emerged, became dominant and often dissipated later. Evangelical Theology,
5
 in its radical 
view of sin, maintains that human nature fails not only through weakness, but also as a result 
of alienation from God. According to dialectical theology
6
 (associated with Karl Barth, Emil 
Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr), humanity is entirely incapable of responding to God in the 
correct way, as its fallen state is one of total depravity following a broken relationship with 
God. Existentialist theologies
7
 (associated especially with Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich) 
returned to a notion of sin prevalent in liberal theologies, namely a failure of authenticity in 
the individual person‟s way of living in God‟s presence. In secular theologies8 (associated 
with Harvey Cox and John Robinson) an emphasis on sin became underplayed, except in 
terms of the side-effects of urbanisation. John Hick (2007), for example, rejects the doctrine 
of the fall. He claims that the point of departure for sin is the ontological imperfection of 
creation, which finds expression in humanity‟s instability and ethical-religious immaturity. In 
various forms of (Western) postmodern theology
9
, as well as in the context of discourse on 
science and theology (associated especially with Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, Philip Hefner 
and others) the classic notion of the fall of humanity is called into question so that a 
discussion of (human suffering) is treated in terms of the theodicy problem and not in terms 
of a reflection on salvation from sin.  
In the context of political theologies
10
 (associated especially with Jürgen Moltmann and 
Johann Baptist Metz) the focus shifted to the impact of structural violence, with specific 
reference to anti-Semitism, the conflict of powers during the so-called “Cold War”, the 
failure of “development” and communist oppression. This emphasis on the impact of 
structural violence and systemic injustices was radicalised in the context of liberation 
                                                 
5 This very broad and diversified movement was developed in England and North America and later also 
Africa and includes representatives of a number of denominations. Evangelical Theology (in the German 
sense of “evangelisch”) includes scholars standing in the Anglican, Scottish Presbyterian, Baptist, 
Congregational, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Reformed, Roman Catholic, Holiness, Pentecostal and Charismatic 
traditions. For further reading, see König (1998) and Carl (1957). 
6    Barth (1957), Brunner (1946; 1950; 1943, 1964) and Niebuhr (1996). 
7
    See Tillich (1951; 1957a; 1952) and Bultmann (1958). 
8
    See Cox (1966) and Robinson (1963). 
9
    See Peacocke (1981), Barbour (1997) and Hefner (2008). 
10
   See Metz (1969, 1981) and Moltmann (1967, 1988). 
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theologies (associated especially with Gustavo Gutiérrez and several others
11
), black theology 
(associated especially with James Cone
12
), feminist theologies (associated with Sallie 
McFague and many others
13
 
14
) and womanist theologies (see Beverly Harrison).
 15
 
Accordingly, structural violence was understood in terms of various forms of domination, 
such as the impact of industrial capitalism, the legacy of slavery and racism, patriarchy, 
sexism and a combination of these ideologies. This tendency is complemented through a 
variety of indigenous theologies (especially various forms of African theologies
16
), in which 
the lasting legacy of colonialism is highlighted and the need for a retrieval of indigenous 
wisdom emphasised. Towards the end of the 20
th
 century, various forms of ecotheology 
emerged in different bioregions. As indicated in the following, this led to a new interest in the 
notion of sin, but also to rather diverse reinterpretations of the nature of sin. 
b) Six themes addressed in current discourse 
In the history of Christian reflection on sin, a number of crucial problems have typically been 
addressed. Durand (1978:9) identifies six main themes that are addressed in current discourse 
on the doctrine of sin, namely the origin of sin, the relationship between sin and demon 
possession, the relationship between sin and suffering, the notion of original sin, the 
knowledge of sin, and the nature of sin. Durand offers a survey of the available literature on 
each of these themes up to the end of the 1970s. For my purposes it would suffice to indicate 
the underlying theological problems that are addressed in each case. 
                                                 
11
 See Gutiérrez (1973; 1987; 1984). 
12
 A particular theological response to the experiences of people of colour in North America and South Africa 
faced with racial discrimination and oppression. See for example Cone (1970). 
13
 This type of theology calls the church‟s attention not only to the issue of the oppression and exploitation of 
women, but also to other forms of injustice such as ageism, ableism and racism. See McFague (1975; 1982). 
14
 In an early article entitled The Human Situation: A Feminist View (1960), Valerie Saiving expresses her 
defiance of contemporary theology. She argues that terms such as pride, exertion of power, exploitation, 
self-assertiveness and the like do not indicate a universal predicament but rather illustrate the modern male‟s 
form of existence. Saiving believes that the temptations of women – who experience sin in a dissimilar 
manner to men – are better described by terms such as worthlessness, distractibility, faintness, lack of 
organising focus and reliance on others for their own self-definition. 
15
   See Harrison (2004). 
16
  See for example Mbiti (1977) and Mugambi (1990). 
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One classic debate is on the origins of sin. Where does sin come from? A possible answer 
could be that sin is the result of evil forces, perhaps symbolized by the figure of the devil. 
One may also argue, however, that human sin is the origin of evil. This requires further 
reflection on the dialectic between sin and evil. One aspect of this debate is the use of the 
term “original sin”, although this term is perhaps best used to indicate the seriousness of sin 
and not the mythical origins of sin. Durand (1978:77-78) maintains that the search for the 
origin of sin is futile – seeking to make sense out of the senseless. At the same time, it can 
also be a dangerous task from the point of view that it may negate human guilt altogether. 
Therefore, the origin cannot be explained; sin can only be confessed as guilt. 
Durand (1978:90-94) argues that although the Scriptures do not deny a relationship between 
sin and demonic possession, temptation by evil forces outside of humanity does not provide a 
demonic justification for human sin. Sin is not an unavoidable, overpowering misfortune; 
rather, through his own sin “man” chooses the devil as his father. As such, the sinful human 
is “from the devil”, making sin an inevitable part of his nature, unless he is born of God. 
Furthermore, the biblical message does not reveal an original dualism between God and the 
forces of evil. The devil‟s realm of darkness only becomes known through the light of the 
gospel of Christ. Evil forces have no autonomy against God, but are subject to His authority.  
The above acknowledgment also highlights the theodicy
17
 problem and underlying questions 
on the relationship between sin and suffering. Suffering is not a natural or fatal occurrence, 
but an alien intruder in God‟s creation because it is linked to the alien character of sin. 
Although various forms of suffering can sometimes be clearly connected to specific human 
guilt, the Scriptures only disclose a general relation between sin and suffering. The theodicy 
question is therefore unfathomable, given that the deepest form of the mystery of sin is the 
mystery of suffering (Durand 1978:109-113).  
Concerning its universal character, Durand (1978:126-131) holds that sin is not carried over 
from generation to generation. Yet, there is indeed a historical continuity that manifests 
throughout all generations on account of the destructive nature of sin from the very 
beginning. The notion of original sin implies that sin is a historical power that reigns via 
human addiction to sin. As a result, original sin can never be an alibi for humanity‟s guilt. 
                                                 
17
 An argument in defence of God‟s goodness despite the existence of evil. Attempts to address the theodicy 
question mainly diverge in two directions: God is the originator of suffering, or He Himself is subject to 
suffering. Both these points are irreconcilable with the Scriptures, however (Durand 1978:107). 
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The correlation between sin as historical power and the addiction of human nature is obscure 
and inexplicable – just as sin is strange and mysterious to God‟s creation. 
On the knowledge of sin, Durand notes that two essential aspects have to be recognised: the 
Law as measure, and the Gospel as the way along which humans encounter the true nature of 
their sin. The Law is not eliminated, but the Gospel, which leads to confession and 
forgiveness has everything to do with it – sin in its most profound form only becomes known 
and understood through faith in the Lawgiver. The Law, which fuels sin, has an unveiling 
function in the knowledge of sin. Yet, through the redemptive power of Christ alone is the 
deepest reality of human guilt revealed – the only knowledge of sin that leads to faith and 
conversion (Durand 1978:138-143). 
Durand (1978:156-157) claims that while the deepest nature of sin cannot be localized, there 
is one culmination point in which all types of sins are bound up. In his opinion, Genesis 3 is 
not only an expression of pride, but also of deception, the lie, disobedience, transgression and 
desire. The serpent awakes in human beings unbelief in God (“You will not surely die... For 
God knows…” – Genesis 3:4, NIV), that breaks the relationship of trust between the latter 
two. The lie, unrighteousness and fleshly desire ultimately leads to the rejection of Christ, 
therefore all human sin culminates at the point of unbelief.  
Underlying each of these problems there is still a need to reflect on the very nature of sin. 
What is sin? As the history of Christian theology suggests, sin can be defined in many 
different ways. It is contested, however, whether it is even possible to define it. That may 
presume that one can locate, isolate and eradicate sin. Many classic theologians have 
maintained that sin cannot be defined or explained – given that to explain it may well amount 
to an excuse or apology of sin. Instead, one may insist that sin is utterly meaningless. This 
project heeds this warning, but the next section nevertheless explores the always inadequate 
attempts to understand and re-describe the very nature of sin in more depth. 
1.2.3 The nature of sin 
Sin has many faces and cannot be reduced to any one thing. This is noticeable in the diverse 
terminology applied to the nature of sin in Christian theology.
18
 Three specific attitudes 
                                                 
18
 Conradie (2005a:12) cites a diversity of terms to express the Christian notion of sin, including “shame, pride, 
presumption, selfishness, greed or covetousness, concupiscence, (sexual?) desire (lust), unfaithfulness and 
faithlessness, petulant disobedience, idolatry, as active rebellion against God and as passive  resignation in 
the face of evil (acedia), as opposition to God‟s grace‟ as the negation of the good (privation boni), as 
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identified as grounds for human sin significantly influenced the Christian doctrine, however; 
the concepts of sin as pride (superbia) and greed (concupiscentia), which initially contoured 
the Christian tradition, and moral failure (hamartia), which followed afterwards. These 
expressions constitute the classical view of sin. While some scholars argue that sin may also 
manifest itself in various forms, i.e. as a “hydra”, others believe that sin has no ontological 
status and can only be described as a deprivation of the good (privatio boni). Sin, however, in 
whatever form it may be, is the groundwork for broken relationships. The nature of sin will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
1.2.4 Sin and Ecology 
In recent debates all these ways of thinking on the nature of sin are being reinterpreted in the 
context of Christian ecotheology, whereby sin is re-described in various innovative ways. For 
the purpose of this study, “ecological sins” are expressed as anthropocentrism, domination in 
the name of differences of species, consumerist greed, and the alienation of humans from the 
earth community
19
. A comprehensive survey and classification of available literature on these 
categories is offered in Chapter 3.  
1.3 Demarcation and statement of research problem 
The current discourse on hamartology and ecology can obviously be enriched by contribu-
tions from the history of Christian theology. In this study I explore the position of the famous 
German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, on the nature of sin. My assumption is that such a 
retrieval of insights from widely recognised theologians may assist contemporary attempts to 
address new environmental challenges. 
1.3.1 Bonhoeffer’s life: A brief description 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, born on 4 April 1906 in Breslau, Germany, was an influential teacher, 
theologian, ethicist and pastor. He is renowned for his instrumental role in the battle against 
Adolf Hitler‟s Nazi regime and anti-Semitism. Bonhoeffer‟s participation in the German 
resistance movement and his involvement in the assassination attempt on Hitler subsequently 
                                                                                                                                                        
“falling short” of God‟s desires for us (hamartia), and of our own potential (?!), as “self-centred turning in 
upon oneself” (incurvatus in se), as using God as a means to secure enjoyment and money (and thereby 
inverting the relationship between transitory means and final ends), and as enmity or alienation from a 
relationship with God”. 
19
 While these terms are dealt with separately, in many instances they overlap. 
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led to his arrest on 5 April 1943. After being charged with high treason, Bonhoeffer was 
hanged on 9 April 1945 at the Flossenbürg concentration camp, just days before the Nazi‟s 
surrender. Although there is some degree of objection, Bonhoeffer is considered by many to 
be a martyr.    
The context and events of Bonhoeffer‟s life immensely influenced the formation of his 
theology. Accordingly, his literary works echoes a multitude of ideas and themes unique to 
his class.      
1.3.2 Bonhoeffer’s literacy works 
Bonhoeffer‟s theological works have now been collected in a scholarly edition comprising 
sixteen volumes published in German as the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke (published by Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag) and translated into English as the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (published by 
Fortress Press).
20
  
This thesis focuses on Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of sin. His books Act and Being, Creation 
and Fall and Ethics therefore serve as primary sources for this study.  
1.3.3 Bonhoeffer’s legacy 
Commemorated as theologian, pastor, spiritual writer and martyr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer is a 
source of inspiration in both religious and non-religious circles. Although his work is often 
subject to misinterpretation and distortion, he nevertheless became so influential over the 
years that he is currently one of the most renowned modern theologians.  
The International Bonhoeffer Society (IBS) aims to preserve the memory and to enhance the 
knowledge of this dynamic scholar and his legacy. It operates primarily through conferences 
and meetings held both domestically and internationally, where various academic papers on 
Bonhoeffer‟s work are presented, ensuring an ever-increasing expansion of his theology.  
Bonhoeffer‟s work is not only instrumental among scholars, but moreover, in the midst of 
Christian witnesses within the political sphere. His theology encompasses valuable resources, 
which aids the struggle for liberation and justice and had a profound influence on leading 
figures like Martin Luther King, Jr. and former Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  
Bonhoeffer‟s work is also regarded an essential point of reference for gaining an 
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 Bonhoeffer‟s publications have gone through numerous editions. In this thesis I will work only with the 
scholarly edition.  
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understanding of the notion of sin. A number of scholars has written and published secondary 
material on Bonhoeffer‟s view of sin.21 In addition, Bonhoeffer‟s writings are also considered 
an indispensable source in the field of ecotheology.
22
  
1.3.4 Statement of research problem 
This project investigates the contribution made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer to a Christian 
understanding of the nature of sin. The question that is addressed here is how the significance 
of Bonhoeffer‟s position in this regard may be assessed in the light of contemporary Christian 
discourse on hamartology and ecology. On this basis, the research problem investigated in 
this study may be formulated in the following way: 
What are the similarities and differences between Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s 
understanding of the nature of sin and current discourse on the nature of sin in 
available literature on ecology and hamartology? 
The research problem as stated above assumes the validity of my overview of the literature 
on hamartology and ecology that was developed below. My argument is that contemporary 
Christian discourse on hamartology and ecology can be captured in terms of the rubrics of sin 
as pride (read anthropocentrism), domination in the name of differences of species, greed 
(read consumerist greed) and the privation of the good (read alienation). In this study, such 
discourse will be placed in juxtaposition with Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of sin. This invites 
a mutually critical correlation as indicated previously in terms of identifying and discussing 
the similarities and difference that may emerge through such juxtaposition. Various questions 
are elicited, for example whether Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of the nature of sin is perhaps 
falling in the very traps that are widely recognised and criticised in contemporary 
ecotheology? Alternatively, may a retrieval of Bonhoeffer‟s position perhaps yield insights 
that tend to be forgotten in contemporary discourse? Or are such discourses so divergent that 
mutually critical correlation is hardly feasible? Can one indeed construct something of an 
overlapping consensus despite very different contexts? Or do emerging ecological insights 
perhaps provide fresh lenses through which Bonhoeffer‟s writings may be read, leading to 
new perspectives for secondary scholarship on Bonhoeffer‟s legacy? Although these 
observations are preliminary, Chapter 6 offers a more definite response to the research 
question.  
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   See for example, Robinson (2005); Gregersen (2007); Tietz (2007); Dabrock (2007) and Mathews (2000). 
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  See Chapter 4, 4.4.1, and Chapter 6.   
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1.3.5 Limitations of the study 
This research project focuses on relevant literature from the last century on hamartology and 
ecology published in English and Afrikaans (given my language abilities), including books, 
journal articles, essays in edited volumes and postgraduate theses. As a result of the vast 
amount of available writings on sin, an exhaustive study in this regard is beyond the scope of 
this research project, as only a limited selection of texts can be contained within. This study 
only focuses on hamartology and ecology in Christian theology, and not on theological 
reflections in the context of other religious traditions, for example Judaism, Islam or the 
Baha`i faith. 
1.4 Research procedure 
This thesis is a literature-based study on the basis of a survey of available literature on 
hamartology and ecology. The first step required to investigate the research problem is to 
gain an in depth understanding of the different ways in which the nature of sin has been 
understood in the Christian tradition. A full description is almost encyclopaedic in scope. 
Instead, I used some of the main reference works in this regard in order to offer a brief survey 
of this history. Sources that were employed in this regard include Tillich (1957b), Niebuhr 
(1996), Barth (1960), Hick (2007), Pannenberg (1994), Heyns (1978), Peters (1994), and 
Durand (1978). The results of this brief survey are documented in Chapter 2.  
Secondly, the research problem necessitates reflection on narratives on the notion of sin in 
the light of the contemporary ecological crisis. An in-depth survey of relevant literature on 
hamartology and ecology, including works of contributors such as Birch and Rasmussen 
(1978), Nash (1991), McDaniel (1995), Martin-Schramm and Stivers (2003) and Conradie 
(2006), thereby constitutes Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
A brief description of Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s life, work and legacy, drawing from 
contributions of, among others, Bethge (1995) and Nelson (1999) is documented in Chapter 
4. 
Bonhoeffer‟s Act and Being, Creation and Fall and Ethics were utilized in order to offer a 
detailed critical analysis of Bonhoeffer‟s view on the nature of sin. This is documented in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
The manner in which the nature of sin is understood in ecotheology, i.e. anthropocentrism, 
domination in the name of differences of species, consumerist greed and alienation of humans 
from the earth community, is juxtaposed with Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of the nature of 
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sin. Chapter 6 thus contains the ultimate results yielded by this thesis. The thesis is brought to 
a close by means of a few concluding remarks.  
1.5. Significance of the study 
This research project is situated in the context of the Christian Faith and the Earth project. 
This is a collaborative project involving more than 100 scholars from around the world. Its 
aim is to assess the state of the debate regarding the reinterpretation of the core symbols of 
the Christian Faith in the context of Christian ecotheology and to offer a sense of direction for 
the way forward. This project was initiated in January 2007 upon the initiative of Prof Ernst 
Conradie, who is also the supervisor of this project. The projected culminated in a recent 
conference held from 6 to 10 August at the Sustainability Institute near Lynedoch. At a 
planning session during the conference, a number of themes were identified that requires 
further collaborative work, including reflection on the relationship between sin and the 
suffering of God‟s creatures. It is likely that this will lead to further collaborative work, 
consultations and conference in years to come. My research project therefore builds on the 
insights that emerged from the larger project and will contribute to the plans for the future.  
More specifically, the significance of this project has to be understood in terms of other 
considerations. While there is some conviction that the doctrine of sin is indispensable in 
analysing the root causes of contemporary environmental evils,
23
 it is to a large extent 
neglected in ecotheological discourse.
24
 Also, though there have been some contributions on 
                                                 
23 McGrath (2002:79-80, 83) believes that environmental degradation needs to be explored in the light of 
human sinfulness. In support of this argument, he refers to Leviticus 26:16 and Hosea 4:3. He argues that the 
Christian understanding of sin inevitably impacts human environmental attitudes. Conradie (2006:52) also 
advocates the idea that the human roots of ecological destruction suggests a diagnosis of the human state 
which is quite similar to the doctrine of sin. If, in classic Christian terms, sin is identified the root of evil, 
then societal evil, in this case environmental degradation, must be the collective result of human sin. 
24 Theologians have identified various reasons for this. Becker (1992:155-156), for example, asserts that in a 
society which seeks to maximize individual freedom and rights, it is very difficult to promote the doctrine of 
(original) sin. Conradie (2005a:4) shares a similar view. He holds that modernity would rather believe in 
humanity‟s essential goodness and dignity instead of relishing the unpleasant images (“stern Calvinism, 
disciplinarians and punishment, patriarchy and cultural pessimism”) evoked by the doctrine of sin. On the 
other hand, Berry‟s stance is that Christian theologians are guilty of overemphasizing the process of human 
redemption from sin (thus Christ the Redeemer), thereby understating God as Creator and His presence and 
concern with creation. They attempt to resolve this preoccupation with redemption by shifting Christian 
theology toward a new focus on the whole of creation as an expression and revelation of God (1988:126).  
 
 
 
 
24 
 
hamartology and ecology, I offer a detailed survey and classification of the available 
literature to the advantage of further discourse. Furthermore, this research project carries 
significance for dialogue on Bonhoeffer‟s legacy. While there are some secondary existing 
writings on Bonhoeffer‟s notion of sin, there is nothing yet that relates that to hamartology 
and ecology. My study is thus a contribution to filling this gap in available literature.  
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Chapter 2 
The nature of sin 
2.1 Introduction 
In the hope that Christian theology could address the ecological crisis at hand, a careful 
understanding of the doctrine of sin, with specific reference to the nature of sin, would have 
to be acquired to examine the essence of this problem.  In the Christian tradition the nature of 
sin is defined in countless ways. In classic terms it is described as pride (superbia), greed 
(concupiscentia) or moral failure (hamartia). Others argue that sin may also manifest itself in 
various forms, whereas others believe that sin has no ontological status and can only be 
described as deprivation of the good (privatio boni).
25
  
A comprehensive study of Christian narratives on the nature of sin is beyond the scope of this 
project. This chapter therefore serves to offer a concise survey of viewpoints in this regard. In 
order to execute this task, the chapter is structured as follows: Sin is described in classic 
terms, i.e. as pride, greed and moral failure. Each of these categories comprises a section on 
historical developments in Christian theology, as well as a section on the views of modern 
scholars who significantly researched the relevant subject. This is followed by a discussion of 
sin as a “hydra”, and a discussion of sin as deprivation of the good, respectively. The chapter 
is brought to a close with a few concluding observations. 
2.2 Classic understanding of the nature of sin 
2.2.1 Sin as pride (superbia) 
God is the Source of life, the centre of everything. Pride is the human being‟s desire to be like 
God and the rejection of His divine superiority as the Creator of all things, thereby becoming 
his or her own centre. Based on a system of hierarchy, the self is valued highly, above others. 
Human beings are innately inferior to their Creator and limited in their capacity for 
knowledge and success. To overcome this constriction, they rebel against God in attempting 
to be like Him – in control and the source of life – an idea encountered as early as the biblical 
creation story (see Genesis 3:5). The sin of pride extends to include other similar flaws such 
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  For additional reading on the nature of sin, see Augustine (1947); König (1991); Brunner (1939); Hick 
(2007); Shuster (2004); Gunton (2002); Van Ruler (1989); McGrath (2001) and Sakuba (2004). 
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as arrogance, rebellion and egoism. Despite the fact that pride may also be deemed a virtuous 
quality, it is only “good” to the extent that it supports a sense of self and community and 
“bad” or “deadly” insofar as it relies on subtle or overt alienation (LaMothe 2005:239). 
a) Developments in the Christian tradition 
The biblical witnesses are quite consistent in maintaining that the sin of pride is the most 
basic form of sin. The apostle Paul‟s account of human self-glorification – changing the glory 
of the incorruptible God into a figure made like unto corruptible human
26
 – in actual fact 
represents an excellent summary of the entire biblical doctrine of sin (Niebuhr 1996:186). 
The notion of sin as pride was significantly developed by St. Augustine. Identifying the very 
core of sin, he poses the question: “What could begin this evil will but pride, which is the 
beginning of all sin?” Augustine goes further to define pride as a “perverse desire of height” 
as a result of the soul forsaking God – the very one to whom it is solely supposed to cling – 
and making the self the source of life. In addition to abandoning God to whom it ought to 
cling as its end, the soul unduly exalts itself and thereby becomes an end in itself (Niebuhr 
1996:186-187). In the view of Augustine, pride is therefore the core of perverted desire – the 
perverted will which replaces God with the self and makes the latter the centre and principle 
of everything. This pride or love of self, which attempts to set the self in the place of God or 
wanting to be as God, ultimately implies hatred of God, and thus inevitably fails in this 
attempt (Pannenberg 1994:243). Augustine believes that pride causes the self to be 
absolutised at God‟s expense (in Hodgson and King 1985:199).  
Having laid the foundation for ascribing the deepest nature of sin to pride, the ideas of Paul 
and Augustine extensively influenced the thinking of their successors, for instance Thomas 
Aquinas. In the view of Aquinas, “disordered desire” stems from a more basic sin – the fact 
that someone loves the self inordinately – what he refers to as self-love. Although he 
maintains that greed is the essence of all sin, he argues that the purpose of acquiring material 
riches “is the attainment of distinction and importance” (Aquinas 1991:268). From this 
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  “For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking 
became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools 
and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal man and birds and 
animals and reptiles. Therefore God gave them over in sinful desires of their hearts to sexual impurity for the 
degrading of their bodies with one another. They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and 
served and created things rather than the Creator ...” (Romans 1:21-25). 
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viewpoint, pride (self-importance) is the point of departure for all sin. In Blaise Pascal‟s 
definition of pride, the “I” is perceived to be hateful. For him, this “I” has two fundamental 
characteristics: “It is essentially unjust in that it makes the self the centre of everything and it 
troublesome to others in that it seeks to make them subservient”. In both cases, Pascal argues, 
“I” is the “enemy and would be the tyrant of all others” (quoted in Niebuhr 1996:187). 
The Augustinian idea of pride was significantly expanded by the Protestant Reformers. 
Martin Luther applies the terms “pride” and “self-love” synonymously. In his opinion, the 
turning of the soul to the creature, and away from God, is an expression of the general lust of 
the soul. Furthermore, Luther regards self-righteousness – the unwillingness of a sinner to 
admit their sins – as the ultimate form of pride (Niebuhr 1996:187, 200). John Calvin, who 
affirms the Pauline definition of sin in Romans 1, holds that those who are prideful arrogate 
themselves more than is right and as a result, wilfully darken and infatuate themselves with 
pride, vanity and perverseness. Calvin believes that pride is a folly rooted not only in vain 
curiosity, but also in the excessive drive to surpass the limits of human knowledge (Niebuhr 
1996:187). 
The notion of sin as pride constitutes a significant element of modern hamartologies. Emil 
Brunner (1952: 92-93), for instance, maintains that the root of all sin is rebellion and pride. 
Wanting to be as God, the person attempts to become on par with his Creator and thereby 
become independent of Him. This desire for autonomy and enmity against God is an act of 
spiritual defiance – “the denial of God and self-deification; it is getting rid of the Lord, and 
the proclamation of self-sovereignty”. According to Wolfhart Pannenberg (1994:248), sin is 
the product of one of two possibilities. On the one hand, it may be because of our desperate 
striving for self-fulfilment based on our finiteness, rather than accepting our finite lives as a 
God-given blessing. On the other hand, sin may be the consequence of our pursuit to surpass 
our finiteness in our attempts to become like God, instead of acknowledging our finite 
creaturely nature. Larry L. Rasmussen (1996:275), making reference to the views of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, describes pride as follows: “To sin is to overstep and overshoot finitude, deny its 
potentialities and its limits and reject creatureliness.”  
At this point we now turn to a somewhat more comprehensive discussion on the sin of pride, 
explicated in the hamartologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth.  
b) Reinhold Niebuhr: “Three forms of pride” 
Reinhold Niebuhr (1996:186-188) notes that Christian theology has been fairly consistent in 
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maintaining the Augustinian definition of pride. In his own exposition, which draws from 
political, sociological and psychological knowledge, Niebuhr argues that the sin of pride has 
many faces, yet it manifests most clearly in three specific forms, that is the pride of power, 
the pride of knowledge and the pride of virtue. The latter – the pride of self-righteousness – 
however, gives birth to a fourth type, namely spiritual pride. Although not a form of pride in 
itself, it may well be described as pride in its deepest and all-encompassing form. 
Niebuhr (1996:188-190) believes that anxiety is the precondition of sin, which then springs 
from the self‟s attempts to secure and enhance its safety and well-being. The pride of power 
finds expression in two (provisionally) distinct forms. The one type of pride hinges on the 
possession of human freedom and self-mastery. Hereby the ego assumes itself to be self-
sufficient and its own master, and believes itself to be secure against all vicissitudes. Failing 
to recognise the finite and dependent character of its life, it deems itself the author of its own 
existence, the judge of its own values, as well as the master of its own destiny. This particular 
form of the pride of power is mostly characteristic of individuals and groups who possess or 
seems to possess an extraordinary degree of social power and security.
27
 
Closely related to the first kind of pride of power is the lust for power with pride as its end. 
The ego is prompted by a threatening sense of insecurity to grasp for more power to make 
itself feel secure. It regards itself insignificant and not respected or feared, and consequently, 
pursues the enhancement of its own position, even at the expense of other life. This type of 
pride is particularly attributed to the less secure or the advancing individuals or groups in 
society in terms of social recognition, economic stability and even physical health. What 
arises is the temptation to defeat or conceal insecurity by arrogating a larger degree of power 
to the self. Every so often this lust for power is expressed in humanity‟s conquest of nature, 
whereby their legitimate freedom and dominion over nature is tainted into the mere 
exploitation of it. A person‟s dependence upon, and their gratitude for nature is destroyed by 
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  In Biblical prophesies of doom, this proud pretension of security is declared to be false, and those assuming 
it are warned against an impending doom. The prophet, Isaiah, warns Israel‟s rulers who are designated “the 
crown of pride” that their “glorious beauty is a fading flower”, and in the day of judgement The Lord will 
destroy their power (Isaiah 28:1-5). In Isaiah 47, which describes the pride of Babylon, this impending doom 
is defined as an exposure of Babylon‟s weakness and insecurity. Ezekiel, on the other hand, frequently 
accuses the nations of the world of foolishly overestimating their security, self-mastery and independence. In 
Ezekiel 30, for example, Egypt is accused of supposing itself to be the creator of the Nile River. In all these 
prophesies and throughout history, God is revealed as the one and only source and end of life, and those who 
overestimate their own power are thereby disillusioned (Niebuhr 1996:189-190).    
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the self‟s arrogant sense of independence and greedy attempts to overcome its insecurity by 
gathering from nature‟s resources beyond natural limits. Greed is thus a form of the will-to-
power. Because this insecurity flows from the vicissitudes of not only society and history, but 
also of nature, the ego seeks to overcome social, as well as natural insecurity and thereby 
expresses the impulse of “power over men”, as well as “power over matter”. The will-to-
power is responsible for accentuating the very insecurity that it seeks to eliminate, as the 
threat of a competing human will is overcome by inferiorating that will to the ego and by 
utilizing the power of many subordinated wills to protects itself against the enmity created by 
such inferioration. In simple terms, the will to power implicates the ego in injustice, as it 
seeks security beyond the limits of its human finiteness. Furthermore, it is a direct form and 
indirect instrument of pride regarded as sin in its quintessential form (Niebuhr 1996:190-
192).  
This distinction between the two categories of the pride of power can only be regarded as 
strictly provisional, as it is clear that the proudest and most secure person is compelled to 
proclaim themselves beyond limits in part by a sense of insecurity, partly as a result of the 
fact that the greater their glory and power, the greater the incompatible fate of death becomes 
visible. In addition, what also escalates is the fear of losing their prominence, forfeiting their 
treasure, or being discovered in their pretention. The will-to-power in itself is therefore a 
manifestation of insecurity, even when it has achieved what an ordinary person would 
consider complete security. The more immediate insecurities are eliminated, the more 
apparent a person‟s finiteness, dependence and weakness becomes to them. “Thus man seeks 
to make himself God because he is betrayed by both his greatness and his weakness; and 
there is no level of greatness and power in which the lash of fear is not at least one strand in 
the whip of ambition” (Niebuhr 1996:192-194).   
With reference to intellectual pride, Niebuhr (1996:194-195) states this is a more spiritual 
sublimation of the pride of power. It is embedded in the unwillingness to recognise that all 
human knowledge is blemished with an “ideological” taint, that it is finite knowledge, 
acquired from a particular viewpoint, that it is not final and neither infallible. Similar to the 
pride of power, intellectual pride stems, on the one hand, from the ignorance of the finiteness 
of the human mind, and on the other hand, from attempts to obscure the known conditioned 
character, and the taint of self-interest in human knowledge. It thus fails to acknowledge that 
it is involved in a temporal process and instead regards itself in complete transcendence over 
history. Niebuhr (1996:195-198) further holds that the pride of knowledge is more than the 
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mere “ignorance of ignorance” because it always involves a conscious or subconscious effort 
to disguise a known or partly known taint of interest – that the truth is not final and that the 
ego is boosted with this truth. Particularly significant of this type of pride is the inability of 
the adherent to recognise the limitations of perspective in him/herself that they detect in 
others. This is an expression of the desperation of the adherent to veil the finiteness and 
determinacy of their position. The temptation of both human freedom, as well as human 
insecurity is thus apparent in this situation. Intellectual pride finds full expression in cases 
where the universalistic note in human knowledge becomes the groundwork for dominating 
others who does not conform to it, for example in the discrimination of majority racial groups 
against minority racial groups.     
All constituents of intellectual pride are involved in moral pride, which is revealed in a 
person‟s own self-righteous moral standards are final and absolute, condemning others for 
failing to live up to these standards. The self judges itself and others by its own standards – 
which are regarded God‟s standards – and consequently finds itself good and others evil in 
the event of their standards failing to conform to its own. Moral pride hence makes virtue as 
such the very vehicle of sin. The self-righteous person neither knows God as Judge nor needs 
God as Saviour. The sin of self-righteousness is therefore responsible for many of a person‟s 
cruelties, injustices and transgressions against other life (Niebuhr 1996:199-200). 
When moral pride has been conceived, it gives birth to spiritual pride, Niebuhr (1996:200-
203) argues. Religious sin, which is the ultimate sin, makes the self-deification implied in 
moral pride explicit by relating human partial standards and achievements to the 
unconditioned good, thereby claiming divine sanction. Religion is not perceived as religion in 
the usual sense – that is the virtuous human quest for God – but becomes the ultimate theatre 
of war between a person‟s self-esteem and God. As such, even the most devout practices may 
possibly become instruments of human pride. For this reason, the worst form of class 
domination, intolerance and self-assertion is found on a religious level, whereby a dominant 
priestly class subjects subordinate classes to social disabilities, and finally exclude them from 
sharing in any universe of meaning. Christianity is a religion of revelation which reveals a 
holy and loving God as the source and end of existence against whom a person‟s self-will is 
shattered and their pride abased. However, when the Christian, by means of possessing this 
revelation, regards him/herself more righteous and penitent than others, they just add to the 
sin of self-righteousness and thereby make religion the tool of their pride.  
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c) Karl Barth: “Human pride in the light of the humility of the Son of God” 
The hamartology of Karl Barth – in which the sin of pride takes central place – is revealed 
through his Christology. Barth (1961:413-415) maintains that only through the obedience of 
Jesus Christ, the son of God, can we truly have knowledge of sin. In his view, “the sin of man 
is the pride of man ... [Therefore,] [s]in in its unity and totality is always pride ... The sin of 
man is the human action which does not correspond to the divine action in Jesus Christ but 
contradicts it.” Barth (1961:414-418) believes that pride concretely takes on the form of 
disobedience and more precisely, unbelief – unbelief in the sense of rejecting God‟s grace, 
giving rise to disobedience which rests on our self-alienation from God‟s majesty. The being 
and activity of Christ reveals four distinct aspects: God became flesh, sacrificing Himself in 
His divine Lordship, being the divine Judge, yet bearing the judgement of our sin and in 
everything remaining our Helper and Redeemer. It is through these four standpoints that one 
discovers the human disorder, which is the complete opposite of divine grace. Thus, in each 
instance one is able to see how human pride, which is always concealed, contrasts and 
opposes God‟s humility. 
The first standpoint that Barth (1961:418-432) emphasises, is that through Christ the Word 
became flesh. Having to face the same challenges, temptations and ultimately death, God 
became human. He is the one and only true God who is by nature free and able to become 
flesh. In fact, this was the execution of His divine will – becoming human for the sake of 
humanity. It is precisely through this act of God‟s humility that our pride is exposed. The 
proud person, being a creature of God, wants to be God. Though we lack the freedom and 
power, we attempt to exalt ourselves as God, wanting to exceed our creaturely limits. This is 
a self-contradiction which results in destruction – while it may be natural for God to become 
human, for humans to become God could only have devastating effects. Our pride is 
concealed, however; the fact that we strive to be our own source of living and being does not 
appear to be an act of pride. Yet, although the concealment of pride is powerful, it cannot 
hide the three things which take place with the concealment: First and foremost is our 
erroneous self-alienation in which we believe that we can truly be human by exalting 
ourselves. Even if this occurs in the most pure, noblest, or even pious and philanthropic 
forms, we humans inevitably fail in this task and thereby become supremely non-human. 
Secondly, we cling to the absurd desire that we are our own source and standard. The aseity 
that we ascribe to ourselves can naturally only belong to God, and thereby we rob God of 
what essentially belongs to Him. Finally, what takes place with the concealment is the fact 
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we, in positioning ourselves as absolute, honour and worship a false god – the self. In 
choosing that which is not, we ignore God‟s grace, renounce our responsibility to Him and 
thereby portray God as the devil.  
Barth (1961:432-445) maintains that the second aspect of Christ‟s being and activity in which 
the sin of the unreconciled, alienated and prideful person is revealed is through the 
Christological fact that the Lord humbly and obediently – in his royal omnipotence – became 
a servant for the sake of humanity. Yet, in our pride we want to become lord. When we 
humans are at peace with God, He gives us the power to rule with Him. However, in our 
pride we forfeit this power by alienating ourselves from God – relying on ourselves. We seek 
to master and control the world, our fellow humans, our own destiny in vain, and even want 
to play a superior role in our relationship with God. Yet, the more we seek to control, the 
more we ourselves are controlled. In folly we despise being servants. Once again one should 
note that the concealment, which hides evil under the name of good, is powerful: Our 
legitimate use of power, knowledge, judgement and capacity that ensures our superiority may 
well appears to be the will of God. In reality, however, we find ourselves in a state of self-
alienation and self-destruction: In our folly we regard what is infinitely less as infinitely 
more; believing that we cover ourselves with glory we cover ourselves with shame; wanting 
to exalt ourselves we actually fall; in revolting being servants we become slaves. These are 
clear acts of rebellion, disorder and chaos. Our every standard is false; all our thoughts and 
words are self-contradictions; our every act and attitude are perverted. Finally, in His majesty 
we turn the Lord Himself into becoming a creature, a human being, a servant.  
God is the divine Judge, yet He executed the judgement in such a manner that he took to 
Himself the accusation rightfully laid against humanity, causing Himself to be judged in the 
process. This is the third aspect of the being and activity of Christ through which our human 
pride is revealed, Barth (1961:445-458) argues. The prideful person is the exact opposite of 
this – seeking to be their own judge. God, being the one true Judge, accuses, sentences, 
judges and accordingly, is also the One who freely gives Himself to be crucified. For us 
humans to play the judge – judging ourselves and others, distinguishing between good and 
evil, right and wrong – is thus a futile case. Pridefully and self-righteously moving against 
God, defending and maintaining our own right, we put ourselves in the wrong. One may 
notice once again how our human pride is concealed by what appears to be good. It may seem 
praiseworthy that we are able to judge and distinguish between good and evil in our everyday 
tasks. Yet, under this concealment hides the very essence of our pride: In the first instance, in 
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our desire for knowledge and the fact that we want to be judge, we totally misunderstand and 
over-estimate ourselves. Rejecting the idea of God as the absolute Judge, we renounce our 
obedience to God‟s will and in the process lose our freedom. Furthermore, in our pride we 
desire that which is objectively evil. Thinking that we are doing good – wanting to be judge – 
we want to stand alongside God, protecting the world of chaos and disorder, yet not aware 
that we ourselves are unleashing chaos and disorder in the process. When we falsely believe 
that we humans can take God‟s Word and explain and apply it ourselves, it can only bring 
wrath. Finally, this concealment is rooted in the fact that we, as proud humans, have a 
seriously erroneous understanding of God: Doubting His honour on which our very existence 
depends; thinking that His role as Judge can be seized; and doing evil instead of good by 
thinking that God is in need of our human assistance and counsel to execute His role as 
Judge.      
According to Barth (1961:458-478), the last aspect of Christ‟s being and activity that exposes 
humanity‟s pride is the fact that He, being the Son of God – God Himself – cried out for His 
Father‟s help on the cross: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”28 This cry most 
clearly shows how Jesus, out of the depths of complete helplessness, needed and would not 
let go of God‟s help. Out of humility for humanity, God, the great Helper and Redeemer, 
received Jesus into His hands. In contrast to this is the person who wants to be their own 
helper, and yet in this self-help thinks that they have a claim to God‟s help. In our pride we 
do not want to be helpless, because we believe that we know how to save ourselves. Although 
God gives us certain means and capacities as human beings, these are limited by our 
creaturely nature. Moving away from God into complete emptiness, we are deceived by the 
beautiful, noble and useful things through which we believe we will be able to help and save 
ourselves. Never being content, we long and grasp for things which in reality cannot help us, 
neither ensure our salvation. We believe that the idea of “progress” implies an extension of 
our knowledge, improvement of techniques, deepening our understanding and dissemination 
of instruction, or acquiring more goods – all these being futile. In the process, we still cling to 
God, or rather to some kind of “higher being”, or “religion”, which we believe will 
encourage, support and strengthen us in our quest to become our own helper, redeemer and 
saviour. Once more, the concealment of evil under good is clear, for is there anything evil in 
the fact that we take on an “if-I-don‟t-do-it-myself-then-who-will”-attitude? The concealment 
is sinful in itself, however, evident in three points that require consideration. First of all, we 
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 Mark 15:34. 
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misunderstand ourselves, thinking that we have the right and necessity to self-affirmation and 
an autonomous responsibility to God and others in fulfilment of our human task. We do not 
recognise that we are in need of God‟s grace, thereby losing our soul and our life by 
undertaking our own cause and saving ourselves. Furthermore, in committing to being our 
own helper, we place ourselves once again in the wrong and thereby bring ill and destruction 
to ourselves. The very things we flee from become our reality; our flight from helplessness 
before God brings us absolute helplessness, destruction and humiliation. Wanting to be our 
own best friend we become our own worst enemy. Without grace, we are left without help. 
All of this rests on the fact that in our pride we have a seriously flawed view of God. Deists 
see God as a supreme being, remote from the world, incapable of understanding and helping 
humans in their human needs. Idealists, on the other hand, perceive God as a divine power of 
life at work in all things, which needs to be feared because His over-ruling has no respect for 
human freedom and dignity. In either case, what is left for us but to resort to ourselves and be 
our own helper?  
Barth‟s view on sin as pride could therefore be summarised as follows: Christ is the only 
mirror in which one could perceive and gain a true knowledge of human sin. He is the 
humble, reconciling God who enables us to distinguish in ourselves the sin of pride. As 
prideful humans – in contrast to Christ‟s humble character – we attempt to be God, instead of 
human; lord, instead of servant; our own judge; and our own helper and redeemer. Without 
knowledge of God‟s grace our sin as pride is always concealed.    
2.2.2 Sin as greed (concupiscentia) 
Greed may be defined as a state of continual discontent, particularly with regard to material 
wealth. This dissatisfaction is motivated by an undue longing for acquiring and possessing in 
excess. In addition, human greed is a fearful response to life; fear of scarcity, or fear of 
insufficiency, fear of losing out, or fear of being deprived of something (Copenhaver 
2011:25). Greed also encompasses other related sins such as lust, selfishness and 
covetousness. 
a) Developments in the Christian tradition 
Although Christian theology is fairly consistent in regarding pride (self-love) as the most 
basic form of sin, it is primarily the Hellenistic and the rationalistic sides of the Christian 
tradition that are inclined to define sensuality (the love of pleasure/lust) as the primal sin and 
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tend to identify sexual license as the specific symbol representing this sin.
29
 For the great 
Hellenistic theologian, Origen, original sin is defined as an inclination “to ignominy and 
wantonness”. As such, he considers all sexual activity as innately wrong and as the 
groundwork for all other sins. In the view of Clement of Alexandria, original sin is a fall 
“under the power of pleasure, for by the serpent pleasure creeping on its belly is in a figure 
signified”. Gregory of Nyssa goes one step further by not only defining the basic sin as the 
love of pleasure, but also deriving it from “our being made like unto irrational creation”, 
although admitting that something is added to animal passion in human life, for the love of 
pleasure “was increased by the transgression of man becoming the parent of so many 
varieties of sins arising from pleasure as we can not find in animals” (quoted in Niebuhr 
1996:228-230). 
The Pauline understanding of sin as greed to a large extent oriented the Christian doctrine of 
sin. Paul‟s claim that the summing up of the Law in the one divine instruction, “Do not 
covet” in Romans 7:7 confirms the perverted nature of sin, being evil desire. Although it 
appears that hidden sin only becomes blatant sin in the desires that are contrary to the Law,
30
 
for Paul, desire (covetousness) itself is a manifest form of sin (Pannenberg 1994:239-240). 
Paul also sees covetousness as a disordered love for material wealth: “People who want to get 
rich fall into temptation ... and into many foolish and harmful desires ...”31  (Aquinas  
1991:268). In addition, in Romans 1:21-31
32
, Paul describes lust – more specifically 
unnatural lust – as a consequence and punishment for the more basic sin of pride (Niebuhr 
1996:230).   
Augustine, in line with Pauline thinking, also maintains that the various forms of sensual 
desire are “not only sins in themselves but punishment for sins” (quoted in Niebuhr 
1996:230-231), reaching its highest point in sexual desire (Durand 1978:145). In his analysis 
                                                 
29
  Brunner (1952:105) believes that the close association of concupiscence with sexual desire is a distortion of 
the idea of sin, as sin is essentially understood as the life of the senses, which is a radical departure from the 
Biblical view of sin as defiance and arrogance (pride).  
30
  “But sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, produced in me every kind of covetous 
desire” (Romans 7:8).  
31
  I Timothy 6:9. 
32
  “... Therefore God gave them over in the sinful desires of their hearts to sexual impurity ... They... 
worshipped and served created things rather than the Creator...Because of this, God gave them over to 
shameful lusts ...” 
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of pride, Augustine particularly focuses on the term “immoderate desire”, the emphasis being 
on immoderate. Thus, he specifically states that those who desire what is good are not 
chargeable. According to Augustine, immoderate cupidity is an expression of the corrupt 
will, which in prioritising, sets worldly (lesser) goods above God (the supreme good), and 
even uses God to attain these worldly goods. The ultimate goal of desiring becomes apparent 
in the fact that those who desire seek everything that they desire for their own benefit 
(Pannenberg 1994:242-243).   
The Pauline-Augustinian interpretation significantly influenced later Christian thought. 
Aquinas holds that “to implement sin we start from what provides the opportunity to fulfil 
sinful desires, and that is riches” (quoted in Aquinas 1991:268). Although he regards greed 
(avarice) as the root of all sin in the sense that it promotes all of them, he insists that it is a 
consequence of self-love: “Every sin arises from disordered desire for some temporal good 
and that arises from disordered love of self” (Aquinas 1991:260). Aquinas therefore states 
that “avarice is commonly, but not always, at the root of all evils” (Aquinas 1991:268).   
This Thomistic idea was also taken up by the Protestant Reformers. Likewise, Luther argued 
that sin is primarily lust (concupiscence/cupidity), although not in the sense of natural 
physical desires or impulses. For Luther, lust is the consequence of human pride, resulting in 
the corruption of the heart and will with evil desire. While Luther uses “lust” as the inclusive 
term for sin, he pursues the general tradition by referring to lust in the narrower sense of 
sinful pleasure, as a consequence of self-love, of turning away from God, of pride (Niebuhr 
1996:232).  
The idea of sin as greed also appealed to many Enlightenment and modern thinkers. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, for example, believes that a person‟s disposition toward God is impeded by 
their bodily nature‟s involvement with the material world. As such, Schleiermacher refers to 
sin as “all arrestments of the disposition to the God-consciousness” which are always a result 
of “the independence of the sensuous functions” whereby “the spirit is obstructed in its action 
by the flesh” (quoted in Hick 2007:222). The idea of greed as a consequence of pride is 
encapsulated in a number of modern views. Gordon Kaufman (1968:369), for instance, also 
maintains that the movement into idolatry, whereby a person turns away from God to some 
finite reality, subsequently leads to enslavement by a “merciless master”; insatiable desire. 
Kaufman holds that all forms of self-indulgence, whether “drives for food or sex ... the lust 
for money and property ... [or] the desire for power and prestige”, reveals the fact that “[t]he 
more one seeks meaning through satisfaction of [desires] ... the more he becomes enslaved to 
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gluttony and lust”. He adds: 
Seeking gratification in the finite object only increases the craving, thus plunging 
one deeper in enslavement to the passion. Moreover, such meaning as he 
originally found ... begins to grow flat and cloy upon him as he becomes satiated 
but still unsatisfied. But this only makes him more desperate in the search for 
meaning and salvation, and so he plunges yet more blindly into deeper bondage. 
Other modern writers who particular discuss the sin of greed are Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul 
Tillich, whose interpretations are discussed in the following section.  
b) Reinhold Niebuhr: “The relation of sensuality to self-love” 
In the view of Reinhold Niebuhr (1996:228), the sin of sensuality – although it is more 
noticeable and discernible than the basic sin of self-love – is a secondary form and 
consequence of man‟s rebellion against God, i.e. pride. This is pretty much in line with the 
Pauline-Augustinian tradition of thinking. Niebuhr holds that the sin of sensuality is “the 
destruction of harmony within the self, by the self‟s undue identification with and devotion to 
particular impulses and desires within itself”, which includes various forms of physical 
desires, including extravagance, gluttony, drunkenness, abandonment, and sexual desire. In 
his analysis of sensuality, he uses the latter at length to illustrate his arguments. Niebuhr 
(1996:228-233) believes that although Paul, Augustine and their followers identify sensuality 
as a derivative of self-love, they fail to elucidate the relationship between these two forms of 
sin. Their explanations do not prove to be satisfactory for Niebuhr, as he believes that they 
are too vague, partially contradictory and they do not provide an adequate account of how 
self-love results in sensuality. The following question leads Niebuhr (1996:233) to discover 
the essence of the sin of sensuality, and thus inevitably its relation to pride: “Is sensuality ... a 
form of idolatry which makes the self god; or is it an alternative idolatry in which the self, 
conscious of the inadequacy of its self-worship, seeks escape by finding some other god?” 
Niebuhr (1996:233-234) concludes that the sin of sensuality comprises a little of both, and 
employs an analysis of various forms of sensuality to justify his argument.  
Luxurious and extravagant living is a form of self-love on the one hand, as occasionally its 
goal is to display power and enhance prestige. Sometimes it might also be a consequence of 
the freedom secured by power. Yet, more often than not it is a desperate attempt to escape 
from the self. Recognising its inadequacy as the centre of its existence, the self seeks to find 
another god in a person or process over which it presumably has control (Niebuhr 1996:234).  
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Likewise, drunkenness may on the one hand be an attempt to enhance the ego, but it may also 
be an attempt to escape from it on the other hand. In the first instance the purpose is to 
overcome the ego‟s sense of inferiority and insecurity, which is rooted in anxiety. In the latter 
instance the desire for intoxication is a product of guilt, or a state of bafflement in which guilt 
has been compounded by the previous sense of insecurity. Drunkenness is thereby an attempt 
to completely escape consciousness as the bafflement becomes too much to bear. The logic of 
sin is thus vividly revealed: The self is tempted by anxiety to sin; sin however intensifies the 
very insecurity it was supposed to alleviate to the point where an escape from the whole 
tension of life is sought (Niebuhr 1996:234-235).  
Niebuhr (1996:235-239) further holds that in the Christian tradition, sexual passion is a 
particular striking form of sensuality. It is a powerful impulse that has been vigorously 
expressed throughout history. As such, an exploration of it could excellently portray the 
essence of the sin of sensuality. Like every other physical desire, sexual impulse is subject to 
and compounded with the freedom of the human spirit. Therefore, its dynamism stretches to 
the highest peaks of human spirituality, while humanity‟s insecurity in the heights of its 
freedom grasps down at the sex impulse, using it as a means of compensation as well as an 
opportunity to escape. Based on “pure nature” sexual impulse is a natural basis of “alter-
egoism”. Being a natural method, which insures the preservation of the human species, the 
natural instinct of sexual passion is also otherwise used to assert the ego and to escape from 
the ego into another. Consequently, the self‟s domination over another‟s desires, and the 
abnegation of the self in favour of another are in perplexed tension, which is further 
intensified with the creative discovery of the self in the process of giving it to the other. It is 
because of this that the climax of sexual union is also a climax of creativity and sinfulness, 
the latter not as a result of sex being sinful as such, but because of the presupposition of sin: 
When the original harmony is disturbed by the ego‟s self-love, sexual instincts can be 
effectively used for both the proclamation of the self and also the escape from the self. Sexual 
passion thus becomes both an instrument of the basic sin of pride, as well as an expression of 
an uneasy conscious which attempts to flee from the self through the deification of another. 
This conviction thus confirms the accuracy of the apparently ambiguous Pauline-Augustinian 
interpretation of relationship between sensuality and self-love, and it encloses both a further 
extension of self-love, as well as an attempt to escape from it, an attempt that leads to the 
futile worshipping of the creature instead of the Creator. To complete the analysis of 
sensuality, however, it is worth mentioning that sexual passion is subject to the development 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
of a further degree of sensuality. Sexual passion serves the exact purpose as drunkenness – it 
becomes an anodyne – by the very power it develops in the spiritual confusion of human sin. 
The ego, vainly worshipping the self and the other, uses sexual passion – without any 
reference to the self and the other – as an escape-mechanism to flee from the tension of life, a 
flight to nothingness. The sexual passion that makes this escape possible is therefore both a 
primary consequence of sin and a secondary consequence of an uneasy conscience because of 
sin. This conclusion therefore confirms Augustine‟s conception of sensuality as a further sin, 
which is also a punishment for the primary sin of pride. Humans, in their fallen nature, sin in 
their sex life, not because sex is essentially sinful, but through having lost the true centre of 
their life in God they fall into sensuality, of which sexual passion is most obvious and vivid. 
Therefore, sex reveals sensuality as, firstly, another and final form of self-love, secondly, an 
attempt to escape self-love through the deification of another, and finally, as a flight from 
both forms of idolatry by plunging into unconsciousness.   
Niebuhr (1996:239-240) believes that sexual passion thus clearly illustrates the problem of 
sensuality in general, whether love of luxury, an excessive devotion to a mutable good, 
gluttony or drunkenness: “sensuality is always: (1) an extension of self-love to the point 
where it defeats its own ends; (2) an effort to escape the prison house of self by finding a god 
in a process of person outside the self; and (3) finally an effort to escape from the confusion 
which sin has created into some form of subconscious existence”.  
c) Paul Tillich: “Estrangement as concupiscence”  
Paul Tillich (1957b:29-55), who bases his arguments on a philosophical-anthropological 
analysis of sin, describes the fall as the transition from essence (perfection) to existence 
(estrangement). Tillich believes that the state of estrangement – the situation in which human 
beings are estranged from God, themselves and other beings – contains both a tragic element 
(in the sense of universal destiny) and a moral element (in the sense of personal guilt). In this 
context concupiscence adjoins unbelief and hubris
33
 as a third distinctive quality of the nature 
of sin (estrangement
34
). Unbelief, whereby a person in the totality of their being remove 
                                                 
33
  Tillich (1957b:50) maintains that the Greek term hubris cannot be adequately translated. In his opinion, 
hubris implies the self-elevation of humans – in their greatness – into the divine sphere. Their greatness lies 
in their being infinite, a temptation of hubris into which they universally fall through destiny and freedom. 
As such, for Tillich hubris should not be translated as “pride”. He therefore prefers to retain the term‟s 
original linguistic rendition.  
34
  Tillich (1957b:44-47) chooses the term “estrangement” over “sin” to describe humanity‟s existential 
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themselves from God, leads to hubris, whereby they make themselves the centre of their 
being. The question therefore arises: Why are we humans tempted to remove ourselves from 
the divine centre and position ourselves as our own centre? 
In offering an answer to this question, Tillich (1957b:52) presents his account of 
estrangement as concupiscence. He contends that this is the temptation of us humans in our 
place between finitude and infinity, whereby we are lured into locating ourselves in the 
position of drawing our whole world into ourselves. Given that we are in a state of 
estrangement, we are separated from the whole and therefore desire reunion with the whole. 
Our “poverty” urges us to pursue the possibility of reaching unlimited abundance – the 
unrestrained desire to draw the whole of reality into ourselves. This is referred to 
concupiscence, which encompasses all physical hungers, whether for food, sex, knowledge, 
power, material wealth, as well as for spiritual values.  
Tillich (1957b:52-53) proceeds to offer a few examples, drawn from existentialist literature, 
art, philosophy and psychology, which express the meaning of concupiscence. Kierkegaard, 
for instance, employs the figure of Emperor Nero for a psychology of concupiscence. 
Embodying the demonic implications of unlimited power, Nero is a representation of an 
individual who has succeeded in drawing the entire universe into himself by means of his use 
of power. The complete inner emptiness that Nero experiences leads to the determination to 
bring death to all he encounters, including himself. Tillich also makes reference to 
Kierkegaard‟s interpretation of Mozart‟s Don Juan, creating the additional figure of the 
seducer, Johannes. Kierkegaard emphasises the emptiness and the despair implicit in 
unlimited sexual striving, which hinders a creative union of love in sexual activity. Hereby 
the self-defying character of concupiscence is also revealed. In a third example, Tillich refers 
to the figure of Goethe‟s Faust, who is filled with a drive for unlimited knowledge directed 
toward the subordination of both power and sex. Through the desire to “know everything”, 
Faust cognitively draws the universe into himself and his finite particularity. These examples 
clearly illustrate that knowledge, sex and power are not expressions of concupiscence in 
themselves. Rather, it is the unlimited character of these strivings that renders them 
symptoms of concupiscence.  
                                                                                                                                                        
situation. He believes that “sin” expresses what is not implied by “estrangement”, that is, the personal act of 
turning away from that to which one belongs, i.e. the moral element. “Sin” thus particularly emphasises the 
personal character of estrangement – personal freedom and guilt – over against the tragic character of 
estrangement – universal destiny. See 2.3 (b) for a more detailed discussion of “existential estrangement”.  
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Tillich (1957b:53) goes further to analyse the nature of concupiscence, making reference to 
two conceptual descriptions renowned for their noteworthy contribution toward the Christian 
understanding of this predicament, namely Freud‟s “libido” and Nietzsche‟s “will to power”. 
According to Tillich both, however, interprets humanity solely in terms of existential 
concupiscence and neglect reference to essential concupiscence. Instead of also focusing on a 
human being‟s essential eros, which is associated with a definite object, it only highlights the 
human existential desire, which is associated with an infinite object. Analysing these 
descriptions, Tillich reveals the fundamental distinction between these two contrasting 
elements. 
In making reference to Freud‟s account of concupiscence, Tillich (1957b:53-54) states that 
libido is here described as a person‟s unlimited desire to release their biological (particularly 
sexual) tensions and gain pleasure in doing so. In addition, Freud shows that even the highest 
spiritual experiences and activities contain libidinous elements. In describing the 
consequences of concupiscence, Freud explains how the libido is caught in a state of 
continuous unsatisfied striving. This is especially expressed in what he refers to as the “death 
instinct”, the desire to escape the pain of the unsatisfied libido. Concupiscence therefore 
implies that the person is in a state of continual discontent with their creativity. Tillich 
argues, however, that Freud‟s description of the libido is insufficient for a theological 
analysis of concupiscence, as it only describes the human being‟s existential predicament and 
not their essential nature. Tillich thus maintains that the endlessness typical of the libido is a 
sign of our estrangement, which contradicts our essential (created) goodness. In the latter 
sense, libido is not concupiscence; it is not the infinite human desire to draw the universe into 
the self, but rather an element of love, in harmony with the other qualities of love – eros (sex 
out of love) philia (fondness) and agape (wholly selfless and spiritual love). Love does not 
exclude desire, but receives libido into itself, thus implying that the libido united with love is 
not infinite. Like all love, it is directed toward a definite subject, with whom it seeks to unite 
the bearer of love. On the other hand, concupiscence – the distorted libido – does not want 
the other being, but seeks its own pleasure through the other being. In this manner the 
distinction between libido as love and libido as concupiscence is illuminated.  
Similarly, Tillich (1957b:55) uses Nietzsche‟s “will to power” to illustrate concupiscence in 
terms of the contrast between infinite desire (existential) and definite desire (essential). 
Nietzsche describes the will to power as an unlimited, never-satisfied driving power, 
stimulating in a person the desire to come to rest through the self-negation of the will. In 
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Nietzsche‟s view, the will to power is unlimited and has demonic-destructive qualities, 
making it yet another symbol of concupiscence. On the other hand, when the will to power is 
judged according the norms and principles of a person‟s essential nature, embedded in the 
unconscious desire to affirm their own power of being, it becomes an ontological symbol of 
their natural self-affirmation. The will to power as an expression of love thus belongs to the 
sphere of created goodness, and is a powerful symbol of the dynamic self-realisation 
characterising life. 
The above two examples thus prove that neither libido nor the will to power represent 
concupiscence in themselves. They only become expressions of concupiscence and 
estrangement, however, when they are not rooted in love and thus have no definite object 
(Tillich 1957b:55). 
Important to note in Tillich‟s hamartology is the fact that although concupiscence is awarded 
third place in the distinctive qualities of sin (estrangement), it appears to be more 
fundamental than unbelief and hubris. One can conclude that as motif it precedes unbelief and 
hubris, thus paving the way for other sin.   
2.2.3 Sin as moral failure (hamartia) 
A third classic way in which the notion of sin has been understood in the Christian tradition is 
in terms of hamartia. This means to be “missing the mark”, like an archer‟s arrow would 
miss its target. This Greek word for sin is similar to adikia, which means “injustice” or 
“unrighteousness”, and anomia, which means “lawlessness” or being “without the law” 
(Peters 1994:7). In the Hebrew translation, hatta‟t, for example, suggesting “carelessness”, is 
the closest to hamartia as missing the mark. In contrast to hatta‟t, ʽawon implies wilful and 
thus “culpable failure to hit the mark”. The sinful act involving revolt against the norm itself, 
that is, the underlying authority, is expressed in the term peshaʽ, meaning “apostasy”35 
(Pannenberg 1994: 238-239). H. Wheeler Robinson (1911:42-43), on the other hand, is of the 
opinion that the term hamartia reveals nothing definite about sin; it is the failure to do some 
or other thing either in relation to God or to mankind. Moral failure also extends to include 
other related sins, for example, apostasy, a lack of holiness, inability to become all that one 
can be, and the denial of life‟s intrinsic meaning or purpose, thus taking responsibility for and 
attempting to shape one‟s own destiny.   
                                                 
35
  In an example to illustrate this sinful act, Pannenberg (1994:239) makes reference to Isaiah 1, which speaks 
about the state of apostasy that God‟s people find themselves in and their revolt against Him.  
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a) Developments in the Christian tradition  
The notion of sin as moral failure is relatively modern. Yet, this idea has also been 
incorporated into the work of historical writers.  The biblical view on moral failure is most 
clearly expressed by Apostle Paul, who argues that sin is everything that is not a result of 
faith, or of unity with God (Peters 1994:23-24). He uses the verb “hamartono” in Romans 
3:23, stating that, “... all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God ...” So also, the 
Apostle John states that, “Everyone who sins breaks the law; in fact, sin is lawlessness”36.  
This idea was taken up in the patristic age by Augustine, who believes that any word, deed or 
desire that stands in opposition to God‟s eternal law amounts to sin (Peters 1994:22). Sin is 
therefore a bad, voluntary act, either from exercising the will (willing, choosing), or 
commanded by will (external words or deeds). The will‟s standards are twofold; human 
reason‟s immediate standards and God‟s reason‟s ultimate standards. The badness inherent in 
sin arises as a result of falling short of either one of these categories of standards (Aquinas, 
Aquinas 1991:250-251). In addition, Augustine believes that the sin of moral failure is a 
betrayal of human transcendence. The person who does not open him/herself to God falls 
radically short of their own fundamental possibilities. The fact that their place is with God is 
no longer recognised. In addition, although he belongs to the reality that God has made 
possible, he refuses to be filled with it. Augustine thus insists that in essence by sinning – by 
turning away from God‟s purpose – the person loses their self (Brinkman 2003:129, 130).  
In the medieval period, the concept of moral failure was also furthered by Aquinas, stating 
that sin is a disorder that turns a person‟s life away from its ultimate goal in God, to whom he 
is united by charity. Such sin is fatal – irreparable by nature – and brings with it eternal 
condemnation (Aquinas 1991:252). 
The view of modern writer, Paul Tillich, who comprehensively interpreted and expounded 
the idea of sin as moral failure, will be discussed in the section that follows.   
b) Paul Tillich: “From essence to existence” 
As seen previously in his analysis of the nature of sin, it is apparent that the views of Paul 
Tillich are shaped within the framework of understanding the fall of man as the transition 
from the state of essence to the state of existence.
37
 Tillich (1957b:33) holds that “the state of 
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  I John 3:4.  
37
  See 2.2 (c). 
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essential being is not an actual stage of human development which can be known directly or 
indirectly. The essential nature of man is present in all stages of his development, although in 
existential distortion ... [It] has been projected into the past as a history before history, 
symbolized as a golden age or paradise. In psychological terms one can interpret this state as 
that of „dreaming innocence‟ ... It has potentiality, not actuality. It has no place, it is ou topos 
(utopia).” Tillich (1957b:44) argues that on the other hand, “The state of existence is the state 
of estrangement. Man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from 
himself.” It is within the context of this continuum that constructs his views on the nature of 
sin as moral failure: “Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He is 
estranged from his true being”; from that to which he essentially belongs (Tillich 
1957b:45).
38
 
Tillich (1957b:44-48) further holds that although “estrangement” is not a biblical term, it is 
implied in most biblical descriptions of humanity‟s existential predicament, for example in 
the expulsion from paradise, the hostile relation between man and nature, the deadly hostility 
between fellow brothers, the estrangement between fellow nations through language 
confusion and in the continuous turning of kings and people to false gods. In the New 
Testament, it is implied in the apostle Paul‟s reference to humans perverting the image of 
God into that of idols, his classical description of “man against himself” and in his vision of 
the hostility between fellow humans in their distorted desires. These examples evidently 
highlight the personal element of estrangement – our personal freedom and responsibility for 
our predicament. Turning to our finite selves as the centre of everything, in our sin we turn 
away from that to which we essentially belong, i.e. God, and thereby lose our essential unity 
with the ground of our being and our world. This loss of unity with the Creator is the 
innermost character of sin.  
We continue to exist outside the divine centre to which we essentially belong, failing to 
become what we were destined for. All expressions of existential estrangement – whether 
unbelief, hubris or concupiscence – are therefore contradictions of our essential being and our 
potency for goodness. In addition, they contradict our created structure of ourselves, our 
world and their interdependence. This self-contradiction inevitably leads to self-destruction 
as the elements of essential being move against each other, tending to annihilate each other 
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  Although Tillich (1957b) continually emphasises the inseparability of the moral and tragic elements of 
estrangement, for the purpose of this discussion, being the nature of sin, we are more specifically focusing 
on the moral aspect of estrangement, i.e. man‟s individual freedom and guilt.  
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and the whole to which they essentially belong. The basic mark of self-destruction is self-loss 
– the loss of our determining centre. The centred self is disintegrated by disrupting forces 
which cannot be brought into unity. Moving against each other, they split the self, and as the 
disruption continues, the more we are threatened. In extreme situations, we feel the complete 
unreality of our world, with nothing left apart from the awareness of our own empty self. 
Thus, attempting to make the finite self the centre of everything ultimately implies that little 
by little the self ceases to be the centre of anything, threatening both the self and its world. 
Losing ourselves and our world, we become a limited self, depending on a limited 
environment, resulting in ever-increasing devastation (Tillich 1957b:59-62). 
Tillich (1957b:62-66) further maintains that these destructive consequences include our 
interdependent loss of the polar elements of being. First to separate is our freedom and 
destiny. As our freedom is aroused, it separates itself from the destiny to which it belongs. 
With hubris and concupiscence in control, freedom ceases to relate itself to the objects of 
destiny and instead turns to other objects contingent upon the choosing subject, as we make 
ourselves the centre of the universe. The immediate results of this are restlessness, emptiness 
and meaninglessness. In the process we do not notice or intentionally disregard any signals 
coming from our destiny. Existentialism most accurately describes the dialectics of this 
situation. Following this is the existential disruption of our dynamics and form. In our 
essential nature, dynamics and form are in perfect unity. In the existential state, our dynamics 
are distorted into a formless drive for self-transcendence, however, and we are thereby driven 
in all directions, with no definite aim and content. In existential estrangement 
individualisation is also separated from participation. While in our essential nature we freely 
participate without any limits, in the existential state we are cut off from participation and are 
shut within ourselves. Concurrently, we find ourselves under the power of objects that seek to 
make us a mere object with no self.  
Being estranged from the ultimate power of essential being, we are determined by our natural 
fate. In the essential state death is seen as finitude, but in the existential state it is regarded as 
evil, and we are driven by anxiety having to face death. As estranged beings we are thus 
given over to our finite nature of having to die. Filled with guilt, we feel responsible for the 
loss of our potential eternity, despite its universal tragic actuality. In the essential state time 
and space, like causality and substance are valid structures of creation. In the estranged state, 
however, we experience time without the “eternal now” and space without the “eternal here”. 
Unwilling to accept this temporality, we attempt to prolong the time given to us, filling it 
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with many transitory things and imagining a continuation of our life and endlessness without 
eternity. Furthermore, in our longing for a final “home” we attempt in an absolute sense to 
make a definite place our own, but fail in this task as we remain mere “pilgrims” on the earth. 
Similarly, suffering and aloneness are also elements of finitude. In the essential state 
suffering is not removed, but rather transformed into blessedness (meaningful suffering). 
Likewise, aloneness reveals our complete centeredness and is thus an expression of 
“solitude”, the condition for communion with others. In the existential state, however, 
suffering is no longer considered blessedness, but rather becomes a structure of destruction. 
In the same way, aloneness is no longer considered as solitude, as we are removed from the 
dimensions of the ultimate power and is left in loneliness. Two more aspects which 
necessitates reflection is doubt and meaningless. In the essential nature we experience doubt 
as yet another facet of finitude, because we understand that truth is only in the whole and that 
no finite being possesses the whole. Conversely, in existential estrangement insecurity and 
doubt become absolute and drive us toward despair – rejecting any finite truth and despairing 
about the possibility of being at all. In the process, we attempt to construct an absolute 
security and absolute certainty out of finite security and finite certainty, and are thereby 
thrown into restlessness, emptiness, cynicism and meaninglessness (Tillich 1957:66-74).  
Most noteworthy in this regard, Tillich (1957b:74-75) argues, is the element of responsibility 
in the various forms of self-destruction, whether self-loss, world-loss, objectification, 
meaningless suffering, loneliness, emptiness, despair or meaningless. Just as these are con-
sidered consequences of sin (evil), they are also deemed the individual sinful acts of a person. 
Whether these structures of destruction are historically conditioned because of their universal, 
structural presence, one cannot disregard the fact that because of one‟s own sin and guilt we 
fail to become what we are essentially destined to be.   
c) Other contemporary views on sin as moral failure 
The idea of sin as moral failure became especially strong in the modern era. Various scholars 
included this concept in their hamartologies, although their ideas were diverse and often very 
different to the post-Enlightenment idea of moral failure. Brunner (1952:90-93), for example, 
concentrates on sin as apostasy, which he believes is a contradiction of the Word. In a 
person‟s “falling away from God”, they transgress the Law and defy what God has ordained. 
Similarly, Pannenberg (1994:239) holds that hamartia implies the “transgression of norms of 
conduct”. The human heart is always considered in relation to God‟s commands – whether 
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the heart is directed toward evil and thus breaking His commands, or whether the heart is in 
harmony with God and thus keeping His commands. Simply stated, this transgression of 
norms can only be identified by making reference to God‟s holy commands. Buswell 
(1977:104-105), who founds his argument on the idea of God‟s holy character as the 
foundation of the law, therefore perceives sin as anything in the human nature that is not an 
expression, or which is a contradiction, of God‟s holy character. Peters (1994:8) also believes 
that, in short, sin is a lack of holiness in the sense of failing to live up to the two fundamental 
commandments of Jesus to love God and to love one‟s neighbour. By not trusting in and 
depending on God‟s grace, humans wander from the faith and cause destruction to other 
forms of life through uncaringness, insensitivity, injustice and cruelty. Likewise, Marguerite 
Shuster (2004:102) believes that “sin is that which ought not to be before God, with reference 
to the order God has established”.39 As such, Durand (1978:155-156) describes sin as 
“lawlessness” in the light of God‟s holy Law; “lovelessness” in the light of His love; 
“unrighteousness” in the light of His righteousness; and “unfaithfulness” in the light of God‟s 
faithfulness. 
Regarding moral failure as “missing the mark”, Heyns (1978:175-176, 178) states that this 
refers to human sin in the sense of missing one‟s God-ordained goal. As created beings, 
humans receive their destiny from God. Moral failure thus implies that what ought to have 
been achieved one did not achieve, not because of external circumstances, but because of 
one‟s own choices and acts. Sin in this sense is therefore a mis-deed, and vice versa – 
misdeed is sin whereby human beings fail to reach their destiny. Sin therefore turns a person 
into a transgressor, meaning someone that does things that miscues. As such, sin leads a 
person to their downfall, in fact, sin is the person in downfall. As a result of their own doings, 
humans find themselves outside of God‟s ordained decree, missing their life‟s path set by 
Him. On account of their own guilt they encounter misfortune, because they have lost the 
path of life – over and over again – thereby ending in death. The sin of moral failure is thus 
humanity‟s deliberate act of destiny-annihilation. In this regard, Jay B. McDaniel (1989:143) 
suggests that God‟s divine mystery is not outside or above the universe; instead it is the core 
of life itself. Divine transcendence is experienced when responding to the wellspring of 
potentialities within oneself, which is God. Sin is rejecting these possibilities and missing the 
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  Hereby, Shuster (2004:102) makes reference to Psalm 51:4, which is an illustration of the sinner being 
accused of transgressing the First Commandment. Also in the cases of Leviticus 20:1-3 and II Samuel 12:13, 
the sin against humans is deemed to be sin against God, and thus a transgression of His commands.  
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mark of responding to God within oneself. In line with this thinking, Peters (1994:31-32) 
refers to the pervasive sense that things are not the way they are supposed to be:  
The world is not the way it ought to be. My family and professional lives are not 
the way they ought to be. Perhaps even my own soul, my psyche, my inner life 
are not the way they ought to be. Reality as we confront it from day to day misses 
the mark. It falls short. It is not all it can be, not all it should be. 
Peters (1994:32) further states that in order to rationalise this irreconcilable difference, we 
envisage pictures of perfection and stories of paradise, for example the story of the Fall. 
Feeling estranged from the state of perfection from which we have so far tumbled, we now 
wander in a wilderness created by ourselves, with the choice of two options: Accepting the 
reality and staying in the wilderness for the indefinite future, or refusing to accept the reality 
of wilderness by sinning more audaciously and transforming the wilderness into an even 
more fierce place than it already is  
Similar to Tillich, Kaufman (1968:371-374) argues that estrangement from God implies a 
lack of fulfilment in the various dimensions of existence, whether individually or socially. In 
terms of the former sense, the individual is unable to be honest with him/herself and others. 
Deceiving both themselves and others, they believes that their own finite values are what give 
meaning to life, and thereby attempt to rationalise their own actions and existence with the 
hope of proving them good, honest and true. The individual therefore continues to live in a 
state of self-contradiction. In terms of the latter sense, the community creates ideologies 
which they believe reflects the purpose of life. These include, for example, the elevation of 
the Germans as the “master race”, the subordination of people of colour by white people and 
the exploitation of “backward countries” by the developed countries. Here, the community 
also wants to rationalise its false beliefs and is thereby plunged into self-contradiction.  
2.3 Sin as a “hydra” 
Based on the previous section, it is clear that the Christian tradition encompasses different 
notions of the nature of sin.
40
 J. J. F. Durand (1978:152) states that the destructive and 
catastrophic character of sin is in each case illustrated from another perspective. Ascribing to 
one exact description is therefore an almost impossible task. One could therefore rightly 
                                                 
40
  Durand (1978: 152-155) argues that what scholars illustrate as the “being” or “essence” of sin is nothing 
more than (what they believe to be) the most prominent shape in which sin manifests itself. He concludes 
that sin is inexplicable and its deepest essence cannot be localised. See 2.4. 
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remark that sin has many faces, and can mutate from one form to another. As Mary Potter 
Engel (1990:163) remarks, sin is a kind of “hydra”, a “monster that grows two new heads for 
every one that is severed”.41 In the medieval period, the three classic notions of sin – pride, 
greed and moral failure – were developed by, among others, theologians and moralists, 
towards a wide range of over a dozen Christian models of sin, used for the purpose of 
educating and instructing Christians on fallen humanity‟s inclination to sin. The most popular 
one to date is the “Seven Deadly Sins”.  
2.3.1 The Seven Deadly Sins
42
 
Based on the works of earlier writers, the “Seven Deadly Sins” were particularly developed 
by Gregory the Great in the sixth century. Also known as the “Capital Vices” or “Cardinal 
Sins”, the list of Seven Deadly Sins, which is also apparent in the Scriptures,43 categorises 
seven evils, subdivided into three “spiritual” and four “corporal” or “bodily” sins. While all 
of these sins are evil and thus potential causes of damnation, the spiritual sins are considered 
more dangerous than the bodily sins. The Seven Deadly Sins includes pride, envy and wrath, 
which are spiritual sins, and sloth, greed, gluttony and lust, which are corporal sins. The use 
of the popular medieval mnemonic, “SALIGIA”, aided the ingrainedness of the Seven 
Deadly Sins in Catholic culture and consciousness throughout the world. “SALIGIA” is the 
acronym for the first letters of each of the deadly sins in Latin: superbia (pride), avaritia 
(greed), luxuria (lust), invidia (envy), gula (gluttony), ira (wrath) and acedia (sloth). These 
seven sins are labelled “capital vices” because of the fact that they propagate other vices, as 
Aquinas states: “Any vice from which other vices arise is called a leading (or capital) vice, 
especially if it acts as a goal for other vices and thus defines their viciousness in some way” 
(Aquinas 1991:268).   
                                                 
41
  In Greek mythology, Hydra, a nine-headed monster, was killed by Heracles. When one head was cut off, 
another grew instantly in its place. 
42
  See also Ware (1982), Boyle (1997), Okholm (2000), Greeley, Neuder & Durkin (1999) 
43
   Proverbs 6:16-19 states that: “There are six things the Lord hates, seven that are detestable to him: haughty 
eyes, a lying tongue, hands that shed innocent blood, a heart that devises wicked schemes, feet that are quick 
to rush into evil, a false witness who pours out lies and a man who stirs up dissension among brothers.” This 
biblical list differs substantially from the traditional list of Seven Deadly Sins, with only pride being 
discernible. However, in Galatians 5:19-21, the apostle Paul includes more of the traditional seven sins in his 
(longer than the customary) list: “sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft, 
jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies and the like”.  
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Pride – regarded as the most serious and the source of all the other deadly sins – is identified 
as a perverted, excessive love for the self. The person, puffed up with pride, seeks to be more 
important than others and also fails to acknowledge others‟ good works. Pride reaches its 
peak in the arrogant attempt to replace God‟s position with the self. The story of the fallen 
angel, Lucifer, who endeavoured to be like God and was consequently cast from heaven, is 
possibly the most renowned example of pride.  
In Aquinas‟ view, envy implies that a person resents the good qualities of another person 
because they lower the envier‟s self-esteem (Cumberlege 1955:135). Distinguished by an 
insatiable longing for something that they do not have, the envious person is usually filled 
with a desire to deprive another of the object that he/she wishes to possess. Envy is therefore 
directly related to the last commandment: “You shall not covet...anything that belongs to your 
neighbour” (Exodus 20:17). Envy is similar to greed, but whereas greed is predominantly 
concerned with material goods, envy may apply more generally. Also, the envious person, 
recognising their own lack, envies another for having what the envious person lacks, and 
wishes that person to be deprived of it.    
Otherwise known as rage, wrath is an inordinate, unrestrained feeling of hatred and anger. In 
its most overt form, wrath presents with violence, hatred and self-destructiveness that may 
instigate feuds or grudges that can continue unresolved for many years, as the wrath of a 
victim may persist long after the perpetrator has passed away.  Impatience, revenge and even 
vigilantism are but a few ways in which wrath is manifested. This is the only sin that is not 
necessarily associated with self-interest, although a person can obviously be wrathful for 
selfish reasons, such as jealousy, which is very closely related to envy.  
Sloth is generally defined as laziness, indifference or the failure to use one‟s talents. Being a 
less wilful failure, for example to love God, sloth is often perceived as more a sin of omission 
than commission, and is thus regarded as being less serious than other sins. De Young 
(2009:84), however, after extensively studying the seven evils, believes that although the sin 
of sloth has been trivialised in modern culture, “busyness, workaholism, diversion, and 
frenetic activities can all be symptoms of sloth, just as much as laziness or inactivity can be”.  
Greed, also known as avarice or covetousness, is the desire to possess more than what is 
actually needed. This especially holds true with regard to material goods, social status and 
power. Similar to lust and gluttony, greed is a sin of excess. The term “avarice” more 
specifically encompasses other examples of greedy behaviour, for instance treachery, and 
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betrayal, primarily for personal benefit, for example in the form of bribery. Actions induced 
by greed may include theft, robbery and the scavenging and hoarding of materials by means 
of the misuse of authority, violence and fraud.  
Gluttony is generally regarded as the over-indulgence or over-consumption of anything to the 
point of waste. Christianity considers it a sin because of the excessive desire for food causes 
it to be withheld from those who are genuinely in need of it where food is relatively scarce. 
Aquinas notably expanded the view of gluttony, to the extent of preparing a list of six ways in 
which this sin can be committed, including eating too much; eating too soon; eating too 
daintily; eating too eagerly; eating too wildly; or eating too expensively.  
Excessive thoughts or desires of a sexual nature are considered to be lust. Feelings of lust, 
which are not necessarily associated with love or affection, are embraced for the energy and 
excitement that they ignite. Consequently, it more than often leads to the lustful person acting 
on such desires and thereby dishonouring his/her body because of a lack of self-control.  
Throughout the years, the Seven Deadly Sins were continually subject to expanded views 
based on various perspectives. For example, Peter Binsfeld‟s classification of demons in 1589 
matched each of the deadly sins with a demon, whom he believed tempted humans by means 
of the related sin. The classification was done as follows: Lucifer/Satan was paired with 
pride; Leviathan with envy; Amon/Behemoth with wrath; Belphegor with sloth; Mammon 
with greed; Beelzebub with gluttony; and Asmodeus with lust (Bloomfield 1952:214-215). 
Another example is the psychiatrist Karl Menninger‟s book, Whatever Became of Sin? 
(1973), in which he argues that the traditional model of the deadly sins are incomplete. In his 
opinion, modern ethicists would add dishonesty and cruelty as deadly vices, as these are 
considered more serious than some of the customary deadly sins, for example gluttony. 
The model of Seven Virtues, which is also subdivided, includes faith, hope and charity 
(caritas), classified as spiritual or theological virtues, and prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance, which are deemed to be cardinal or pagan virtues. Any person, regardless of 
religion, could possess the pagan virtues; however, in medieval belief only a Christian 
possesses faith in God, hope for an afterlife, and caritas – the type of charity that enables one 
to do good deeds solely out of love for God. The medieval church, carrying forth the 
numerological mysticism of seven, compiled a list of seven good works in its catechism as 
cures to the seven deadly sins, which includes sheltering strangers, feeding the hungry, giving 
drink to those thirsting, clothing the naked, visiting the sick, ministering to the imprisoned 
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and burying the dead. The following list of corresponding sins and virtues is recognised in the 
modern Catholic catechism: Humility overcomes pride; kindness overcomes envy; patience 
overcomes wrath; diligence overcomes sloth; charity overcomes greed; temperance 
overcomes gluttony; and chastity overcomes lust.
44
  
2.3.2 Ted Peters: “Seven steps down the path to radical evil” 
Ted Peters (1994), in attempting to construct an integrated yet differentiated understanding of 
the nature of sin, describe what he refers to as “seven steps down the path to radical evil”, and 
thereby exemplifies the conception that sin is multi-faceted. By situating the phenomenon of 
Satanism within the broader context of a theological and psychological understanding of sin 
and evil, and thus within the larger perspective of human experience, Peters successfully 
“parses” sin into its various constitutive elements and in doing so illustrates the notion of sin 
in a form of progression – from the least to the most profane. Believing in “various levels” of 
evil, Peters presents how these are experienced in our daily experiences.
45
     
The first step is anxiety. Though not sinful in itself, it opens the door for sin. Anxiety has its 
roots in the fear of loss, principally the fear of losing oneself to death. Confronting frustration 
– particularly humiliation that impairs one‟s sense of being and renders one helpless – kindles 
the flames of anxiety. In the attempt to combat anxiety, an illusion of immortality is created 
out of two elements, namely lying to oneself and pilfering the strengths of others. This results 
in the raging urge to pre-emptively strike out in aggression, and steal other‟s power, glory or 
money (Peters 1994:11-12).  
When a person becomes engulfed by anxiety, he falls into the temptation to strike out in 
violence if he lacks faith or trust – in his neighbour or in God – living in unfaith. Mistrust and 
fear become the determinants of behaviour. This may begin with petty sins like complaining 
or gossiping, but if unrestrained, sin will manifest in more forceful ways, for example in an 
institutionalised means of harassment, or in an illegal means like embezzlement and even 
murder (Peters 1994:12).  
                                                 
44
  Note how these lists are constructed differently based on the time and context.  
45
  While some might challenge the idea that some forms of sin are worse than others – based on the idea that 
all human sin is equal because all human sin is infinite – Peters (1994:11) maintains that “[a]t the mundane 
level there are degrees in the kind and amount of evil that is produced”, wittingly stating that “I would much 
prefer my neighbor to sin by gossiping behind my back than to sin by murdering me on my way home from 
the office.”  
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As soon as unfaith takes control, leaving one to trust neither God nor neighbour, it gives way 
to pride. The ego attempts to make itself the source of life and a person tries to treat 
themselves as if they were God. In the process, anxiety is hidden under a veil of self-control 
and by exerting power over others, resulting in a lack of empathy, insensitivity and a lack of 
expressing remorse. Pride hinders one from sharing in the pain and strife of other persons and 
creatures, instilling the mentality that the world consists only of winners and losers and that 
one always has to be a winner. The antithesis of pride is prejudice and discrimination against 
“outsiders” (Peters 1994:12-13).  
When pride entices one to steal from “outsiders”, it has produced concupiscence, which 
includes sensuality, desire, lust, envy, greed and coveting. Having a hunger to possess, 
especially what others have, starts an inextinguishable fire of continuous wanting. This 
hunger to possess more and more presents the motive for stealing, although more frequently 
the impulse to buy. In order to guard against anxiety, the concupiscent soul constructs a safe 
haven out of material possessions. Being devoured, it becomes possessed by possessions. 
Individually, this is manifested in seeking profit from the losses of others or stealing their 
livelihood. Corporately, it finds expression in the composition and maintenance of socially 
unjust economic systems. This unbridled consumption may well be equated to sexual lust, 
whereby the bodily desires of passion and excitement entirely overpower a person‟s mind and 
will. Yet, in the process the consumer is “extinguished”, rendering the belief that material 
possessions ensure immortality but an illusion (Peters 1994:13-14).  
Pride and concupiscence together lead to desiring what only God possess – divine goodness – 
and applying it to oneself. Self-justification thus arises, in which attempts are made to make 
oneself righteous by relating to what is good, even if it implies lying or scapegoating. The 
most common form is gossip and the most dramatic form is ideology that leads to genocide. 
Self-justification is the denial of one‟s own sinfulness, generally accompanied by attributing 
badness to one‟s alleged enemies and correspondingly attributing goodness to oneself. What 
is good is used to justify one‟s own perpetration of evil. In self-justification, any possibility 
of external goodness and forgiveness – from other people or from God – is rejected. Also 
rejecting grace, self-justification is a direct expression of unfaith (Peters 1994:14-15).   
One of the fruits of self-justification is cruelty. This involves the conscious, self-righteous 
infliction of suffering and pain on others, which may arise from the illusion that one can erase 
the anxiety of one‟s own extinction by torturing and destroying others. Physical or emotional 
pain is inflicted on another person or creature in order to generate anguish or fear, their 
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suffering being the evil effect of the sin of cruelty. The torturing of others is considered a 
desirable and tolerable policy, believing that one can gain immortality by stealing life from 
others. The joy brought about through this torturing or even murdering is as irrational as it is 
sinful (Peters 1994:15-16).  
The most deadly sin on the list of evils is blasphemy. Traditionally understood as using God‟s 
name in a profane manner, blasphemy in this sense more specifically implies the misuse of 
divine symbols to prevent the communication of God‟s grace. In its concealed form, where it 
hides under the name of something good, it is a means for self-justification concerning the 
use of religious symbols to enhance human positions of power. Examples are appealing to the 
divine royal rights of kings to justify exploitation of peasants, or using Scripture to justify 
slavery. The symbols of God‟s salvation become symbols of injustice. Consequently, God 
becomes identified with evil. In its unconcealed form, blasphemy is the conscious use of 
divine symbols in the worship of radical evil which finds expression in Satanism – evil in the 
name of evil. God is replaced by the devil. God‟s symbols of grace are utilised in reverse: 
baptism is relinquished in loyalty to Satan; the Lord‟s Supper becomes a human sacrifice to 
Satan, instead of Christ‟s sacrifice on our part; love for one‟s neighbour and enemies 
becomes self-love and revenge. Selfishness, intemperance as well as concupiscence in all 
their expressions entirely take control. The relationship between death and life becomes 
distorted to the extent that killing is confused with living. God‟s symbols of forgiveness and 
resurrection become objects of violence and destruction, and are used to inflict physical 
suffering and spiritual death. Blasphemy is thus God‟s ultimate enemy (Peters 1994:16-17). 
It is important to note that what Peters (1994:17) is attempting to illustrate through the “seven 
steps” is a logical pattern of linking the various aspects of the nature of sin and not 
necessarily a chronological order. The “seven steps” do not imply that evil is simply 
progressive or that entering the one means leaving the others behind. Nearly every step is 
present throughout the entire process.  
2.4. Sin as deprivation of the good (privatio boni) 
While some are satisfied by the idea that sin may manifest itself in various forms, others still 
feel the need to come to terms with the essence of sin. The question therefore arises: Can sin 
be reduced to one common denominator? Williams (1985:215), for example, maintains that 
the seven deadly sins are just different manifestations of one fundamental structure of human 
evil. Yet, another long line of thinking holds that sin is not something, but rather the 
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deprivation of something, more specifically expressed by the notion of a broken relationship. 
As such, sin has no ontological status and can only be described in negative terms.  
After meticulously exploring the nature of sin, originally as pride and subsequently as desire, 
Augustine eventually resorted to a negative or privative view of sin – the negation or 
deprivation of the good (privatio boni). For Augustine, sin is not a substance, and as such it 
has no ontological status. Accordingly, there exists no ontological basis for, or explanation of 
sin. It may be described (yet not explained), however, as a deliberate defection of humanity 
from the natural order of creation (Williams 1985:198). Augustine‟s notion of sin as 
deprivation of the good was a product of his challenge against Manichaeism, which 
fundamentally claims an ontological dualism of good and evil, and therefore substantialises 
evil (Brinkman 2003:129). Resorting to a negative (privative) view of sin, Augustine makes 
the following statement in his Confessions: 
That evil, whose origin I was seeking, is not a substance; because if it were a 
substance, it would be good. For either it would be an incorruptible substance, 
which could not be corrupted unless it were good. And so I saw, and saw clearly, 
that all that Thou hast made is good; and there are no substances at all which 
Thou didst not make (quoted in Robinson 1911:175). 
Pelagius, on the other hand, maintained that sin is not a force that naturally belongs to human 
existence, but rather an “extra” force. As such, it can only reign quasi natural as an intruder 
or an unwelcome guest in the lives of humans (Brinkman 2003:119).  
The Reformers, especially Luther and Calvin, argued that sin was much more than a mere 
defect or deprivation of the good. In fact, sin is a depravity or corruption of the whole human 
race. To this idea they applied the term “total depravity”, implying the sinful permeation of 
every single aspect of human existence (Williams 1985:204). 
The notion of sin as deprivation of the good has also been furthered in modern writings. In 
many instances it is described as a broken relationship with God. Brunner (1952:92-93), for 
example, emphasises this “break in communion with God, due to distrust and defiance” 
whereby “the whole man shakes off all the bonds which tie him to God”. Berkouwer (1971: 
63-65) agrees that the Christian tradition has made constant affirmation that sin is not a 
“substance” or a “part” of creaturely reality. Many theologians therefore describe sin through 
the negative concept of a deprivation of the good. God‟s creates a perfect world with 
harmonious relationships. Sin, such as unbelief, disobedience, rebellion and lovelessness 
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negate these good relationships. Likewise, Tillich (1957b:46-47) states that sin is the 
condition in which humanity finds itself estranged from God. Because the vital humanity-
God relationship is broken, this vital break also results in other breaks, for example 
estrangement from fellow humans and even internal estrangement (from oneself). Durand 
(1978:153-155) argues along the same line, and states that sin – whether against God or 
against one‟s neighbour – can only be known from the perspective of a broken relationship 
with God. In the view of Adrio König (1985:102-111) sin, with its irrational, inexplicable and 
chaotic character, is the negation of good, loving relationships – with God, fellow humans 
and nature – thereby leading to alienation, meaningless and judgment. Also in line with this 
thinking, Daniel L. Migliore (2004:150-151) states that “sin can be described as the denial of 
our relatedness to God ... sin is [therefore] the disruption of our relationship with God”. Birch 
(1991:93) sums up this idea, stating that sin has harmed humanity‟s relationship with God, 
other humans and the rest of God‟s creation. Sin is therefore the prime factor destructing the 
innate harmony of God‟s creation.  
Others, such as Barth (1958:102) labels sin as the “ontological impossibility”. He states that 
sin is:  
... chaos, the world fashioned otherwise than according to the divine purpose, and 
[is] therefore formless and intrinsically impossible ... and ... can have reality only 
as ... a frontier of that which is and will be according to God‟s decision and 
action. 
 
This “impossibility” does not imply that sin is not a reality, but indicates that sin can only 
exist in relation to the good. In addition, Barth (1960:349-355) refers to sin as “Nothingness” 
that exists alongside God and in opposition to His will, continually leaving its devastating 
effects. In the view of Heyns (1978:174-175), sin does not have its own independent 
existence, implying that it is not a substance and thus not a natural part of creaturely reality. 
Sin “is” not, or at least not like creation “is”, yet again sin is not nothing. Therefore, the “is” 
of sin is not the “is” of creation, but it is also not the “is” of nothing. Instead, sin is a form of 
“reality” that came into being after the good creaturely reality, and which also feeds on the 
good creaturely reality for its continued existence. As such, sin is a parasite – not having its 
own life root, but consuming the good to ensure its own survival. One could thus argue that 
sin as a parasite is a devouring and destructive force indicating an active devastation and 
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elimination of the good. Arnold A. Van Ruler also believes that sin is not a natural part of 
creation but secondary and accidental – it is a disturbance, a faulty direction of the will. Sin is 
therefore guilt, and guilt is the mystery of human existence
46
 (stated in Van der Reest 
2012:39-41). Durand (1978:154) emphasises the mysterious character of sin, and maintains 
that the description of sin as a broken relationship with God does not explain sin, but rather 
highlight its inexplicability and the fact that its deepest nature cannot be localised. The 
theology of Herman Bavinck also maintains that sin is a nihil with no substantial being: 
We do not know from where it is or what it is. It is here and has no right to be. It 
exists and no one can possibly explain its origin. It has come into our world and is 
nevertheless the motive for all men‟s thinking and doing (Berkouwer 1971:64-
65). 
Likewise, Peters (1994:9-10) believes that sin is inexplicable because it is innately the denial 
of truth, and it is inherently irrational. Furthermore, it is “the absence of being, because it 
seeks to dissolve or destroy what is”. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the Christian understanding of sin is diverse and fragmented. This is proven in 
the various ways in it has been defined in this tradition. Although it was impossible to offer a 
comprehensive overview here, this chapter is plausible in the sense that it offers four different 
ways in which the nature of sin is understood in the Christian tradition.  
In recent debates, all these ways of thinking, whether classic or other, reverberate into the 
sphere of ecological theology. The views outlined in this chapter are therefore essential for 
reinterpreting and redefining sin in the light of our contemporary ecological crisis.  
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  See also Van Ruler (1989).  
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Chapter 3 
Christian hamartology in ecological discourse 
3.1 Introduction 
It was previously ascertained that if Christian theology hopes to address the ecological crisis 
at hand, it would require a thorough understanding of the doctrine of sin – especially the 
nature of sin – in order to examine the root of the problem.  This essential prerequisite was 
fulfilled in the foregoing chapter. In this chapter, such narratives on the nature of sin will be 
reinterpreted and re-defined in the light of ecological threats, here described as “ecological 
sin”, which include “human failings ... to relate to non-human creation in ways informed by 
justice and peace” (Horrell 2010:134), causing damage to the entire earth as an ecological 
system.  
Ecological sins may be classified into various categories, which in many cases overlap. For 
the purpose of this task, the notion of sin finds expression in the concepts of 
anthropocentrism, domination in the name of difference, consumerist greed and the alienation 
of human beings from the earth community. A comprehensive survey and classification of 
available literature on these ecological sins will thereby be offered in this chapter – each 
category highlighting among other things, its respective contributing factors, with special 
emphasis on the role of Christianity in rendering religious support,
47
 the corrupt principles on 
which these ecological sins are built, as well as a few practical alternatives. The chapter is 
wrapped up with some concluding remarks.  
                                                 
47   Christianity‟s contribution to promoting ecological destruction remains a contentious issue. A large number 
of scholars subscribe to the idea however, that the Christian tradition is, in one way or another, responsible 
for humanity‟s anti-ecological behaviour. Their views are discussed in what follows. On the question as to 
why I choose to discuss specifically the role of Christianity in the ecological crisis – apart from the Christian 
context of this study – I believe that the words of Rosemary Ruether (1994:10) are appropriate in this regard: 
“First, because this is my tradition and therefore it is the culture for which I must be accountable. Second, it 
is a culture that has shaped and continues to shape ... the rest of the world ... This does not mean that other 
cultures, such as diverse Asian cultures, are simply innocent and good. They also have classic patriarchal, 
hierarchal and militarist patterns.” 
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3.2 Re-describing sin in an ecological context 
3.2.1 Anthropocentrism 
a) The role of Christianity in rendering religious support 
Although the whole human race, people of every nation, culture and religion, must be held 
accountable for the ecological damage they have caused, the distinct role played by the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition should not be underrated (Conradie 2011:5). With reference to the 
doctrine of creation, humanity is placed at the pinnacle of the creative process. The book of 
Genesis gives dominion to human beings. In addition, the great biblical covenants, with the 
exception of the covenant after the flood in Genesis 9, where God inters into relationship with 
Noah and his family and also independently with nature, are between God and humanity. 
God‟s chosen people, not nature, made history. The rest of creation thereby only became the 
background against which the God-human drama plays off (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 
2003:18). The course of history proves this in prominent statements, like that of Kant in his 
Letters on Ethics: “Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end, 
and the end is man”, and John Paul II's 1995 papal encyclical, The Gospel of Life: 
“Everything in creation is ordered to man and everything is made subject to him ... [A]nimals 
and plants ... receive only the „faintest glimmer of life‟ compared with „the sublime dignity‟ 
of „the crown of creation‟ (us)” (quoted in Rasmussen 1999:18). 
It is therefore not surprising that many scholars would agree that Christianity has to a great 
extent contributed to an anthropocentric attitude; to the extent that White (1967:1205) affirms 
that it must be the most anthropocentric religion of all. Much emphasis is placed on 
humanity‟s well-being, while little attention is paid to rest of creation. In this regard 
McDaniel (1989:53) states that it is thus not uncommon to find Christian thinkers 
accentuating peace and justice without a focus on the integrity of the entire creation. 
Christian ethics has largely been practiced with a lack of consideration for the innate value of 
non-human creatures. In this instance one may look at how the Catholic Church (which 
constitutes a significant part of the Christian tradition) has addressed environmental concerns 
as an example. Hart (2004:2, 7-8) states that Catholic social teaching on ecology showed a 
significant shift in perceptions about nature since the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) up 
to the twenty-first century. At the onset of the Council‟s first consideration of environmental 
issues, terms like “environmental crisis” and “respect for the integrity of creation” were not 
part of their ecological consciousness. The Council proceeded from the then-prevailing 
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Christian attitude toward creation: Creation is a hierarchically structured pyramid with 
humanity at the top as its ruler in God‟s image, having dominion over the earth and being the 
ultimate beneficiary of the earth‟s resources, provided by the creator to serve humanity. 
Catholic environmental teaching at the time was accordingly built on the union of social 
concern and anthropocentrism. The Gaudiam et Spes (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in 
the Modern World) document expressed, among other things, then-current attitudes about 
humanity‟s relations with the rest of creation, as Hart (2004:8-9) cites:  
[H]umanity “can and should increasingly consolidate its control over creation” 
(GS §9); that “all things on earth should be related to man as their centre and 
crown” (GS §12); and that “man created in God‟s image, received a mandate to 
subject to himself the earth and all that it contains” (GS §34). In this anthropo-
centric view, “man” at the pinnacle of creation has the right to dominate – the 
right to “subject to himself” or to “subdue” (GS §12) – all other creatures. 
Subjection of creatures is limited; it does not allow subjection of humans; in fact, 
people should not neglect the welfare of members of the human community (GS 
§34). The right to “subdue,” then, is qualified: “man” has the mandate to subject 
the Earth and all in it, but also to use the mandate to build up the world, in part to 
care for other people. The focus remains anthropocentric, but it is an extended 
anthropocentrism: “man” should be concerned about the well-being of all humans 
(Hart 2004:8-9). 
Catholic teaching may have changed over the years from an anthropocentric, individualistic 
perspective to a biblically based biocentric and egalitarian outlook, as Hart (2004:2) affirms, 
but it leaves us with the question as to how many Christians were indoctrinated in the 
process, causing the earth irreparable damage. Bookless (2008:149) therefore correctly 
maintains that any worldview that elevates humanity above other the rest of creation and 
disregards the interdependence between human beings and creation is bound to lead to 
environmental disaster.  
b) Anthropocentrism as ecological sin 
Although humans have a unique role in creation, it does not imply that they should be 
anthropocentric. The human is “that being in whom the universe celebrates itself and its 
numinous origins in a special mode of conscious self-awareness” (Berry 1999:19). 
Furthermore, humans are an integral part of the created order and are not intended to be 
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elevated above the rest of creation. Any separation between humans and the rest of earth 
community is drawn for the purpose of greater clarity, rather than implying a radical 
disjuncture between the two. A separation that is taken too far may persuade human 
domination of nature, yet, if there is no separation whatsoever, humans merely become 
passive observers in the natural world (Deane-Drummond 2000:143). David Clough proposes 
a distinction between instrumental anthropocentrism and teleological anthropocentrism. The 
former, which is certainly evident in the Scriptures, holds that humanity has a central place in 
the process by which the entire creation is redeemed by God.
48
 The latter, however, holds that 
humanity has central prominence in the redeemed creation. This view is problematic and 
sinful, and should be rejected (stated in Horrell 2010:131). 
Nevertheless, in reality the division referred to above has been drawn fairly sharply, evident 
in humans‟ “superior” position in the “hierarchy” of creation, their “uniqueness” and “special 
value”, distinct from all other created beings (Hall 1986:53). This is because, as Conradie 
(2005b:100) suggests, it is relatively easy to move from affirmations of human uniqueness 
and dignity to believing that it implies a mandate of power over the entire creation. In this 
regard, humanity‟s uniqueness easily creates a platform to advocate positions of privilege. 
Cafaro (2004:144) holds that the same prideful attitude whereby humans wish to free them-
selves from the inherent limitations of their creatureliness, assert superiority and prioritise 
their own selfish interests high above that of others is perceived in humanity‟s treatment of 
nature. Humanity is regarded as the universe‟s superior entity, and everything is judged 
according to human perceptions, values, and experiences. Excessive value is attached and 
undue respect is paid to the human species, while the opposite holds true for the rest of 
creation (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:18). It is precisely this anthropocentric view that 
David Clough calls to be rejected (cited in Horrell 2010:131) that has caused great 
devastation to the earth. Delio (2008:78) states as follows: “At its deepest root, our ecological 
crises derive from our belief that humans are somehow above or fundamentally distinct from 
– indeed, absolutely superior to, the rest of creation.” It is true that without attentiveness to 
the needs of nature, the centrality of humans is accepted without question – it is simply 
deemed to be a fact, a fortunate privilege and honour (Welker 1999:60). Anthropocentrism 
holds that God‟s primary acts are evident in human history alone, and not in nature, which is 
merely the “theatre” in which the “real drama of God and God‟s people” plays off. Human 
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  Deane-Drummond (2008:18) also argues in favour of the redemption of both the human and nonhuman 
facets of creation.  
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history, however, “is the arena of revelation and response” (King & Woodyard 1999:13, 18-
19). Furthermore, anthropocentrism “places humanity at the pinnacle of creation, endowed 
with a divine blessing to dominate the earth” (Horrell 2010:61). Believing they are of “central 
and defining importance”, the human race becomes “the creator and arbiter of values and is 
free to interpret and manipulate nature as it pleases ... We [have no] ideas or values forced 
upon us by others. Making the rules is to be seen as the ultimate expression of human 
freedom” (McGrath 2002:54-55). Ruether (1994:5) challenges anthropocentric attitudes 
toward nature, stating that: “We are latecomers to the earth, a very recent product of its 
revolutionary life. Yet we, particularly in the West, have constructed our concept of ourselves 
as humans over against all that is nonhuman.” It is therefore undeniable that human beings 
see themselves as the supreme rulers of the universe, sustained by the idea of human-
centeredness (Horrell 2010:8, 13). Undue emphasis is placed on the survival, reproduction 
and well-being of humankind. Other species only hold value to the extent that they serve 
human interests. Such anthropocentric attitudes consequently leads to the devaluing of nature 
and thus, to exploitation (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:18). 
Berry (1988:202) maintains that humanity‟s anthropocentric attitude defies the integrity of 
creation. He observes:  
[This] radically anthropocentric society [has] broken the primary law of the 
universe, the law of the integrity of the universe, the law that every component 
member of the universe should be integral with every other member of the 
universe and that the primary form of reality and of value is the universe 
community itself in its various forms of expression. 
In the process, we humans place an exaggerated emphasis on ourselves, thereby depriving the 
rest of creation of its own intrinsic value (Haught 1993:41). Berry (1999:18) believes that 
anthropocentrism pervades human perceptions of material and spiritual realities. Everything 
is made relative 
 to humans as the absolute source of meaning and value, even if the spirit world is recognised 
beyond humans. An anthropocentric view of the world almost focuses exclusively on the 
instrumental value of nature instead of its intrinsic value (Haught 1993:41; King & 
Woodyard 1999:6). The nonhuman world only carries worth to the extent that it profits 
human needs and desires. Even in environmental analysis, nature is seen as “something to be 
analyzed” rather than “a category of analysis”. To illustrate, the investigation of rainforests is 
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anthropocentric if it is carried out to determine how they might benefit humans instead of 
investigating them because of their intrinsic worth. Whereas the latter approach looks at how 
nature itself is affected, the former examines how humans are affected by their use of nature 
(King & Woodyard 1999:6). Gebara (1999:28) also laments the fact that the interdependence 
of all life systems is not recognised. Instead, humans are exalted above the rest of creation. 
For example, after a war the number of dead people is usually counted – the destruction of 
the environment is forgotten. The animals that died, water that was poisoned, forests that 
were burned, flower fields that were trampled, starry skies obscured by poisonous clouds and 
the air that was made unbreathable go unremembered or is rarely mentioned. This 
anthropocentric attitude defies all creaturely limitations on the basis of human ingenuity and 
technology and disrespects the interdependent bonds between all creatures and their 
environments (Nash 1991:119; Primavesi 2009:11). Rasmussen (1999:19) believes that there 
may be a growing recognition of a globally interconnected world, but the very same species 
responsible for this social and technological cohesion is guilty of endangering the global 
metabolism sustained by both biotic and abiotic beings. 
Martin-Schramm and Stivers (2003:18) maintain that the central problem in anthropocentric 
attitudes toward the rest of creation is human sin. Furthermore, they argue that such attitudes 
are spiritually numbing because it is likely to reduce human interaction with nature and to 
diminish human appreciation of nature. Similarly, Hart (2004:16) affirms the connection 
between human sin and anthropocentrism. Speaking out against the anthropocentric 
statements made by Pope John Paul II, Hart remarkably asserts:  
The “humans benefit, creation benefits” idea is also an implied appeal to human 
self-interest: humans should safeguard creation not because it is God‟s or because 
it has an intrinsic value in itself, but because doing so will benefit humankind. 
Finally, it is an appeal to pride, that humans should benefit first, and that indivi-
duals seeing human well-being as the center of the natural world would be more 
responsible. 
 Larry Rasmussen (1999:18) therefore rightly states: “We consider ourselves the creators of a 
world that is our own. Moral autonomy soon becomes moral sovereignty, and the Sovereign 
Human Self dominates both in deep theory and everyday practice”. Hall (1986:56) adds that 
“pride ... incites us to attempt a status above our creaturely condition, that is our solidarity 
with all the other created beings; and sloth ... prompts us to slink from underneath our 
particular creaturely vocation, that is our responsibility for the other creatures”. A most 
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noteworthy point made by Haught (1993:42) in this regard concerns humanity‟s anthropo-
centric attitude as a product of alienation. Anthropocentrism, in his opinion, is a way of 
responding to a feeling of not truly belonging to the created cosmos. In addition, it is humans 
rebelling against the perceived forgiveness of their situation. The shamefulness caused by 
feeling “abandoned in a foreign world” is countered with unwarranted self-inflation and 
undue amplification of their own worth. Elevating themselves above the natural world – 
which they regard as holding them in captivity – human beings begin to see the rest of 
creation as their possession, being beneath them, undeserving of their care. As McGrath 
(2002:56) remarks, however, this attitude stems from a more profound trouble: “A deliberate 
and principled rejection of the authority of anything and anyone other than individual human 
reason”, which philosopher Jeffrey Stout dubs the „flight from authority‟ – “[a] revolt against 
God”. McGrath (2002:61-62) adds that when the notion of God is eliminated, humans can do 
as they please “and all things become possible ... The conquest of nature [can] proceed 
without any credible religious barriers being placed in its way”.49  
It is therefore no surprise that anthropocentrism has taken over every aspect of the human 
being, even its so-called “care” of nature. King and Woodyard (1999:7) explore the concept 
of sustainability – the belief that future generations should have access to the same resources, 
of the same quality, as the current generation. They argue, however, that this belief is human-
centered as the users that it is concerned with are humans. It only focuses on how its impact 
on nature affects humans, instead of how it affects nature as such: “It addresses only our 
                                                 
49
   McGrath (2002:62-64) discusses the „elimination‟ of God in detail. He believes that this idea was exploited 
to its full potential by Enlightenment schools of thought. The atheist German philosopher, Ludwig 
Feuerbach, for example, contended that „God‟ was only the product of “a sad and lonely mind”. This is 
because people feared death and longed for meaning in life. It is thus natural that they would „invent‟ the 
existence of God to console them. Feuerbach concluded that “God was the „objectification‟ or „projection‟ of 
human desires and longings on to some kind of imaginary heavenly screen”. Karl Marx, building on this 
argument, attempted to eradicate the notion of God altogether, holding that humanity‟s bogus belief in God 
originated from their “socioeconomic alienation” – the injustices and iniquities inflicted by systems of 
capitalism. If this human alienation were to be eliminated, presumably through a communist revolution, the 
factors that predispose humans to believe in God and, ultimately, faith in God would also be eliminated. 
Another approach is taken by the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. For Freud, God is merely a 
“coping mechanism”, used by people to acclimatise “themselves to the harshness of an essentially 
meaningless world”. McGrath notes that these intellectual assaults on the idea of God “point inescapably to 
the conclusion that, since humanity created God, humanity was God [.] Having dethroned God ... humanity 
... [is] in a position to ascend to the throne of nature ... No obstacles now remained to the mastery of nature”.   
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future in nature, not the future of nature itself”. In addition, it also evades the issue as to 
which humans are “most” important. “Who suffers the consequences of today‟s reduced 
resource use? How are the future benefits distributed? There is a real danger here of creating 
a royal „we‟, one human and elitist.” Such attitudes, argues Borrong (2005:74-75), evidently 
sees nature only in terms of the framework of human interests, especially material and 
economic concerns. Borrong makes reference to the views of such anthropocentric 
environmental ethicists and conservationists. John Passmore, for example, states that instead 
of environmental ethics, there should be a firm commitment to what is good for humankind. 
In his opinion, the degradation of the environment is felt by humans and not by nature itself. 
Correspondingly, Eugene Hargrove and Mark Sagoff believe that environmental ethics 
should be based on human interests, particularly aesthetic interests. Derived from humanity‟s 
perception and outlook, the aesthetical value, rather than the intrinsic value of nature serves 
of greater importance. Such viewpoints, Borrong argues, are adherents of shallow ecology, 
based on the following anthropocentric principles, among others, human images separated 
from that of nature; the rights of humans being prioritised over nature, without any emphasis 
on human responsibilities; the feelings of humans being classified the centre of their 
apprehensiveness; and natural resource policies and management designed to serve human 
interests. On the same topic, Rasmussen (1996:16-17) recalls the views of Vaclav Havel, who 
assumes the earth to be a community and attempts to comprehend humanity‟s present failures 
to live out that community:  
To put the matter as bluntly as Havel does: the world of “modern anthropo-
centrism” is deeply, even fatally, flawed. The notions and institutions that issue 
from its ethics and spirituality, and depend upon them, must be set aside. A moral 
universe limited to the human universe will not, under present circumstances, 
even understand life, much less serve it. 
It is indisputable that human anthropocentric attitudes have played a significant role in the 
demise of nature. Moreover, humans cause ecological devastation that not only harms their 
present historical moment, but also God‟s creative envisagement of the future (Hart 2004:82).  
c) A biblical example of anthropocentrism: The man from the land of Uz 
While humankind‟s anthropocentric ethic is (superficially) justified by the Scriptures, it only 
represents one side of the biblical view of nature. This is palpable in the story of Job, the man 
from the land of Uz. Scripture holds that there was “no one on earth like him; he [was] 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
blameless and upright, a man who fear[ed] God and shun[ned] evil” (Job 1:8). The 
prosperous and affluent Job “had seven sons and three daughters, and he owned seven 
thousand sheep, three thousand camels, five hundred yoke of oxen and five hundred donkeys, 
and had a large number of servants” (Job 1:2-3). In a wink of an eye Job loses all of these 
possessions, as well as his servants and children, and to crown it all he is struck with an 
unbearable disease. Job earnestly questions God as to his quandary, yet through it all this man 
does “not sin by charging God with wrongdoing” (Job 1:22). After God eventually answers 
him, however, Job‟s reply is: “I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:6). This 
statement is clearly a confession of guilt, which proves that Job was admitting to sin on his 
part. But which kind of sin exactly?  
A number of authors writing on the sublimity of creation in the story of Job,
50
 in one way or 
another affirm this man‟s ultimate sin – anthropocentrism. In support of this judgement, 
Wallace (1996:159-160) states that in Job‟s rightful cry for justice he expects a logical, 
justifiable explanation for his plight. Instead of providing Job with a straightforward answer, 
however, God‟s response is atypical – He situates Job within the diverse, full-of-life-forms 
setting of creation, starting with a counter-inquiry: “Who is this that darkens my counsel with 
words without knowledge? ... Where were you when I laid the earth‟s foundation?” (Job 38:2, 
4). Hayden (1996:78-81) makes a similar deduction. He affirms that Job is guilty of assuming 
that his horrendous situation is the centre of God‟s concern. After much lamenting with no 
consolation Job‟s words are: “I cry out to you, O God, but you do not answer; I stand up, but 
you merely look at me” (Job 30:20).  Job pauses, however, to listen to the voice of God in the 
storm, whose words encompass the co-dependent elements of creation: the winds, clouds, 
thunder, lightning, lions, antelopes, oxen, ostriches, horses, hawks, vultures, bulls and 
serpents. The voice accuses Job of not understanding and appreciating the complex 
functioning of the cosmos. God tells him to bow down and submit to the divine synergy of 
creation. Job does so in humility and obedience, surrenders to the power of the universe and 
is converted from an ego-centred to an eco-centred consciousness.  
The lesson that God teaches Job here is powerful. Job is prompted to recapitulate his own 
membership of the wider biotic community, and is thereby reminded of his place in the great 
creation: Like the rest of humankind in their mortality, he is not superior to other forms of life 
                                                 
50    See, for example, Habel (2004); Rolston (1992); McKibben (1994); Brown (1999:317-380) and Wirzba 
(2003:41-47).   
 
 
 
 
67 
 
and neither the measure of all things. Job‟s agony, like that of other human beings, is not 
God‟s only concern – the whole creation in all its diversity is! Other creatures‟ needs and 
suffering equally deserve their Creator‟s attention. Moreover, God brings to mind the fact 
that the heavens, the lands and the seas, the plants and the animals are the first of His works. 
Even the meek hippopotamus that is often killed for blood sport precedes humankind in the 
hierarchy of the animal creation, and considering strength and fitness for the wild, Job, like 
the rest of humanity, are lower than the gangly hippo. God reminds Job that he is but one of 
many earthlings, having the same creaturely essence as other forms of life (Wallace 
1996:160-161). Janson (1967:52-53) believes that the good creation is twisted by humanity‟s 
egocentric assumption that they are the centre of the universe and that everything in it only 
exists for their own purpose, and Job is no less guilty of this supposition. They are 
disgruntled with anything that is deemed to have no human advantage: “Useless” plants are 
termed “weeds” and are rooted out; “useless” animals are dubbed “beasts” and are killed only 
for their heads to be used as adornments or their skins as rugs. Owing to this, God lets 
creation‟s loveliest flowers bloom on the highest mountain peaks; he makes the most vibrant 
birds inhabit jungles and forests; God builds the most enchanting wonderlands in the depth of 
the oceans ... where no human eye discerns. In Chapter 39-40 God enlightens Job as to a 
number of animals that cannot be exploited for human benefit, and yet they also exist. In 
addition to these life-forms, there is also the matter of God‟s care for uninhabited landscapes, 
as McKibben (1989:76) asserts. Job does not understand why would someone cut “a channel 
for the torrents of the rain, and a path for the thunderstorms, to water a land where no man 
lives, a desert with no one in it, to satisfy a desolate wasteland and make it sprout with grass” 
(Job 38:25-27). Why would the Creator care for landscapes if they are of no use for 
humankind? Yet, as Celia Deane-Drummond (2008:27) states: “[T]he love of God for 
creation goes beyond simple usefulness for humankind”. He is adamant in proclaiming that 
humans are not the focal point of His creation; He is pleased and content with empty places, 
even though there are no people. Such an awareness of nature is “a radical departure from 
[humanity‟s] most ingrained notions”. Crenshaw (1992:70, 80-81) affirms this by stating that 
the Creator‟s voice, addressing Job, “shatter[s] ... every human illusion of occupying a special 
place in God‟s sight ... the anthropocentric presupposition of ancient sages. Human hubris 
bursts before this rapturous celebration of a universe in which [humans] play no role other 
than that of awestruck witness to grandeur and terror”.  The image of the wider earth 
community that God reveals before Job is thus a demolition of human pride. Similarly, 
Patrick (2001:110-111) states that God‟s first address (Job 38:1-40:2) “put[s] Job – and all of 
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humans – in their place”. In addition, it “envisages a created order independent of humans ... 
a world that has intrinsic worth apart from any human valuation”. God‟s second address (Job 
40:6-41:34) “warn[s] humans to recognize limits on their power to dominate and to control 
their destiny”. Hereby, “God disillusions the human will-to-power” (Patrick 2001:114-115). 
Wallace (1996:161) maintains that not only in the story of Job, but as early as in the first 
chapter of Genesis is the assignment of equal priority to all of creation apparent. Only after 
God formed everything else does he create mankind. Hereby, he refers to Paul Ricoeur‟s 
exegesis of the creation story.
51
 Ricoeur views the Genesis story as a polyphonal “creation 
song”, encompassing a rich variation of themes and nuances that contributes to its 
cosmological orientation, which is never displaced by its anthropological counterpoint. Such 
an interpretation of Genesis conflicts with the historical approach of the neo-orthodox biblical 
theology, which holds that the creation of humankind is the apex of the creation story. 
Wallace (1996:162) further argues that while the order of creation is rearranged in the second 
chapter of the creation account, the designation of humans as biological creatures remains 
steady with the first chapter. Humans are earthlings formed from the dust of the ground who, 
like other creaturely beings, only receive life through the invigoration of the Spirit:  
As with the inaugural creation hymn, the second creation narrative suspends 
humankind within a biological web of interconnected plants and animals – all of 
which is brought to life by the quickening breath of the Spirit. 
d) Conclusion: Alternatives to anthropocentrism 
Considering the previous exploration, Cafaro (2004:156) rightly maintains that anthropo-
centrism is not merely a faulty value system. It is a faulty way of understanding the world, a 
defect which “virtually demands reflection on human sinfulness” (Rasmussen 1999:19). 
Bookless (2008:17) believes that human beings need a change of worldview. He argues that 
people are not the only focus of God‟s creative and saving love. Instead, God cares about His 
whole creation. Therefore, humans urgently need to acknowledge the profound truth that the 
earth and all its creatures are not merely the stage on which the human-God relationship is 
acted out – they are characters in the story themselves! Alternatives, perhaps a shift towards a 
more theocentric or even biocentric approach, are required, in which humanity demonstrates 
profound respect and appreciation for nature as an equal partner in God‟s creation. McDaniel 
                                                 
51  In doing so, Wallace consults Paul Ricoer‟s exegesis of the creation narrative entitled, Sur I‟exégèse de 
Genèse 1,1-2,4a, (1971). 
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(1989:52) argues that while some prefer a post-anthropocentric ethic to be theocentric rather 
than biocentric (life-centred), he would prefer the latter term. He does so not to deny God‟s 
importance, but to highlight the fact that God is on the side of life and ultimately concerned 
with the well-being of life. He believes that being life-centred implies respect for both life 
and the environment. Furthermore, biocentrism is an antidote for human-centeredness, which 
sees humans as the measure of everything and falsely believes that humans alone are worthy 
of moral concern. Nash (1991:186-189) proposes a “bill of biotic rights” in which he 
articulates the rights of “wild” otherkind, and in effect, human responsibilities to respect 
them. He claims that they have the right to take part in the natural competition for existence; 
satisfy their basic needs and perform their individual and/or ecosystemic functions; have 
healthy and whole habitats; reproduce their own kind; freely fulfil their evolutionary potential 
without human-induced extinctions; be free from human cruelty, abuse and frivolous use; 
through human intervention, restore a semblance of the natural conditions disordered by 
humans; and have their fair share of goods necessary for their sustainability. As Conradie 
(2006:58) suggests, such an ethic emphasises humanity‟s creaturehood and specific place 
within God‟s household, rather than a further elevation of humankind.      
3.2.2 Domination in the name of differences of species 
a) The role of Christianity in rendering religious support 
A second way in which the notion of sin may be redefined in ecological terms is as 
domination in the name of differences of species. Over the years, Christianity has been on the 
forefront of religiously supporting the idea that the world has been primarily created for the 
benefit of human beings (Conradie 2011:5). Much of this dominating attitude originates from 
the concepts of “subdue”, “have dominion” and “image of God” expressed in Genesis 1:26-
28. These scriptures are misinterpreted or used wrongly to exalt humanity above the rest of 
creation. As a result, Christianity has played a huge part in tolerating and even promoting the 
misuse of creation, thereby laying the foundation on which aggressive exploitation and 
unsustainable living is built (Bookless 2008:149).  
The concept of dominion as referred to in the creation narrative has widely been interpreted 
as domination (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:21). Such a sense of dominion has, 
according to Nash (1991:79), “become isolated from the moderating and controlling 
influences of the whole corpus of Christian though, and served as a license with extreme 
prejudice. The practices under the rubric of dominion [are] alien to the biblical and most 
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traditional understandings of the concept. Instead of trusteeship and benevolence ... dominion 
became a rationale for exploitation. Whatever else this dynamic might illustrate, it shows 
clearly the ... distortion of religious values for social goals”. McHarg (1969:26) therefore 
rightfully believes that “if one seeks license for those who would increase radioactivity, 
create canals and harbours with atomic bombs, employ poisons without constraint, or give 
consent to the bulldozer mentality, there could be no better injunction than” the creation 
story‟s proclamation of human dominion and subjugation of nature.    
Wilkinson (1991:289-90) offers a list of examples of how the entire biblical and even church 
history has been interpreted as an extensive lesson in how human beings ought to use their 
ability to manipulate, dominate and rule over the earth. In a striking example, he refers to 
Genesis 3:17-19, the “curse on nature”. Wilkinson argues that this text has often been 
appealed to as a validation of the exploitative measures taken by humans toward the natural 
environment. It is usually read in a way suggesting that “thorns and thistles” – weeds or 
plants which “get in the way” – are not a part of the good creation, but a consequence of 
human sin. The very ruggedness of the earth, a burden to humans who try to move about, is 
seen as a result of the fall. In actual fact, however, there exist only a few plants that are not 
regarded as weeds. The same hold true for animals, hills and even valleys, in reality, most 
things in creation! Wilkinson asserts that the curse does not describe a quality of the earth 
itself, but human misuse of dominion. The ground is cursed because humans are set against it. 
Adamah, translated as ground, suggests that the curse pronounced on Adam actually describes 
a division within himself – his inability to be at harmony with the earth. “Cursed is the 
ground to you” would therefore be a more accurate reading of the Hebrew text.   
Cooper (1990:41) believes that the Christian tradition almost solely emphasises the well-
being of humanity, thereby creating the idea that the rest of creation has no other purpose but 
to serve humankind. Thereby, it is believed that the earth and everything in it simply exist for 
human enjoyment (Bookless 2008:149, 147). Because of the Christian thinking that humanity 
is nature‟s supreme master, people tend to think that they can do whatever they wish to other 
creatures and the earth‟s resources (Conradie 2011:6). Although there is very often a focus on 
the liberation of human beings from oppression by other human beings, there is no attention 
given to the liberation of nature‟s other beings from human exploitation. An example of this 
is some contemporary liberation theologies (McDaniel 1989:53; King & Woodyard 1999:11). 
“It is [therefore] not hard to find quotations from preachers saying that the world is there for 
us to use and enjoy as we like. Too often churches have remained silent when the forces of 
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destruction have been at work” (Boookless 2008:34).  
b) The impact of major world developments  
Over the years, the relationship of humanity with the rest of creation has changed in relation 
to the various stages of civilisation of the former. Toffler (1980) holds that these changes are 
based on the evolution of technical skills, which he believes comprises three distinct 
movements: The agricultural-, industrial- and technological age. On the other hand, Miller 
(1987:62-65) is of the opinion that the humanity-nature relationship developed according to 
people‟s economy and culture patterns during certain periods, economy implying rules in 
place to achieve the set goals. Rasmussen (1996) makes a similar deduction and thereby 
observes four world revolutions: Agricultural, industrial, informational and ecological
52
. 
Whichever basis is used, it is clear that these major world developments significantly 
influenced humankind‟s attitude towards the rest of creation. It is widely agreed that 
agriculture and science and technology mostly contributed to human domination, 
manipulation and exploitation of the earth, which will be discussed in the following section.
53
 
(i) Agricultural civilisations 
The development of agriculture might be considerably beneficial to human beings, yet it has 
detrimental effects on the rest of creation. Hunter-gatherer societies are somehow responsible 
for hunting a number of species to extinction, and at times their fires led to the degradation of 
landscapes, but on the whole they functioned less as degraders of the biosphere and more as 
an integral part of it (Cobb 1994:1). Their way of life was typified by stability instead of 
constant change in culture and technology (Leakey 1981:200). In addition, their ways 
encompassed a certain innocence that modernity lacks (McDaniel 1995:123), as they were 
living proof that at one time it was possible for humans too to function harmoniously in an 
ecosystem without deliberate manipulation. “But that is no longer an alternative for most of 
us” (Wilkinson 1991:25).  
Agriculture, a revolutionary human discovery, occurred approximately fifteen thousand years 
                                                 
52
  The ecological revolution is what we have now entered – becoming ecologically conscious and recognising 
that we need to prioritise the welfare of the whole earth community, not only that of humans. 
53
   Although industrialisation is production by machines by means of technology – and therefore also a 
contributing factor to the domination and exploitation of the earth – in my opinion, the principles of 
industrialisation are most profit-orientated and thus have enormous potential to arouse human greed. As 
such, it will be discussed as a determinant of consumerist greed.  
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ago. By 2000 B.C.E., all major crops and animals belonging to the present agricultural 
system had been domesticated (Ponting 1991:52). Cobb (1994:1) believes that this is where 
systematic degradation of creation began. Along with this development, humans started to 
expand their knowledge about the secrets of nature and increasingly tried to control and 
subjugate nature. McDaniel (1995:123) makes a very interesting remark in this regard. 
Because of its heightened ecological domination as distinguishing feature, he refers to the 
emergence of agriculture-based civilisations as a “Fall” – not a singular event, but something 
which occurred over many years, all over the world.
54
 As these civilisations emerged, human 
beings started to modify animal and plant species, breeding and cultivating them for human 
purposes; manage soil, land, water and mineral supplies; use animal energy in supplementing 
human energy: in simple terms, they “became lords of the planet ... gain[ing] increased 
dominion over other animals and [their] bioregions”. The relation between humanity and the 
rest of creation became a distorted relation. In utilising nature for their own welfare, humans 
altered the previous harmonious relationship into a subject-object relationship – humans 
being the subject and nature the object. They no longer acknowledged the importance of 
balance with nature, but rather looked down upon the latter as a “facility” and not as their 
equal (Borrong 2005:47).   
For thousands of years, humans have been living in tension with their supporting ecosystems. 
They have been able to manipulate the natural environment to an extent that no other animal 
has. In replacing natural systems with agricultural systems, humans have shown little concern 
for stability, longevity and sustainability. Well-functioning ecosystems were converted into 
dust bowls and cesspools (Wilkinson 1991:25, 27). Animals are now bred for attributes 
useful and convenient to human beings, yet contrary to intelligence and adaptability. Unlike 
wild animals, domesticated animals graze in ways that that are harmful to the landscape. 
Some of the world‟s greatest deserts are evidence of their ability – obviously under human 
control and support – to destroy the biosphere (Cobb 1994:1-2).  
McGrath (2002:80-81) maintains that humanity refuse to accept the divine limits relating to 
the natural environment as ordained by God, requiring to leave the land fallow as a period of 
sabbatical rest.
55
 Instead, through using aggressive agricultural practices, humankind has 
                                                 
54
  He bases this contention on arguments drawn from Wes Jackson (1987), John Cobb, Jr (1991) and J. Baird 
Callicott (1991). 
55
  In both Exodus 23:10-11 and Leviticus 25:1-7, the divine instruction to sow and reap for six years, and to let 
the land rest and lie fallow every seventh year is found.  
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continuously endeavoured to change and dominate nature through exploration and 
exploitation (Borrong 2005:47). Cobb (1994:2) and McDaniel (1995:124) highlight but a few 
of the destructive effects this had on the created order. The domestication of plants led to the 
loss of once-fertile lands; the breaking up of soil for planting resulted in erosion; where trees 
were cleared to make room for agriculture the soil often turned to rock; deforestation, which 
also caused river pollution, is evidence of just how heavy demands on forests were; farming, 
fields and settlements brought about displacement of animal habitats at alarming rates; and 
food stability generated a dramatic increase in human populations.  
McDaniel (1995:123) states that although agricultural civilisations ensure endless goods that 
humans rightly cherish, it also created many evils, including a loss of ecological innocence. 
He further holds that history books do not express the emergence of agricultural civilisations 
as a Fall, but instead refer to it as an advance of humankind, “celebrat[ing] the tremendous 
creativity involved in spinning and weaving, brick-making and mortaring, mining and 
smelting, law and religion, in urban life itself”. Modern human beings believe that they have 
transcended the hunters and gatherers, whom are now imagined as “primitives”. Wilkinson 
(1991:25) asserts that while human beings may once have been simply a part of the 
biosphere, and although they still depend on it, they are capable of modifying it drastically, to 
their own benefit. Cobb (1994:2) believes that in the past, most of these changes were gradual 
and largely unplanned; now they are rapid, in many cases under human control. In recent 
years, sustainable agriculture emerged as a means of combating deteriorating ecosystems. 
Yet, for the most part, agriculture continues to operate, to a large extent, on principles 
different from those of the rest of the biosphere, and as such, remains a non-sustainable 
practice (Wilkinson 1991:32).  
(ii) Science and technology 
There is no uncertainty as to the magnitude of benefits implicit in modern science and 
technology, developments which continue to shape all forms of existence. Snyder (1995:29-
35) raises the question of what the world will be like by 2030. In response, he offers a 
number of possibilities, including on science and technology – most of which have already 
materialised at present. This just about proves how powerful the development of science and 
technology had been over the last two decades. Snyder (1995:30) argues however: “Will 
these developments really advance our health, happiness, and sense of purpose, or the welfare 
of the Earth? Not necessarily ... But they gradually will change our perceptions of life and 
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meaning”. Indeed it has. Regardless of its immense advantages, science and technology have 
played a substantial role in the ecological crisis at hand. Yet, environmental damage is not the 
product of science and technology per se, but rather the result of human beings who have 
created and manipulated these innovations to exploit the earth and its resources (Borrong 
2005:17). Modern science is an extrapolation of medieval natural theology, and industrial 
science is a manifestation of the Christian notion of human mastery of nature (Conradie 
2011:5).   
McGrath (2002:78-79, 83-84 & 95) holds that the rise of technology is seen as a tool, 
allowing human beings to control and shape their environment, without respecting natural 
limits. In addition, the development of natural sciences creates an increasing understanding of 
nature, directly leading to new ways of ways of mastering and exploiting nature. As a result 
of this, many Enlightenment thinkers were captivated by the theme of the “limitless power” 
of the natural sciences. McGrath ponders whether science and technology enabled humanity 
to break free from their ordained place in nature and become like God, having the ability to 
change the face of the earth by imposing their own authority upon nature and redirecting it 
for human ends. On this issue, Conradie (2005b:88) comments that while other animals 
interact with the world as it is, human beings are constantly driven to adjust to create their 
world, using technology as a tool to accomplish this. Humans perceive nature as a “flawed 
starting point”, something in need of development and modification through technological 
innovation (McGrath 2002:76). It is therefore clear that the scientific and technological realm 
is permeated with human sinfulness. Snyder (1995:35) maintains that the fundamental 
principle of the technological society is: “Whatever is technically possible should be done”. 
Some of its slogans include, “You can‟t hold back science”, or “You can‟t stop progress”. 
Snyder further states that technology can build its own worldview. It gives birth to its own 
values – a “technological morality” – bringing human behaviour into harmony with the 
technological world in order to set up new values and virtues in terms of technology. Such a 
morality is dubious, however, because it is concerned with means, not with ends; with 
technological necessity, not personal relationships, in the least not with personal relationships 
with the earth. John Mustol (2012:6) states that: “We live almost all our lives within our 
constructed human environments of electronics, plastic, steel, glass and concrete, isolating 
ourselves from God‟s natural world. We have used our wealth and technology to exclude 
nature from our lives and from our consciousness and so have lost touch with it.” 
Having said all this, humans could not continue to dominate and exploit nature without a 
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cost. Over the years, nature started to illustrate its relentless power over humanity more and 
more. With reference to this, Duchrow and Liedke (1987:66) testify that for as long as human 
beings existed, nature has been both threatening and frightening. Santmire (1985:77) cites an 
interesting passage by the ninth-century writer, Sedilius Scotus, who paints this picture of an 
untamed nature: 
White squalls from the north, amazing to behold 
Scare us with sudden gusts and threats of cold. 
Earth itself shakes, fearing to be so blown, 
Old ocean mutters, and the hard rocks groan. 
The unruly north wind hollows the vast air, 
Its hoarse voice whines here, now bellows there, 
Stray milk white fleeces thicken into cloud, 
The faded earth puts on a snow shroud. 
Even to this very day, humans have reason to defend themselves against nature for the sake 
of maintaining human life. Human beings now endeavour to subdue and rule, not only 
because of their drive to possess, but also because they are worried and afraid of nature, and 
ultimately uncertain about their future. To overcome these limitations and to retain their 
ambition to rule, humanity persistently put into service “forces of disintegration into the body 
of creation” through science and technology (Limouris 1990:5). Moltmann (1988:91) makes 
the following statement in this regard: “The modern science provides the knowledge that 
enables us to subject nature. The basic value of modern society which has produced this 
science and technology is the will to power, progress in accumulating power and the safe 
guarding of power. Science and technology may therefore be justifiably seen as the deepest 
core of ecological oppression and exploitation”. In the process, we humans have become, as 
Heidegger (1969:3) affirms, unaware of the things that condition our sense of being and sense 
of self.  
Duchrow and Liedke (1987:65-67) conclude that the scientific and technological basis of 
modernity‟s lifestyle rests on the basic premise of violence against nature, driven by the 
desire for power over nature. Power – the ability to do what one wants to do – is the 
precondition for violence – the manifestation of power. In addition, violence is often only 
achieved by using force. They are confident that the founders of modern science and 
technology, for example René Descartes and Francis Bacon, were from the beginning 
reasonably aware of the power and violence involved in these developments. To illustrate this 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
argument, they refer to Francis Bacon‟s Novum organum (1620), in which he distinguishes 
three levels in the human pursuit of power and violence: The first level is the advance of 
power domestically; the second level is to extend prestige and power among other nations; 
and the highest level is power and dominion of the human race over the entire world of 
nature. Science and technology have therefore made human seizure of power over nature 
possible. Yet, through modern division of labour humans have distanced themselves from the 
idea of violence against nature:  
Who thinks of the violence of the abattoir when there is a schnitzel in his plate? 
Who can judge how much power pushing a button can release when in the clean 
white room of a power station? Who understands clearly that the pressure on a car 
accelerator is an example of violence against nature? (Duuchrow & Liedke 
1987:66). 
In recent times, as ecological consciousness started to increase, the adverse effects of science 
and technology on the environment have come under the spotlight, which humans now 
attempt to “combat” and “mitigate” through scientific management56. Martin-Schramm and 
Stivers (2003:19), however, argue that scientific management is but a veil for hierarchical 
attitudes – an ideology that disguises and validates domination. At worst, it sees nature in an 
anthropocentric way as a resource that may rightly be exploited by superior human beings, 
with devastating effects: Climate change, extinguished species, pollution, soil erosion, ozone 
depletion and deforestation. Being human products, science and technology seem to have 
become humanity‟s masters. Yet, it “did not just „happen‟. For many ... [it] represents the 
outcome of a purposeful and sustained human quest, fuelled by a self-centred ethic, for the 
means necessary to achieve the goal of the domination of nature” (McGrath 2002:54).    
c) Domination in the name of differences of species as ecological sin 
Human domination of the earth and its creatures is based on the misconception of humans as 
the “crown of creation” (Daneel 1998:262), the highest form of life. “The problem is that the 
integratedness of ... „higher‟ forms of life within the ecological ... systems from within which 
they emerged, is obscured” (Conradie 2005b:117). In the modern scientific worldview for 
example – as René Descartes puts it – humans render themselves the masters and possessors 
                                                 
56
   “Scientific management” is an attractive perspective critical to science and technology that encourages the 
use of natural resources whereby it is managed in way that also ensures its conservation for future 
generations (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:19).  
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of nature, while Francis Bacon asserts that science makes humanity‟s power and dominion 
over the universe possible (Northcott 1996:65). Ever since the birth of hunting and 
agriculture, humans have continually been on a mission to change the earth‟s natural systems, 
reshaping soil, water, air, plants and animals according to their preferences (Ruether 1994:5), 
as Deane-Drummond (2000:219) suggests, nature is seen “as a vast store of energy, a 
„Standing Reserve‟ to be tapped at our own convenience”.57 Humans are reluctant to serve, 
but use everything to be served (Borrong 2005:154). Wirzba (2003:136) believes that the 
turning away from or rejection of God, like when the gifts of creation are organised primarily 
to serve human ends, is a turning away from or rejection of life itself. According to 
Rasmussen (1996:276), humans “abuse power in hubris ... fail[ing] to be the kind of earth 
creatures [they] ought to be”. While the advantages for humanity‟s well-being, for example 
improved disease control, better nutrition and greater mobility, have been significant over the 
last few centuries, these human benefits legitimated manipulation as long as the supposed 
side-effects were ignored. Yet, in the present context the side-effects have become main-
effects. Stronger term such as “domination” and “exploitation” substituted more neutral 
words like “control” and “manipulation”, accentuating what was previously ignored (Martin-
Schramm & Stivers 2003:21). McGrath (2002:53) suggests that the Western culture is 
notorious for its pervasive tendency that “explicitly sees its mission as to „go forth and 
dominate nature!‟... [and a belief holding] that human liberation and fulfilment come about 
through the domination of the natural world”.   
Martin-Schramm and Stivers (2003:21) suggest that while anthropocentric, hierarchical and 
dualistic attitudes toward nature are primary sources of human domination of the earth and its 
resources, the desire to dominate also stems from uncertainties and anxieties about scarce 
resources and death. In the process, constructions of evil are falsely renamed in ways that 
reinforce dominating relations with and the negation of the earth, for example as “physical 
and social otherness” (Ruether 1994:116). Conradie (2005b:117) likewise states that: “Such 
domination becomes possible on the basis of the kind of relationships which develop between 
that which has been differentiated from one another”. Subsequently, “[e]cological devastation 
is the product of [such] domination and exploitation in the name of difference”. McGrath 
(2002:79-80, 82) also comments on such distorted relationships, which he believes develops 
between fellow humans, between humans and God and between humans and the rest of 
creation. In terms of the last-mentioned, humans develop a “longing for empowerment”, 
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    With reference to the view of Heidegger (1969). 
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which includes the desire to dominate nature.
58
 This longing, according to McGrath, is about 
human sin in the sense of refusing to accept divinely established limits, something not 
sanctioned by God. The repercussions of this human sinfulness are manifested in every aspect 
of human existence, including the vitally important relation to the rest of creation. 
“[H]umanity [longs] to break free from its ordained place in nature and become like God, 
able to change the face of nature ... Sin represent[s] a refusal on the part of humanity to 
accept that there [is] a natural order of things which [limit] their freedom.”59 Northcott 
(1996:50) notes a similar deduction, holding that the harmonious bond between humanity and 
nature is broken by natural resource demands not balanced by an awareness of the limitations 
of lands, rivers and climate, or respect for other species. As such, the consequent disunion of 
human social structures from the needs and limits of creation, as well as a loss of awareness 
of the relationality between humans and nature, are central features of modern abuses of 
nature, which may be connected to a more general demise of virtue in human-nature relations 
in modern urbanised societies.  
The notion that the world has been created primarily for human purposes thus legitimised the 
“remaking of nature”. Out of fear, humans endeavour to order, domesticate and redesign 
“wild and untamed nature” for their own benefit (Northcott 1996:47). Rasmussen (1996:101) 
notes that the primary law of nature is to accept its divinely ordained limits, something that 
humans have always transgressed. In modern times, however, the transgression and 
consequences have dramatically escalated as nature has been altered in dangerous and 
startling ways. Conradie (2005b:203) states that because human beings are created in God‟s 
image, they assume it is their calling to control the forces of nature, using and “developing” 
the earth‟s resources as they deem fit, evident in humanity‟s mastery and control of nature. 
Although humans have been able to control nature, for example through nuclear power, they 
                                                 
58
    At this instance, McGrath (2002:82-83) makes reference to the Faustian myth, which resonates with humans 
who long for power over nature. Legend holds that Faust yearned to dominate both his fellow human beings 
and nature. The question is, how did he gain access to the power that allowed this to happen? Faust finds that 
the only solution is to enter into a pact with the devil. He is thereby given the key to unlock the door to 
forbidden powers and knowledge never intended for humans to possess. Given the technological advances of 
the last century, McGrath states that there can be “found no shortage of individuals, corporations and 
governments who were more than willing to sign up to this Faustian pact”.  
59
   McGrath (2002:79) believes that the building of the Tower of Babel represents such an act of human 
defiance of God‟s authority and the longing to share God‟s power and privileges. “It is in the birth of this 
mind-set that the true roots of our ecological crisis lie.” 
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have been unable to control themselves.
60
 McGrath (2002:58) cites an excerpt from Winwood 
Reade‟s influential thesis, The Martyrdom of Man (1872), which emphasises the power that 
humankind can hold by ascertaining “nature‟s laws”:  
When we have ascertained, by means of science, the methods of Nature‟s 
operation, we shall be able to take her place to perform them ourselves ... men 
will master the forces of Nature; they will become themselves architects of 
systems, manufacturers of worlds. Man will then be perfect; he will then be a 
creator; he will therefore be what the vulgar worship as a god. 
Northcott (1996:57) states that humanity‟s hunger for power as manifested in the beliefs of 
the “rational ordering” of creation and the predictability of nature‟s laws inspired the 
investigation into the natural order‟s regularities and fundamental causative and motive 
structures. This “experimental method”, however, rests on the idea that creation “is governed 
by accident and contingency rather than divine reason and purposiveness”, and is therefore 
not in conformity with a view of creation as rationally ordered by God.
61
 The order of the 
material world is then best explained in terms of “accidents and movements of atoms”, and 
God becomes superfluous to the material world‟s order. Ultimately, the world “becomes 
„open‟ to investigation by the alchemist and the scientist whose vocation is to transform this 
accidental world into a world more truly at the service of human need and human desire”. An 
example of this is the reality that modern scientists merely regard the moon as a physical 
object exercising gravity on the tides, winds and motion of the earth, as opposed to a 
heavenly body affecting the destiny of earthly life or the emotional cycles of the human 
psyche. If the moon were to be blown up, an American mathematician suggests, humans 
could alter season patterns and enrich the planet‟s fertility (Northcott 1996:57, 59). King and 
Woodyard (1999:17) believe that humanity‟s willpower to discover the “laws of nature” is 
malignant, as it is a precondition for the domination of nature. The notion that “knowledge is 
power” drives humans toward the goal of making nature work for them. Nature is perceived 
as merely an object over which human subjects seek and exercise control, and thereby the 
former‟s “rights” are not place on par with the “rights” of the latter. Steven Vogel articulates 
this as follows:  
Disenchanted and objectified nature, appearing now in the guise of meaningless 
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  With reference to the view of Berkhof (1963:8). 
61
   With reference to the views of Blumenberg (1983).  
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matter, is seen ... as something to be overcome and mastered for human purposes, 
and not to be imitated, propitiated, or religiously celebrated (quoted in McGrath 
2002:54).
62
 
When a species maximises itself at the cost of exploiting other beings, the creative life force 
has become evil (Hart 2004:72), and subsequently, when other species are driven to 
extinction, “[m]any pages of the book of life are being ripped out before we have even a 
chance to read them” (Ruether 1994:101). Deane-Drummond (2008:17) defines such 
suffering experienced in the nonhuman world as a result of human deeds as “antropogenic 
evils”. Delio (2008:78) poses three questions that illuminate the sinfulness of these 
anthropogenic evils: “What does the biodiversity crisis say about us as humans and our 
understanding of God as Creator? How can we humans, as one kind of creature, push so 
many creatures of God to extinction? Why are we as species unravelling the integrity of 
creation?” Ruether (1994:141-142) believes that the central core of sin is the misuse of 
freedom to exploit, among others, the earth, and consequently to violate the fundamental life-
sustaining relations. The life of the exploited is diminished when one part of the life 
community exalts itself at the expense of other life-forms. Ruether further explicitly identifies 
the link between sin and human domination of the earth. In her opinion, sin “lies in the 
insistent perseverance in the resultant cycle of violence, the refusal to empathize with the 
victimized underside of such power, and the erection of systems of control and cultures of 
deceit to maintain and justify such unjust power”. The domination and exploitation of the 
earth have thus become a spiritual disease. Wallace (2005:30) makes reference to the term 
“ecocide”, “a habit of life and thought that makes war against earth community”. Ecocide, he 
notes, is deeply embedded – similar to alcoholism – in addictive behaviours and attitudes that 
weaken the health and well-being of human beings, making them unable to break free. 
Wallace believes that ecocide‟s spiritual roots are evident in humanity‟s inclined rush to be 
destructive in their attitudes toward nature: 
[O]ur predisposition toward environmental abuse is an instance of the “bondage 
of the will”, in which we find ourselves unable to stop behaviour that we know to 
be self-destructive. Why else would the human community push itself further and 
further toward certain environmental catastrophe – global warming, irreversible 
ozone depletion, massive deforestation, chronic loss of arable land, daily 
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extinction of numerous species – unless it were addicted to toxic attitudes and 
habits from which it can no longer escape? 
Human domination and exploitation of the earth and its creatures proves that “humans ... can 
commit not only homicide and ethnocide, but biocide and geocide as well (Boff 1997:xi).  
Winwood Reade sums it up as follows: 
[A]s time passed on, [Man] ventured to rebel; he made stone his servant; he 
discovered fire and vegetable poison; he domesticated iron; he slew the wild 
beasts or subdued them ... The river which once he had worshipped as a god ... he 
now conquered to his will (quoted in McGrath 2002:58). 
According to McDaniel (1995:38), humanity‟s disregard for nature‟s constraints and possibi-
lities amounts to “the murder of Creation”. Becker (1992:161) adds that millions of our 
fellow creatures and species which are also, like us, creatures of God and spiritual beings, 
have suffered and have been extinguished because of our anti-ecological behaviour. “We 
wear an ecological mark of Cain. The death and loss we have caused staggers the imagina-
tion”. Humanity is therefore heavily burdened with responsibility and guilt. Becker notes that 
humans will have to suffer the “spiritual nausea” of grief, sorrow and repentance, as 
expressed in this adapted version of Psalm 23 by a Vietnam veteran: 
Yea as I walk through the valley of death 
I shall fear no evil 
For the valleys are gone 
And only death awaits 
And I am the evil. 
Harlow (1985) is therefore justified in saying: “There is no music, no worship, no love, when 
we take the world‟s wonders for granted.” 
d) Double domination: An ecofeminist perspective 
A special point of interest deserving consideration under the subject of human exploitation of 
the earth is an ecofeminist perspective on domination in the name of differences of species.
63
 
Ecofeminism, a distinct approach to ecological discourse, stems from an awareness of 
“women‟s potential for bringing about an ecological revolution”, seeking to expose “the logic 
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   For additional reading on ecofeminism see, for example, Deane-Drummond (2000); Diamond and Orenstein 
(1990); Plant (1989); Eaton and Lorentzen (2003) and Gray (1981). 
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of domination” and undoing the damage caused by “the twin dominations of women and 
nature” (Karen Warren, quoted in Smith 1997:19). It thereby reveals the close connections 
between patriarchy in gender relations and anthropocentric instrumentalism in ecological 
relations – between the devaluation of women and the devaluation of nature (Nash 1991:219) 
– and aims to reveal the interlocking dualisms64 associated with patriarchal Western cultures 
and knowledge systems.
65
 These dualisms, which have been used for the sake of domination 
and exploitation of both women and nature, are personified by means of nature being 
associated with female connotation, such as “mother earth” or “virgin forests”. Elizabeth 
Gray (1981) refers to this as the “feminizing of nature”. In general, ecofeminism suggests that 
domination in the name of gender and domination in the name of species mutually reinforce 
one another (Conradie 2011:54 & 56).    
As systems of patriarchy legitimate the domination of women by men, so an environmentally 
destructive culture sanctions human supremacy in the earth community (Conradie 2011:56). 
Thus, in general, ecofeminists understand the source of ecological destruction not merely as 
anthropocentrism, but rather as androcentrism, “the predominance of the masculine and 
macho, in societal construction and norm-making” (Smith 1997:20). Ruether (1994:3) states 
that the classic Western cultures, of which Christianity is a major expression, have validated 
and sacralised this double domination. The domination of women has presented a crucial link 
to the domination of the earth, for this reason the inclination in patriarchal cultures to link 
women with earth, matter and nature, and males with sky, intellect and transcendent spirit, 
the former commonly seen as “inferior”. Yet, from a feminist perspective, women‟s oneness 
with the earth is seen quite differently, as Ivone Gebara (1994:208-209) exclaims: “I feel 
such a great passion for the world! ... [I]t strengthens me to see myself as a part of this earth, 
neither more nor less, but part of it. I am seed, daughter, fruit, earth. This earth is my soul and 
my body”. Nevertheless, it is alleged that in these Western male-dominated cultures, males 
fear the dark, fertile intuitive powers of the cosmos and hence, the fear is manifested in 
patriarchal attempts to control both women and nature (Daneel 1999:141).    
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   For example, heaven and earth, spirit and matter, sacred and secular, soul and body, humanity and nature, 
male and female, and culture and nature. These dualisms are dealt with in greater detail in what follows, in 
considering its impact on the alienation of humans from the earth community. 
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   Bouma-Prediger (1995:25) notes that Rosemary Radford Ruether was one of the first contemporary thinkers      
to articulate this double domination connection – androcentrism (domination of women) and anthropo-
centrism (domination of nature) – the earliest reference in her work on this subject being 1971. 
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Gebara (1999:27-28) also observes the link between the domination of women and the 
domination of nature. She believes that the same way in which women‟s bodies are used as a 
means of sowing terror, in the same way that they are brutally raped and beaten and left 
forgotten, so nature is also conquered, forced into subordination and destroyed. The reason 
for this, Gebara adds, is because the interdependence of all life systems is not acknowledged, 
although it is present everywhere. Feminist Anne Primavesi (1991:48) makes the following 
statement in this regard: “Patterns of domination have become „natural‟ to the human male, 
and are now certainly part of our common culture. Since they have been allied with advanced 
technologies, they may well contribute to the extinction of our species. That fact too would 
be „natural‟”. Primavesi (1991:61-62) adds that the development of Western culture has 
attributed two distinct images to nature. Both, identified with femininity, are projections of 
male perceptions on to the external world. In the first instance, the earth is identified with a 
nurturing mother, a kind, benevolent woman who provides for the needs of humankind in an 
ordered, planned universe. It carries with it a value system of subtle ethical controls and 
restraints, operating as restrictions, for instance against the contamination of rivers – the 
mother‟s veins. Primavesi makes reference to a poem contained in one of Carolyn Merchant‟s 
works
66
, entitled The Faerie Queen, in which mining is described as an act of human lust, 
“the basest of all sins for it treats its mother, earth, as a passive receptor of human rape in the 
rush to mine gold from her womb”. In the second, opposing image, nature is seen as wild and 
uncontrollable, having the ability to bring about chaos through violence, storms, droughts, 
etc. Nature as disorder thereby evokes power over and control over it. She states that 
Merchant shows how the scientific revolution has made this the focal point of modernity. A 
participating view based on female principles in the earth, honouring its nurturing power, was 
reduced to a mechanically oriented approach that either abolished or used female principles 
in an exploitative manner. In simple terms, the “female earth and virgin earth spirit were to be 
subdued by the machine” – such attitudes of control culturally sanctioning the devaluation of 
nature. 
Ecofeminists, apart from identifying the connection between the earth and women, hold that 
the earth is also associated with other forms of the oppressed, such as “blacks” and the poor. 
These are characterised by terms such as “environmental racism” and “environmental 
classism”. American feminist Alice Walker writes: “Some of us have become used to 
thinking that a woman is the nigger of the world, that a person of colour is the nigger of the 
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world, that a poor person is the nigger of the world ... but, in truth, Earth itself has become 
the nigger of the world” (1988:147). In the same way, Sallie McFague (1993:165) maintains 
that the “new poor” is nature itself. Ecofeminists subsequently contend that notions related to 
justice such as “solidarity with the victims” and “liberation for the poor, oppressed, and 
marginalised” must embrace concern for the most vulnerable and endangered constituent of 
creation – animals, plants, insects, the soil and micro-organisms (Conradie 2011:57).  
e) Conclusion: Alternatives to domination in the name of differences of species 
Human beings do not own creation, and as such, are not free to do with the earth as they 
please. Mustol (2013:6) believes that as human beings we overstress the natural 
environment‟s capacity to support us. Therefore, a serous shift away from sinful 
manipulative, dominating and exploitative attitudes towards egalitarian, cooperating 
approaches is desperately required. In terms of realistic alternatives, humanity‟s heritage 
should relish a language of critique of violence against the earth and foster possibilities of 
healing and wholeness. Humans must exist within nature in a life-sustaining way (Ruether 
1994:12, 86). Conradie (2006:77-78), for example, holds that an ecological reinterpretation of 
the mandate of dominion in Genesis calls humans to fulfil their roles of stewards, guardians, 
gardeners, priests, custodians and caretakers, caring, protecting, nurturing, gardening, 
cultivating and serving the earth. He states that we can only learn to rule the earth “if we rule 
over our own ruling”. Proper care for the whole of creation thus necessitates the wise using of 
resources, sound management, reliability, commitment, dedication, hard work, as well as 
responsibility towards God as owner of creation. Yet, in the process of countering 
domination, there should also be an appeal to Genesis 2:15 that speaks about “tiling and 
keeping”, to the sabbatical rest for the land (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:22). From a 
feminist perspective, Smith (1997:25), referring to Ruether‟s Gaia and God, suggests an: 
Eschewing of systems of “domination” and the retrieval of “sacramental” sense 
of the universe. The perception of the Earth as Gaia
67
, a living, energetic, creative 
system – indeed, an all-embracing organism ... and the perception of Gaia as 
“matrix of life” can be formative ... of a spirituality ... of the merging of “small 
selves” and the “surrender” of self which Earth-healing requires. 
Delio (2008:78-79), who shares the ecological wisdom of St. Francis of Assisi,
68
 believes that 
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  Named after the goddess of the earth, Gaia, in Greek mythology. 
68
  For a comprehensive reading on this topic, see Delio (2008). 
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humans have much to learn from the patron saint of ecology, and calls for greater awareness 
of human choices that harm the earth and its creatures, be it individual or social. The example 
set by St. Francis, who strongly opposed domination, but sought to live as co-creature, 
reminds us of our essential creaturehood – our identity as human beings, members and co-
participants in creation. For too long has modern society placed special emphasis on human 
privileges; we now have to simplify our lives and lessen our use of resources.  
3.2.3 Consumerist greed 
a) The role of Christianity in rendering religious support 
Christianity‟s anthropocentric, dualistic, otherworldly, hierarchical worldview is probably the 
root cause of ecological destruction, leaving nature as “other” and as a result, completely 
exposed to human greed (Nash 1989:91). Various biblical texts, for example John 10:10
69
, 2 
Corinthians 8:9
70
 and 2 Corinthians 9:10-11
71
, have been misused in the Christian tradition as 
justification for unbridled consumerism. Wachtel (1989:62) maintains that this ecological 
destructiveness appears logical and attractive because human beings have socialised 
themselves to see economic well-being, which necessitates ever-increasing economic growth 
– the primary symbol and attestation of personal and social success, worthiness, identity, and 
meaning. 
Nash (1991:71), referring to Lynn White‟s The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 
argues that people continue to live in a context of “Christian axioms”, for instance “perpetual 
progress”, contrary to White‟s opinion, is commonly regarded by Christian theologians as a 
heresy. Yet “prosperity teaching” is a common phenomenon in Christian teaching that is built 
on the idea that God will grant the faithful‟s wishes, in particular those wishes that involve 
material wealth. Usually supported with numerous “proof texts”, together with an emphasis 
on faith, prosperity gospel has become a believable theology. John Garfield (2010), one of 
these teachers, makes the following statement in one of his articles:   
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   “The thief does not come except to steal, and to kill, and to destroy. I have come that they may have life, and 
that they may have it more abundantly” (NKJV).  
70
  “For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became 
poor, so that you through his poverty might become rich.” 
71
   “Now he who supplies seed to the sower and bread for food will also supply and increase your store of seed 
and will enlarge the harvest of your righteousness. You will be made rich in every way so that you can be 
generous on every occasion, and through us your generosity will result in thanksgiving to God.”  
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God has given every believer the ability to have life, and life more abundantly. 
He gives us talents and opportunities to exploit. Our stewardship of those 
opportunities and ideas is a key ingredient of faith that creates wealth. I have to 
believe that wealth is a possibility for me. If I know that learning to multiply 
money is part of God‟s plan for me, I will watch for the opportunities. 
Rooted in charismatic American Protestant Christianity, it is not limited to affluent countries 
like America, but is also prevalent in much of Africa. In addition, prosperity teaching has led 
to the commercialisation of religion itself,
72
 especially through religious products being sold, 
for example gospel books, magazines, music and videos. In this situation, religious products 
become valuable commodities that allow for lucrative business opportunities (Conradie 
2009:64). 
Haught (1993:84) states that the Catholic priest and notable environmental thinker, Thomas 
Berry, charges prophetic religion with unleashing a utopian dream of “progress” destructive 
of nature. Berry is of the opinion that this dream lies behind policies of limitless economic 
growth, which prove to have ecologically disastrous consequences, Christianity being no less 
guilty. For example, a few decades ago American Episcopal Bishop William Lawrence made 
this declaration: “[G]odliness is in league with riches...that man, when he is strong, conquers 
Nature ... [and] it is only to the man of morality that wealth comes” (quoted in Birch & 
Rasmussen 1978:53). In Becker‟s view, human beings hence do this ecological evil because 
they believe it to be spiritually good. Looking at it from a carefully constructed social and 
economic perspective, they essentially find spiritual meaning and satisfaction in it. In other 
words, having an abundance of material possessions is their symbol of being “number one” 
and blessed by God (1992:153).  
b) The impact of industrialisation 
Modern industrial society achieved material abundance on a scale never experienced before 
(Birch & Rasmussen 1978:20). The discovery of the steam engine in the eighteenth century 
was probably the point of departure for modern industry, characterised by the mechanisation 
of instruments and utensils using mechanical energy (Childress & Macquerrie 1986:615). As 
scientific and technological innovations evolved over time, manual production of goods was 
gradually being superseded by the production by machines using technology. The money 
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economy already emerged in the sixteenth century, yet it was not until the mobilisation of 
technology through industrialisation that the economic system started to radically impact 
upon the natural environment (Northcott 1996:56). Nürnberger (1999:4) confers the idea that 
the three hundred years between the mid-eighteenth and mid-twenty-first century “will go 
into history as the passing episode of industrialisation, where humankind multiplied 
recklessly, indulged in a giant shopping spree, squandered key resources and plunged coming 
generations back into misery”. 
Birch and Rasmussen (1978:20) outline the prospects that this new wave of technology had at 
its onset: Nature could be tamed and controlled; in the process society could be managed in 
the interest of material abundance and enjoyment; social problems would be a thing of the 
past; and above all, long-standing barriers to material progress would be overthrown. Human 
greed then got the upper hand. People became aware of the power they could possess through 
controlling and using natural resources on a large scale for increased profits and economic 
growth. Nature were evaluated in terms of its “economic” potential or “commodity” value 
and exploited far beyond the limits of need and fairness. While accepting nature‟s generosity, 
humans returned evil for good (Borrong 2005:48, 51, 53). According to Berry and Clarke 
(1991:134), the concept of reparation has parallels in biology and ecology: Every living being 
is sacrificed for another one; it “is self-sacrifice that makes the universe possible”. The tragic 
flaw of modern industrial civilisation is that it continually aspires to evade this law of 
sacrifice and reciprocity. Humans are not taking precious goods from the earth and offering 
something valuable in return, but at worse, they are taking beneficial resources and returning 
poisonous products.   
Modern industry is driven by the belief that industrial processes should be the prime aspect 
shaping society. Since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, the interpretation of the 
mandate of dominion as domination has been very common (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 
2003:21), hence it comes as no surprise that it has been classified as a major factor in the 
roots of the ecological crisis (Northcott 1996:57). Nürnberger (1999:398) identifies industrial 
society‟s most prominent features as an “economic rat race, environmental degradation and 
spiritual superficiality”. Northcott (1996:79) shares a similar view, and states that modern 
industrial systems function independently of divine, ethical, personal or ecological restraints. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of money dislocates God as the ordering force of modern relations 
and culture. Likewise, Conradie (2009:72) affirms that the desire for what money can buy 
replaces faith in God. Something that is only of some worth is perceived as if it holds 
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ultimate worth. Northcott (1996:79-80) observes that at the same time, there is an analogous 
denial of relationality with regard to the natural environment because industrialised systems‟ 
measures of wealth and exchange relations are removed from ecological systems. 
Industrialism leads to the commodification of nature and considers ecosystems as “materials 
banks, pollution sinks or productivity zones”. This abstraction from the rest of the rest of 
creation is so severe, Northcott argues, “that even were all the rainforests to disappear ... sea 
levels to rise two feet ... climate [to] warm by four degrees, and large parts of the world 
become uninhabitable, individuals and companies who had burnt the energy or consumed the 
forests in industrial production would still be reckoned wealthy in economic parlance”.    
It is thus clear that industrialisation has created a breeding ground for unbridled 
consumerism. It led to the rejection of any teleological or moral significance of physical 
existence and created a new quest in life: Individual pleasure and material satisfaction and 
purpose in everyday life (Northcott 1996:71-72). Conradie (2011:34) notes that the Industrial 
Revolution combined with a consumer revolution has made consumption a social 
responsibility, and thereby changed frugality from a virtue to a vice.
73
 Writing from the 
perspective of African traditional religion, Daneel (1998:245) testifies that Western 
industrialised cultures are “plagued by ... the „demon‟ of consumerism”. Northcott (2007:33) 
makes this provocative statement:  
Citizens of the industrial empire increasingly regard it as their birthright that they 
should continually buy new clothes, own cars, enjoy foreign holidays and fill 
their lives with the latest electronic entertainment devices while living in super-
heated or cooled homes sparkling with every kind of lighting device. The 
constant turnover of consumer objects, and the waste of precious metals, minerals 
and fossil fuels used in their making, fosters growing instability in ecosystems 
and now in the earth system. Industrial consumerism is a form of material culture 
which is entirely at odds with the regenerative and recycling patterns of natural 
systems. As the throwaway society mines precious metals and fossil fuels from 
beneath the earth‟s surface and later buries them in holes in the ground, or emits 
them to the atmosphere, it comes into conflict with the earth system and threatens 
its continuing vitality. 
The fact that modern industrialisation has and still delivers immense benefits, cannot be 
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disputed. Housing size and quality, home appliances and methods of transport, but a 
few of many examples, have liberated multitudes of people all over the world from 
poverty and deprivation (Conradie 2011:29). Since the transformation of England into 
an industrial and consumer society, however, more goods and services were consumed 
over the last four decades than throughout the entire human history. This modern 
consumptive way globalised over time, spreading the message that happiness is attained 
through consumption, and that the more one consumes, the happier one will be. Cooper 
(1990:75) is therefore justified in saying that industrialism is a perversion of God‟s 
will, as human beings are wrongly motivated when their lives are shaped by production 
processes and revolve around money and possessions. 
c) Consumerist greed as ecological sin 
Many believe that the objectification and subsequent degradation of the natural world stem 
from the prime source of the consumer society‟s commitment to material growth. The last-
mentioned is overvalued, while the former is undervalued: The primary goal is “goods and 
services” for humans, which is essentially anthropocentric in nature (King & Woodyard 
1999:18). Northcott (1996:41) argues that a culture of “ecologically damaging consumerism” 
has made the advancement of material fulfilment and human comfort the paramount goal of 
civilisation. According to Daneel (1998:242), consumerism highlights material progress and 
upward mobility as if these were morally justifiable tendencies, despite its alienating 
implications for a sense of self and place. Individual consumers in competition have therefore 
replaced holistic and integrated modes of thinking (Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:22). 
Hart (2004:141) maintains that human beings are part of creation, and use natural goods to 
meet their needs. In doing so, they have a responsibility to God, present and future human 
communities, the broader biotic community, as well as to the earth as a whole in the ways 
that they gather and consume these goods. Because of humanity‟s overarching greed, 
however, these natural resources are used for the fulfilment of their insatiable desires, and as 
a result they are unable to fulfil these responsibilities to Creator and creation. 
The consumerist belief in affluence cultivated a mentality of “no-limits”. In the Western 
world, and in particular in America, terms like “The New Frontier” were adopted into the 
language of this unbounded culture. “Frontier”, traditionally implying “limit”, became 
essentially the opposite – the starting place, not the stopping place. It further implied a 
summons to overthrow and control, as well as a challenge to gain control. Ultimately, it 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
meant the opposite of contentment; acquiring more – more land, resources, wealth, space and 
more opportunities. The close of one frontier meant the opening of a “new frontier” (Birch & 
Rasmussen 1978:21). DeWitt (1996:64) observes that in a culture marked with raging 
consumerist greed, there is no place for intrinsic good – the notion that some action and 
things are good in themselves, without price. Regardless of its destructiveness of self, 
community and nature, individual satisfaction and preferences are valued. Moreover, because 
of their incessant greedy desires, humans have engaged in the worship of Mammon. The 
desire for what money can buy has practically superseded faith in God. Things of little worth 
are treated as if it were of ultimate worth. The quest for incessant economic growth and 
material progress has thus become idolatrous, in the sense that believers in affluence have 
grown to be obsessed to the extent of being motivated by material progress instead of by a 
relationship with God (Conradie 2009:73).
74
 DeWitt (1996:61-62) states that it is therefore 
clear that the global market of consumerism deprives people of their God-assigned 
stewardship – of themselves, fellow humans, as well as the environment. He observes:  
Stewards of God‟s world are being transformed into consumers of God‟s world, 
all of which is being transformed in our minds into natural resources and their 
human use. In all this we deny the diminution and deprivation of our stewardship, 
we rarely and uncomfortably describe ourselves as stewards, but frequently and 
comfortably call ourselves “consumers”. We have put to use one of God‟s many 
gifts for the distribution of goods – the market – but have expanded our use and 
faith in this tool so that it is becoming the arbiter of human ethics. We have come 
to defend religiously our identity as consumers, and to defend religiously our 
creature, the market. We have been insisting that the economy of God‟s Creation 
become a subset of our human economy. We have come to worship this creature, 
rather than its Creator. God‟s gift is becoming the people‟s god, as the only 
meriting the status of global worth-ship. 
It is thus apparent that the consumer society‟s belief in continuous progress effects a shift in 
the orientation of human life, away from the reflective quest for spiritual fulfilment and 
associated moral quest for virtues, which were said to prepare the soul for heavenly life, in 
the direction of material progress. Furthermore, wealth creation becomes the guiding telos of 
the consumer society “with its live-to-shop” philosophy (Northcott 1996:67-68). In the past, 
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productive labour was seen as a means of giving glory to God. Prosperity was a sign of God‟s 
favour; poverty as such was not a symbol of moral depravity, although idleness in the face of 
work opportunities was; and the responsible steward was humble, appreciative and 
hardworking. Over the years, as a humanity sunk deeper into a culture of consumerism, most 
of these elements were altered. Productive labour was still a priority, yet simple, anti-
consumptive and frugal lifestyles of deferred pleasures were entirely abandoned. Prosperity 
as such became a sure sign of God‟s favour. In addition, poverty, not idleness, became a clear 
representation of moral depravity and moral failure. Finally, individual happiness as the goal 
– measured in terms of pleasure, money, material elevation and high consumption – replaced 
giving glory to God as the ultimate purpose of economic endeavour (Birch & Rasmussen 
1978:52-53). It is therefore no wonder that the “traditional vices of avarice and greed are the 
objects of praise in the new money economy” (Northcott 1996:55).75 
The myth of progress holds that anything ancient is without doubt poorer, weaker and less 
fulfilling, and offers less utility and happiness compared to whatever is modern (Northcott 
1996:67). Adherents of the ecologically benign consumer culture have willfully allowed 
themselves to be deceived by this myth. Birch and Rasmussen (1978:44-45), writing from an 
American context, highlight a number of fundamental assumptions held by the modern 
consumer society, including the beliefs that nature has a virtually infinite storehouse of 
resources that exists for human purposes; humans have the right and obligation to use these 
resources for ongoing improvement in their material standard of living; individual, as well as 
social improvement is best attained through the elevation of material standards of living; an 
economic system aimed at continuous expansion of material abundance enhances the quality 
of life; through the careful use of their power, humans can take control of the future by 
ensuring systematic material progress for all of humanity; productive labour and material 
wellbeing represents the good life; the successful person is the achiever; and an overflow of 
material wealth holds freedom – when people have more they can be more because their 
freedom of choice is expanded. Berry and Clarke (1991:46) maintain that this “web of 
assumptions” has a totalitarian character. Even though it rooted in and centres on the 
economic sphere, such assumptions pervade all of humanity‟s social institutions and cultural 
reflection. “Because of this rejection of the discipline imposed by nature, our religion, 
morality, civilization, major establishments – everything – have become counter-productive. 
They are producing the opposite of what they should produce.” As DeWitt (1996:61) states, 
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unbridled consumerism is ever-expanding – it covers the entire earth and infiltrates every 
corner of the inhabitable world. None are left unaffected. Becker (1992:155) comments as 
follows: 
The cultural pathology ... identifie[d] here is precisely the same phenomenon that 
earlier theologians, exploring the doctrine of original sin, referred to as “total 
depravity”. This is the all-pervading presence of sin (the assumptions or 
perspectives of sinfulness) in all the faculties of the human mind (not simply our 
emotions and will, but our reason as well) and in all aspects of human society (not 
simply ... the material realm, but also in education, religion, and the highest ideals 
of a culture). “[T]otal depravity” is not intended to suggest that the individual or 
society is one-hundred percent sinful, without a scintilla of goodness, but, rather, 
that there is no aspect of the self or society genuinely free from sin and able to 
“lead the way” out of sin. 
Conradie (2006:47) therefore rightly maintains that we are not merely facing an ecological 
crisis, but a cultural crisis that needs to be addressed at its ideological roots, lying in the 
human heart. What rants and rages is a sinful desire for more and more. Watchel (1989:17) 
acknowledges that, “[W]e have established a pattern in which we continually create 
discontent.” The human heart, driven by greed toward material privileges, is enslaved in a 
state of constant wanting (King & Woodyard 1999:16). Northcott (1996:79) puts it as 
follows: “Money displaces God as the ordering force or guiding spirit of modern relations of 
exchange and of modern culture ... operat[ing] independently of divine, ethical, personal or 
ecological constraints.” Becker (1992:152) is thus correct in noting the visible tension 
between what we humans know we ought to do and what we actually do. “We are caught 
doing “not what I want” but “the very thing I hate” – all because we are never satisfied by our 
“affluence”. Birch and Rasmussen (1978:26-27) quotes Robert Heilbroner76 in this regard:  
Economic growth and technical achievement, the greatest triumphs of our epoch 
of history, have shown themselves to be inadequate sources for collective 
contentment and hope. Material advance ... has proved unable to satisfy the 
human spirit. 
Charles Birch (in Birch & Rasmussen 1978:33) analyses the overall negative impact of 
human consumption and constructs the following formula: Total population x Consumption 
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of resources per person x Environmental deterioration per person = Total negative impact of 
all.
77
 This means that the more people, the larger the impact; the more resource consumption, 
the larger the impact; and the more environmental deterioration, the larger the impact. The 
conclusion is serious and unambiguous: Humanity cannot afford the modern world, and 
neither can the rest of creation. Birch puts it as follows: “The result is a huge and steadily 
multiplying impact of man on the environment which cannot possibly continue without the 
gravest consequences to both humanity and the rest of creation” (quoted in Birch & 
Rasmussen 1978:33). McGrath (2002:68) holds that the notion of this “destructive spiral of 
consumerist ethos”, being, “You want it? Fine; you can have it” has “encourage[d] patterns of 
consumption that take us far beyond the earth‟s ecological carrying capacity”. Northcott 
(1996:42) states that, “The mobility, and the appetite for natural resources of ... the consumer 
society represent a systematic threat to the health of ... natural ecologies”. Likewise, Hart 
(2004:39) maintains that the forces of rampant consumerism are perverted and hostile to the 
dignity of the earth. Because of its greed, the human heart is unwilling to accept 
responsibility for its anti-ecological behaviour (King & Woodyard 1999:16). “This moral 
evil”, declares Northcott (1996:44), “cannot be outweighed by the economic benefits” 
relating to the modern consumer society‟s exploitation of resources. 
The effect of a culture of unbridled consumerist greed on the environment cannot be negated. 
At the root of the ecological predicament lies modern consumer society‟s belief in notions 
such as “progress”, “success” and ultimately, “being number one”.  DeWitt (1996:62) 
opposes the notion of “Looking out for number one”, as he believes that it implies seeking 
first oneself, expecting that somehow “the Kingdom of God will be added unto you”. 
Furthermore, this notion also converts greed from being understood as a vice into being 
understood as a virtue. Wirzba (2003:136) holds that our present culture, which is often 
referred to as a “culture of death”, impedes us from glorifying the Creator as the giver of life. 
In addition, it indicates just how far we have strayed from “authentic life”. Birch and 
Rasmussen (1978:41) therefore believe that humans will not easily depart from their mindset 
of conquest, control and consumption, or the standard of living to which they have become 
accustomed to. Despite the disappointment of this way of life, we humans will render our 
own version of St. Augustine‟s petition for the sake of affluence: “Lord, make me chaste; but 
not yet”.  
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d) Conclusion: Alternatives to consumerist greed 
Considering the exploration in the previous section, it is most obvious that human attention 
needs to be redirected – away from material, manmade wealth, to a more reflective 
appreciation for God-given wealth – the earth in all its splendour. Wirzba (2003:136) 
suggests that turning away from the notion that the world was primarily created for human 
consumption does not imply that it should serve no human ends. Instead, humanity‟s use of 
creation should always be directed towards the praise of the Creator. In simple terms, “our 
work and consumption should themselves be forms of prayer in which the goodness and the 
purposes of God are foremost in mind”. Perhaps a return to the former way of life prescribed 
in the Protestant ethic could prove much useful in this regard. Birch and Rasmussen 
(1978:52) simplifies these prescriptions: A person‟s area of service to others is in their daily 
lives; God should be glorified in one‟s workaday world, and faithful performance is therefore 
one‟s responsibility before a holy God; a person should work hard and save, yet lead a spare 
and frugal existence, putting of material and sensual pleasures; disciplined self-denial is most 
godly, high consumption and wastefulness is not; wealth may be accrued to the extent of 
one‟s hard work and discipline living, and it should be understood as a sign of God‟s favour; 
however, seeing that the world can be an unkind place, a person may remain poor in material 
matters, yet assured of the fact that God will reward their zealous labour with an abundant 
everlasting life. Acknowledging that as human beings we need to be transformed from our 
destructive habits of consumption and that the first and foremost challenge is not to simply 
change our economy but also ourselves, one may ponder the question: “Can we, given our 
ecological sin, muster the will to change what we are?” Given the enormous anti-ecological 
behaviour of socialisation, especially evident in economic “growth-think”, transnational 
corporations, the bombardment of advertising, and the consumer mentality dominant in 
politics, education, and even religion, it is quite certain that momentous ecological change 
cannot simply be realised through ad hoc recycling projects and educational campaigns. 
Significant change require mindful efforts to re-socialise ourselves spiritually – “away from 
our present materialistic consumer spirituality and toward a new „materialistic‟ (in the sense 
of matter-respecting) creation spirituality” – in constructing a positive response to a culture of 
rampant consumerism (Becker 1992:159). DeWitt (1996:65-66) envisions such change as 
follows: 
I see us free, therefore, to return to some of the most sure and certain principles of 
religion and traditional virtue – that avarice is a vice...and the love of money 
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detestable, that those walk most truly in the paths of virtue and sane wisdom who 
take least thought for the morrow. We shall once more value ends above means 
and prefer the good to be useful. We shall honour...the delightful people who are 
capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the lilies of the field who toil not, 
neither do they spin. 
3.2.4 The alienation of humans from the earth community 
a) The role of Christianity in rendering religious support 
Conradie (2011:5, 7) states that in comparison with other religions, which emphasise the 
sacredness of nature, the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation, highlighting the radical 
distinction between Creator and the created order, has indisputably led to a “disenchantment 
of nature”. It has too frequently displayed “contempt of the world”, as in the past it has 
focused almost entirely on the salvation of the soul from the world. Accordingly, it showed 
contempt for the biophysical world and implicitly authorised ecological degradation to 
continue. Part of the ecological complaint against the Christian faith is the fact that it is 
innately, or at least historically indifferent and even hostile towards nature and, as a result, 
anti-ecological (Nash (1991:68). The human race has hereby become incapable of affirming 
the essential goodness of creation. Nature, in many cases, is seen as “wild” or “something 
which needs to be conquered”. Christianity is an “urban” religion that does not gel very well 
with nature and in the process encourages technological transformations of nature (Watts 
1970:25). Worster (1979:26-27) employs the term “Christian pastoralism” which, he 
believes, very much contradicts classical arcadian pastoralism that focuses on a simple moral 
life, at peace with the earth and all its creatures. He argues that the former idealises the 
position of the Good Shepherd in relation to His flock (humanity), guarding them against 
nature‟s forces – bears, wolves, lions – and guiding them to greener fields.     
Santmire (1985:130) poses the following question relating to another aspect of human 
alienation from the earth community: “Is it true that [Christians] have been such a people, 
wandering as strangers and pilgrims through this world, that they never had the time, nor the 
occasion, nor the will, nor the rudimentary spiritual experience to respond to nature with the 
kind of theological intensity that they have always devoted to God and humanity?” Haught 
(1993:44) adds this rhetorical question: “For do [the world‟s religions, including Christianity] 
not teach us, especially through their mystical precepts, that we should feel dislocated from 
our natural environment?” He believes that the roots of our ecological crisis does have a 
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religious component, as in promoting spiritual homelessness religions have, maybe 
unintentionally, conveyed the impression that human beings do not “really” belong to the 
cosmos. In this instance, one may look at the influence of biblical eschatology, or the doctrine 
of the “end times”, which holds that Christians will be “caught up” to meet the returning of 
the Lord. The critique against this view incorporated in the Scriptures is that more than often 
it nurtures the belief that humans are only residing in “a temporary and soon-to-be-destroyed 
home”, making them reluctant to care for the earth (Horrell 2010:8). For Nash (1991:72-73), 
most Christian theologians focus tremendously on human history to the neglect of natural 
history, disregarding the immense influences of the latter on the former. This emphasis has 
largely been allied with major dichotomies in Christian attitudes towards the “world”, for 
example material-spiritual and nature-humanity. Conradie (2006:54) reiterates this idea and 
argues that Christianity is to a great extent guilty of legitimising the alienation of humans 
from the rest of creation, as it has too often been preoccupied with an “otherworldliness” that 
hinders humanity‟s sense of belonging on earth. Bookless (2008:34) puts it forthrightly: “Too 
often Christians have been so other-worldly as to be of no earthly use”.   
Bookless (2008:14) states that Christianity is responsible for often teaching what is 
contradictory to the Bible and has thereby warranted human alienation from the rest of the 
earth, as McHarg (1969:26) argues: In the biblical creation story‟s text relating to the 
“insistence upon dominion and subjugation of nature ... can be found the sanction and 
injunction to conquer nature – the enemy, the threat to Jehovah”. Bookless (2008:14) 
reiterates this idea by quoting a famous Christian hymn that goes: This world is not my home. 
I‟m just a passing-through. If heaven is not my home then Lord what will I do? Similarly, an 
Afrikaans song, well-known in South African Pentecostal circles, is loosely translated as 
follows: Here I don‟t want to be, because here is nothing for me. Heaven is my dwelling. And 
Jesus is my King. While the latter part holds true, the former part is essentially unbiblical!     
b) The impact of Western dualism 
The great dualisms of the Western tradition have extensively contributed and reinforced 
human alienation from the rest of the earth community (Conradie 2006:54). The concept of 
dualism may be defined as the tendency to separate reality into two distinct parts, the one 
usually superior and the opposite one being inferior. Examples include supernature and 
nature, heaven and earth, spirit and matter, sacred and secular, soul and body, (human) 
history and nature, and male and female – the former commonly “being the superior, and the 
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interdependencies poorly understood” (Nash 1991:73). Martin-Schramm and Stivers 
(2003:20) argue that while dualistic thinking may be appropriate in various circumstances,
78
 
it is also extremely distressing in the sense whereby polar opposites are disconnected, value 
judgements situate one pole above its opposite and social customs and feelings toward nature 
are based on these judgements. Under these conditions, the oppression of people and the 
degradation of nature are bound to occur, as Horrell (2010:129) states, dualistic systems 
“denigrates the material world”. Platonic dualism, for example, splits reality into a transient 
world of matter and an eternal world of ideal Forms known only by the intellect. The soul, 
the seat of the intellect, is compelled to dwell in a body, which is part of mutable nature, and 
is therefore distracted from its true end – communion with the transnatural world of the 
Forms. The body, like the whole of nature, is perceived as something alien to the essence of a 
person. Nature is not worthy of any serious participation, and is nothing but a faint shadow of 
what is truly good and beautiful. The Platonic view is thus that nature, in its stubborn 
materiality, is inherently disordered and can only be ordered through the imposition of ideal 
Forms which are foreign to it. The soul exists apart from the body and is always in tension 
with it (Wilkinson 1991:114-115, 119). Borrong (2005:46) states that in earlier times, the 
relation of humans and nature was one of balance and harmony. This relationship was 
disturbed by such systems of thought pervaded by hierarchical dualism.   
Snyder (2011:4) record eight symptoms of the “great divorce” between heaven and earth: 
They maintain that a person can testify to it whenever one agrees that salvation is about the 
soul and not the body; observes no spiritual worth in material things; considers earthly life as 
unreal or of little importance; sees physical death as the end of earthly life; believes that 
beauty in this life, for example in nature, people, art and music, is ultimately insignificant, 
unless it points to spiritual beauty; views the present world as evil or entirely as being under 
the devil‟s control; ignores the biblical command of creation stewardship; and pictures spirit 
and matter as two opposing, irreconcilable categories. The last-mentioned is especially 
significant to the concept of alienation, because, as Deane-Drummond (2006:117) holds, it is 
responsible for creating the impression that if the material world is designated evil, then 
finding any goodness in it is a vain task, for goodness is only ascribed to the spiritual, 
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immortal realm. Furthermore, it stimulates the idea that the self is in need of liberation from 
the material world for an ultimate life in an ideal spiritual realm in heaven (Martin-Schramm 
& Stivers 2003:20). From there the pervasive sense of otherworldliness arises. Interestingly 
enough, Horrell (2010:129) notes in an example of the intrinsically connectedness of spirit 
and matter the views of Theodore Hiebert.
79
 Studying the word ruach (meaning spirit/Spirit, 
air, breath, wind), Herbert illustrates how its material and spiritual, worldly and Godly facets 
are inseparably woven together. He thereby proves that the dichotomies between spirit and 
matter, and soul and body are the products of Western dualism influencing interpreters, rather 
than the biblical text itself.  
Dualistic thinking, in whatever form it may be, undeniably causes disconnection. Carolyn 
Merchant (1982:143) laments the culture/nature dualism:  
[N]ature/culture dualism is a key factor in Western civilization‟s advance at the 
expense of nature. As the unifying bonds of the older hierarchical cosmos were 
severed, European culture increasingly set itself above and apart from all that was 
symbolized by nature. Similarly, in America the nature/culture dichotomy was 
basic to the tension between civilization and the frontier in westward expansion 
and helped to justify the continuing exploitation of nature‟s resources. 
Systems of dualism deceive humans into accepting the anthropocentric notion that they exist 
apart from the rest of creation and that human actions alone deserve attention. Bouma-
Prediger (1995:271), in referring to the ecological model of Rosemary Ruether, provides 
concrete grounds for rejecting such a dualistic attitude: it is false because the natural world 
has its own history, because it is inherently affected by human action and thus a part of 
human history, and because human beings are deeply rooted in it; it has catastrophic effects 
as it sanctions various forms of exploitation; and it is not in accordance with the biblical 
emphasis on a single, all-embracing covenant. Horrell (2010:129-130) also asserts that while 
dualistic thinking do enhance value in certain contexts, their potentially negative implications 
for human attitudes towards creation must be resisted. Like Irenaeus affirmed creation‟s 
goodness as stated in Genesis 1:31 in his second-century arguments with the Gnostics, we 
humans need to reassert it now in the face of an emphasis on the spiritual dimensions of life 
and a focus on the salvation of only the soul. These dualisms, like the rest of the Western 
tradition, Horrell (2010:130) adds, “[have] been exposed as problematic in its assumptions 
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and implications, not least in terms of human attitudes towards the environment”. 
c) Alienation of humans from the earth community as ecological sin 
The alienation of humans from the rest of creation is one of the categories examined for its 
ideological biases, which contribute toward distorted relationships (Ruether 1994:6). Wallace 
(2005:30) clearly explains the distinct patterns of alienation. First and foremost, God assumes 
the image of a “Sky God” who has little or even no association with the universe‟s natural 
process. Accordingly humans, the bearers of God‟s image, are not regarded as authentic 
members of the earth community. Instead, they are considered to be mere “souls” temporarily 
residing in their physical bodies on earth, awaiting their deliverance into a disembodied 
eternity; heaven. Any connection between humans and the material world is denied, as the 
latter is simply the temporary place from which humans are freed by death to return to their 
originator – their disembodied Source, the “Sky God”. These beliefs utterly confirm that God 
is against nature, and that the bearers of image also ought to be. Thereby, feelings of absence 
of family and co-belonging toward the rest of the earth community are instilled in humans, 
laying the groundwork for ecological destruction. Conradie (2005b:24) believes that 
alienation has become a way of life, contradicting the notions of familiarity and intimacy.  
Haught (1993:39-65) explains the concept of “cosmic homelessness” and its effects on 
ecological degradation at length. In his exposition, he categorises two primary sources of 
human feelings of estrangement from nature, the one being humanity‟s scientific culture and 
the other being “spiritual homelessness”. With regard to the first cause, Haught states that 
scientism
80
, for example, strictly isolates the knowing subject (human knower) from the 
object-world (nature). The knowing subject are not deemed to be a part of the scientifically 
known universe, as to be appropriately “objective” about the world, the scientific subject is 
set apart from nature. In the process, the ecological vision of interrelatedness and 
interdependence is renounced. On the other hand, Haught holds, spiritual homelessness, is 
rooted in the religious belief that human life is defined by pilgrimage, sojourning and 
rootlessness, making authentic existence essentially “homeless”. In order to experience 
salvation, as human beings we must transcend “the world”. Consequently, the ecologically 
malignant feeling of cosmic homelessness is a prerequisite for spiritual homelessness. The 
spirit of cosmic homelessness, Haught adds, is manifested in the feeling that we humans do 
not truly belong to the created cosmos and that the earth is not really our home. We feel like 
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exiles in an alien country. Because the loss of one‟s home is among the most humiliating 
experiences that humans can endure, the sense that we don‟t belong makes us most 
vulnerable to feelings of shame. Feeling “unaccepted” by our environment, we unavoidably 
detach ourselves from it in some way, even though we continue to be bound by it. The natural 
world is perceived as a foreign land, far from our true home. This restless wandering, as a 
result, hinders an ecologically acceptable relationship with the earth. Owing to the lack of 
ecospirit, the underlying continuity of ourselves with the universe is ignored, and nature is 
left to bear the dreadful consequences. 
In the Christian tradition, God is often depicted as a monarch in heaven – far removed from 
the universe – who created humans in His image to fulfil the roles of vice-regents on earth. 
God thus cedes all control of earthly life to His human servants. As disembodied deity, God 
is seen as being uninterested in earthly affairs (Wallace 2005:28-29). An overemphasis on 
God‟s divine transcendence causes “a deist separation and alienation between God and 
creation” (Conradie 2005b:54). Such a theistic framework is thus problematic in the sense 
that it hinders human care of creation (Haught 1993:37-38). Furthermore, the notion of life in 
another world after death, Maguire and Rasmussen (1998:44, 42) argue, “makes our earth-life 
the prologue, not the text and context of our being ... Earth as main stage becomes earth as 
prelude; the biological may be seen as hostile to the spiritual. At the least, its status is 
diminished. It is not our home but the proving ground for our real home beyond. That is 
troubling news for the rest of nature”. Emphasis on individual salvation redirect human 
consciousness inward to the self and outward to heaven, away from the earth (Martin-
Schramm & Stivers 2003:22). It is therefore no surprise that many people might ask: “I am 
headed for heaven anyway, why should I take care of creation?” It is notions like these, 
however, that qualify as “stumbling blocks to earthkeeping” (DeWitt 1996:91). In the view of 
Hart (2004:122), “the planet often has been viewed solely as a place of temporary pilgrimage, 
a short-term place of preparation for a life to come, the context of the human hope for and 
working out of „salvation‟”. Northcott (1996:41) believes that feelings of alienation redefine 
the place of humanity in a cosmos which is more and more perceived as lacking moral 
significance or divine purpose, except for its material value to humans. Bruteau (1997:12-13) 
paints this picture in more detail:  
The world has been presented to us as a great machine, something dead and in 
itself meaningless, something that rolls on relentlessly, ruthlessly, incapable of 
sensitivity or significance. It starts from a fluke of a fluctuation and thereafter 
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operates by chance and necessity. It‟s not trying to accomplish anything, it has no 
purpose, and we human beings have no special place in it. We are simply an 
accident, and our request for meaningfulness meets with no reply from the 
universe. In such a world, how could we have a sense of the sacred that would be 
anything other than a superstition fit only for scorn? Ever since we‟ve had this 
mechanistic, accidentalistic worldview, we‟ve been despondent, and when we‟re 
despondent, we turn to artificial stimulants such as greed and success, inventions 
of local meaningfulness. But, deprived of the sense of the sacred wholeness of 
things, our bonds are weakening. Underneath we know that we‟re whistling in the 
dark. 
Conradie (2005b:184-185) states that: “The earth is God‟s house. God has invited us as 
humans, together with other species in God‟s household, to tend and keep our room and to 
make ourselves at home. Instead, we failed to find a home for ourselves and we are now 
threatening to destroy the whole household. This is the legacy of human sin.” As a result, 
humanity is now endlessly embarking on “the human flight from nature” (Haught 1993:40), 
as Ruether (1994:139) puts it: “The evaluation of mortal life as evil and the fruit of sin has 
lent itself to an earth-fleeing ethic and spirituality, which has undoubtedly contributed very 
centrally to the neglect of the earth, to the denial of our commonality with plants and animals, 
and to the despising of the work of sustaining the day-to-day processes of finite but 
renewable life”. Mustol (2013:6) believes that although we are eco-physical beings, our lives 
are not a reflection of our interconnectedness with the earth as ecosystem, of our earthly 
existence as God ordained it to be. Rasmussen (1996:10) firmly declares, however: “There is 
no room ... for the earth avoidance carried in the teaching of contemptus mundi (contempt of 
the world). Or any other form of otherworldliness ... Nor is there room for ... the metaphor of 
ascetic ascent, throwing off the corruptible things of the earth for the precious booty of 
heaven.” 
Conradie (2005:114) maintains that the destructive patterns of alienation between humans 
and the rest of creation are deeply embedded in a culture, which may described in terms of 
human sin. Likewise, Snyder (2011:3) believes that alienation – “a divorce” – is the product 
of the “disease of sin”. They apply the metaphor of divorce “for the whole problem of the 
relationships between God, humans, and the earth”. Bookless (2008:37-38) also believes that 
when humans turn against God, broken relationships are manifested in various directions. 
Anthropologist Gregory Bateson makes the following statement in this regard: “If you put 
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God outside and set him vis-à-vis his creation and if you have the idea that you are created in 
his image, you will logically and naturally see yourself as outside and against the things 
around you” (quoted in Rasmussen 1994:173). There is thus no doubt that disobedience 
results in turmoil – when people go against God the intended order disintegrates because the 
whole creation is influenced by human behaviour (Cooper 1990:11). Ruether (1994:142), for 
example, highlights this crucial link between sin and humanity‟s impaired relationship with 
the environment:  
Sin, then, as that sort of evil for which we must hold ourselves accountable, lies 
in distortion of relationship, the absolutizing of the rights to life and power of one 
side of a relation against the other parts with which it is, in fact, interdependent. 
In this regard, Gilkey (1979:142) says: “The historical dimension of estrangement is passed 
on communally. We absorb more than our cultural ethos ... we also absorb that community‟s 
„fallen‟ character – its centering of its world on itself, its inordinate self-love and love of its 
own”.  
The relation between humans and nature is therefore not what it should be (Horrell 2010:46). 
Evil has alienated us from the goodness of creation (Conradie 2005b:193). Wallace (2005:28) 
maintains that deep down we humans no longer feel a common kinship with the rest of 
nature, and do not understand ourselves and our existence to be dependent on the 
interconnectedness of natural systems. We may tend to regard ourselves a part of nature but 
we do not see ourselves as nature itself. We humans consider ourselves as living in nature, 
yet we do not interpret nature itself as why we are alive at all. In simple terms, “our 
primordial sense of belonging to the unified lifeweb that our kind and otherkind need for 
daily sustenance” has been lost. Daneel (1998:242) makes reference to the term “indoorism”. 
Such a mentality considers indoor experiences as normal reality and detaches nature as 
something “outside” – seldom enjoyed, but essentially secluded from indoor life. Schumacher 
(1973:10-11) expresses his concern for the fact that human beings do not see themselves as 
an integral part of nature, but rather as an external force, destined to be conquered. He warns 
against the danger of going into battle with nature, which makes humans forget that if they 
“win” the battle, they would actually end up finding themselves on the losing side. 
The 2001 letter entitled The Columbia River Watershed: Caring for Creation and the 
Common Good by Catholic bishops, laid down seven “Convictions That Underscore the Need 
to Care for the Earth”: God, the Creator of the universe, maintains its existence through His 
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ongoing creative will; His presence is discernible in the entire creation; God blessed and 
called all that He created “very good; He loves the community of life; all of God‟s creatures 
share a communal home; the earth He entrusts to the care of humans – they are His stewards 
in the world; and God‟s intention for the earth‟s goods is for them to be equally shared. It is 
therefore clear that the sinful principles, on which human alienation from the rest of creation 
is based, contradict the inherent value of the whole creation (Hart 2004:52-53).  
Feelings of estrangement have blinded people to the beauty of the whole creation, and as such 
have allowed ecological devastation to continue. St. Bonaventure states:  
He, therefore, who is not illumined by such great splendour of created things is 
blind; he who is not awakened by such great clamour is deaf; he who does not 
praise God because of all these effects is dumb; he who does not note the first 
principle from such great signs are foolish. Open your eyes, therefore, prick up 
your spiritual ears, open your lips and apply your heart, that you may see our God 
in all creatures (quoted in Wilkinson 1991:275). 
The recognition that the earth‟s fate is humanity‟s fate as well, “that the piercing of the ozone 
layer pierces us too”, does not even arouse human interest or generate a feeling of community 
(King & Woodyard 1999:4). What humans do not realise, as Hart (2004:24), recalling a 1982 
pastoral letter from Dominican Catholic bishops, observes, is that humanity‟s sin against 
nature “always has its repercussions against humanity itself”, evident in the following 
citation: 
Humans! I, Mountain, am speaking. You cannot ignore me! I have been with you 
since your very beginnings and long before. For millennia your ancestors 
venerated my holy places, found wisdom in my heights. I gave you shelter and far 
vision. Now, in return, you ravage me .... Can't you see? In destroying me you 
destroy yourselves (John Seed, quoted in Becker 1992:161). 
d) The place of humans: Are we home?
81
 
Considering the corrupt principles on which the three aforementioned ecological sins are built 
– anthropocentrism, domination in the name of difference of species, as well as consumerist 
greed – I would justly argue that human alienation from the rest of the earth community is 
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  For a detailed discussion on this question, see Conradie (2005b). 
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seemingly the primary evil that all forms of ecological destruction are subject to.
82
 Had 
humans not perceive themselves as existing apart from the rest of creation, they would not 
see everything in human terms (anthropocentrism); if humanity had the innate ability to 
affirm creation‟s goodness, they would not be incapable of fulfilling their duty to guard and 
preserve the earth‟s and all its creatures (domination in the name of difference); had humans 
believe that the ultimate goal of being is to live at peace in their God-given home, in harmony 
with the rest of God‟s household, they would not consider perpetual material progress life‟s 
supreme purpose (consumerist greed). A number of questions therefore arise: What is 
humanity‟s place in creation? How are human beings ought to respond to nature? Are we at 
home here on earth?  
Although opinions in this regard might vary, an ecologically-benign approach – taking into 
account the needs of all living and non-living beings – requires humanity to feel at home, to 
be at home. Murphy (1989:3) frankly states: “There is no point to a religious ethic of the 
environment unless we believe that our home is on earth and not someplace else ... the earth 
was created by God to be our home ... we humans are „made of earth‟ ... we are by nature 
earthly creatures and ... the earth, our home, has a future that we can responsibly determine”. 
Horrell (2010:130-131) thus rightly argues that human beings have the unique ability to 
reflect on contemporary ecological evils, and to take action based on ways formed self-
consciously by that reflection. Furthermore, they need to recognise how “unspecial” they are, 
and how much commonalities they share with other life-forms. McFague (2008:146-158) 
considers the possibility of a different world, free from ecological despair. She raises three 
issues in this regard: Who we are as human beings, where we fit in with the rest of creation, 
and how we should go about getting there. With reference to the first concern, she states that 
human dignity and the integrity of creation depends on human beings seeing all forms of life, 
human and non-human, as “good”, as God does. Abandoning the old, a new image of who we 
are as humans is showing appreciation for something other than ourselves and our human 
interests. Secondly, contrary to Western belief, human beings live in the earth, not on it. A 
new world calls for oneness where people exist in a community of interrelationship and 
interdependence on the continuum of life, with all earthly beings. Finally, she suggests three 
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  In this regard, Haught (1993:41) poses the question: “Is it not conceivable that our anthropocentric 
tendencies”, which are often believed to be the primary cause of ecological devastation, “are themselves 
secondary symptoms of a more fundamental pathology, that of feeling that we are ... unaccepted by [our] 
environment [?]”   
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steps in order for this new world to be realised: Imagining and asking for a different world; 
seeing the material well-being of the earth community as a spiritual matter; and to persevere 
in order to attain goodness, through small, daily unremitting changes in behaviour and 
insight. Likewise, Wirzba (2003:136-148) also believes that an authentic orientation toward 
God and the rest of creation is possible. He states that the key to achieving this is for humans 
to become servants of creation – not in a demeaning sense, but by building up the entire 
creation and thereby aiding its health and wholeness.  
Haught (1993:127) affirms that humanity‟s existence is defined by relationships – they would 
not be who they are without the concrete ties to other beings. The whole universe, each and 
every depth and complexity of the cosmos produces what we are as humans. There is no 
completely resilient boundary between the self and its constitutive world. Bruteau (1997:14-
15) maintains that the concept of “universe” implies that there is a sense in which it all 
constitutes one thing. It could be argued that the universe is the original Adam – a large 
figure of dust, systemised and energised by the breath of God that sustains its continuous 
development, becoming more diversified, interactive and unified. The universe exhibits the 
holy “Oneness of Being” – humans need to experience it like this. Even more powerful than 
the notion of the universe as Adam, McFague (1993) suggests that the world be seen as the 
body of God Himself, implying that each and every component of creation are intrinsically 
involved in the divine embodiment of Creation. Furthermore, the “body” metaphor also helps 
to overcome the traditional fear and hostility toward the physical world in Western cultures.  
Jung (1993:54) firmly declares that the earth is God‟s home and our home. For too long we 
humans have refused to see ourselves as an intrinsic member of the whole household of God. 
People‟s relationships with their Creator could never be separated from their relationships 
with one another and the world around them (Bookless 2008:144). Welker (1999:44) agrees 
that both heaven and earth are “to be understood as primary environments of God‟s presence 
and the coexistence of human beings and other creatures”. It is therefore clear that a more 
holistic, integrated and communal attitude is needed, in which humanity is able to listen to, 
talk to and feel the rest of creation. After all, as Cooper (1990:69) states, it is not only God‟s 
people that are anticipating liberation, the whole creation is. “We and the earth and the 
universe, all together, still live in „exile‟ from our universal destiny, but not inevitably from 
one another” (Haught 1993:65). Therefore, humanity needs to extend redemption to all of 
creation, as St. Isaac the Syrian affirms:  
What is a charitable heart? ... It is a heart which is burning with charity for the 
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whole of creation, for men, for the birds, for the beasts ... for all creatures...This is 
why such a man never ceases to pray also for the animals ... He will pray even for 
the reptiles, moved by the infinite pity which reigns in the hearts of those who are 
becoming united to God (quoted in Wilkinson 1991:305). 
McGrath (2002:188), talking about the “re-enchantment of nature”,  believes that nature 
should be cherished and valued, not only for what it is, but also for what it foreshadows – a 
new creation, reviving and perfecting the weary and devastated world that we know and 
strive to care for in the midst of what is feared may be its final illness. Re-enchanting nature 
implies that humans accept its divine origins and meaning, not least in what it implies for 
humanity‟s own nature and ultimate destiny. To re-enchant nature does not simply entail 
gaining new respect for its integrity and well-being, but moreover, it is about opening the 
door to a more profound level of existence. Cooper (1990:69) further claims that practical 
steps need to be taken in order to ensure such an existence: Harmonious living with God, 
ourselves, fellow humans and nature. In this regard, Jung (1993:89-105) make suggestions 
for, what he call, “serious homemaking”. In relation to God, we must continually allow Him 
to lure us into His presence and work on earth. In relating to our inner selves, we must never 
be self-destructive but always build ourselves up in the wisdom of the Creator. In relation to 
other species, we should respect animals, plants, and non-sentient life, as our flourishing 
depends on theirs, and in relation to others, we should treat them with respect, equality, 
always prepared to forgive and heal broken relationships. With reference to St. Francis‟ 
ecological wisdom, who “was open to relationship, to receiving from all, whether leper, 
human brother and sister, worms, birds, bishops, water, fire, wind or Blessed Mother Earth ... 
[and] recognized the Incarnate Word of God in all living creatures”, we can all be at home on 
earth.  
3.3 Conclusion 
In the previous exploration, the sinfulness of the roots of the ecological crisis was laid bare, 
with the aid of the Christian doctrine of sin. For ecotheologians, there should be no doubt that 
environmental degradation is in essence the result of human sin. “The loss of the theosphere 
in human consciousness implies damage of the whole ecosphere. Sin has caused pollution, 
moral and spiritual pollution which has damaged the heart of human beings” (Borrong 
2005:154). While the notion that Christianity has made a significant contribution to our 
ecological predicament holds some degree of plausibility, the abounding tradition of 
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Christian discourse on the nature of sin proves that Christianity can also serve as an essential 
means of examining and evaluating our present condition, and thereby holds immense value 
for structuring a positive, realistic approach for practical solutions. If the ecological crisis is 
then ultimately a spiritual disease, it requires a spiritual cure. 
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Chapter 4 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s life, work and legacy 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis rests on the premise that a retrieval of insights from widely acclaimed theologians 
may aid contemporary attempts as discussed in the previous chapter, to address ecological 
challenges. My assumption is that the German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and his views 
on the nature of sin can contribute to the current discourse on hamartology and ecology.  
Gaining a proper understanding of Bonhoeffer‟s views necessitates an understanding of his 
life, work and legacy. This chapter will therefore offer a brief discussion of these aspects. An 
account of Bonhoeffer‟s life, in terms of his childhood and youth, student years and work as 
pastor and teacher, as well as his involvement in the fight against Nazism and ultimately his 
death, will firstly be offered. This is followed by a description of his literacy works, with 
special emphasis on his Act and Being, Creation and Fall and Ethics. After that, a concise 
discussion of Bonhoeffer‟s legacy with specific reference to the reception and interpretation 
of his theology, the International Bonhoeffer Society (IBS) and his relevance for ecological, 
political and other contemporary issues follows. This chapter is brought to a close by means 
of a brief conclusion.  
4.2 Bonhoeffer’s life83 
4.2.1 Family life and youth 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born on 4 February 1906 in Breslau, Germany to Paula von Hase 
Bonhoeffer and Karl Bonhoeffer. Sabine, his twin sister, was born just moments after him. 
Dietrich was the sixth of eight siblings, namely Karl-Friedrich (1899), Walter (1899), Klaus 
(1901), Ursula (1902) Christine (1903) and Susanne (1909). Walter died serving in the 
German army during World War I and Klaus was to be executed for his participation in 
Hitler‟s assassination plot. Karl Bonhoeffer was a professor and physician, who worked as 
Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology in Breslau and also represented them as director of the 
University Hospital for Nervous Disease. Later, he was appointed Professor of Psychiatry and 
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  This section draws on the work of Bethge (1995), De Gruchy (1987), Nelson (1999:22-70), Robertson 
(1966) and Floyd (2005:43-58). For additional reading on Bonhoeffer‟s life, see Bethge (1975, 1979, 1986), 
Bosanquet (1969), Hamilton (1968), Kuhns (1969), Martin (1963), and Godsey (1965). 
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Nervous Disease at the University of Berlin. Paula von Hase Bonhoeffer, a descendant from a 
long line of theologians and pastors, trained as a teacher and after her marriage she focussed 
all her attention on her family and on home-schooling her children. In 1912, the family 
moved to Berlin.  
Unlike other families, the Bonhoeffer family did not attend weekly worship at the 
neighbourhood church, but was nevertheless exposed to the Christian faith, among others, by 
their nannies. Paula was the one encouraging a religious environment for her children, 
however, for example through Bible stories, traditional Christian hymns, saying grace at meal 
times, evening prayers, baptism and confirmation. Her father, Karl Alfred von Hase, basically 
served as the family pastor. After he died in 1914, Paula‟s brother, Hans von Hase, became 
their spiritual leader. Paula recommenced participation in church worship after the 
Confessing Church was established in 1934. After his brother‟s death in 1918, Dietrich‟s 
parents gave him Walter‟s confirmation Bible, which he kept until his own death. 
Dietrich was an energetic boy and performed well in sport, music, as well as learning foreign 
languages. Much to his father and brothers‟ disappointment, Dietrich, decided at age fourteen 
to become a minister and theologian. They even attempted to discourage him by stating that 
the church is “a poor, feeble, boring, petty bourgeois institution”. Dietrich determinedly 
replied: “In that case I shall reform it!” (Nelson 1999:25). The Nazi‟s ascension to power in 
1933 was much to the family‟s dismay, especially for their grandmother, Julie Bonhoeffer. 
Like Dietrich, she made no secret of her opposition to Hitler‟s regime. Julie died just three 
years afterwards and Dietrich was the preacher at her funeral. Dietrich‟s family life and years 
growing up profoundly influenced his writings.    
4.2.2 Student, pastor and teacher 
Bonhoeffer completed his schooling at the Friedrich Werner grammar school. During his 
teenage years, he was very interested in philosophical and religious writings, for example that 
of Schleiermacher, Goethe, Schiller and Max Weber. In 1923, at the age of seventeen, he 
enrolled at Tübingen University. During the following year, Bonhoeffer and his brother, 
Klaus, went on a trip to Rome, staying for three months. His experiences with the Catholic 
Church there immensely broadened his understanding of the church. Later that same year, 
Bonhoeffer returned to university, where he focused on his studies for the next three years. 
Encounters with renowned scholars such as Adolf von Harnack, Karl Holl, Hans Lietzman 
and Reinhold Seeberg significantly influenced his thinking. During this time, he also had his 
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first encounter with Karl Barth‟s writings. Bonhoeffer was part of one of Von Harnack‟s 
seminars, and under the coaching of Seeberg, he wrote his first doctoral dissertation, 
Sanctorum Communio, with the structure of the church as theme. This work was published in 
1930.  
During January 1928, Bonhoeffer passed his first set of theological examinations. After 
qualifying for ordination, Bonhoeffer began his initial pastoral ministry serving at the 
German-speaking United Protestant congregation in Barcelona, Spain at age twenty-two. 
Over the course of the year he presented nineteen sermons, started a children‟s service, taught 
boys‟ classes, and lectured, as well as dealing with social problems in the community. Whilst 
serving as a pastor, Bonhoehoeffer by no means neglected his academic career. During the 
following year he returned to the University of Berlin, serving as an assistant to German 
idealist Wilhelm Lütgert, and also presented his first lectures. In addition, he was also 
preparing another thesis, Act and Being, which was accepted in July 1930. The acceptance of 
this thesis secured him the qualification of an university teacher. At this time he was only 
twenty-four years old.  
In September of 1930, Bonhoeffer enrolled for post-doctoral studies at New York Union 
Theological Seminary as a Sloane Fellow. Much to Bonhoeffer‟s disappointment, he found 
their state of theology rather shallow. Yet, on a more positive note, he made life-changing 
friendships during this time. African-American student Frank Fisher allowed Bonhoeffer to 
teach his Sunday school class at Abyssinian Baptist church, where Bonhoeffer learned 
various lessons on American racism. These lessons he took home and eventually applied to 
anti-Semitism in Germany. He also met Erwin Sutz, who shared his love of the piano. Sutz 
later became one of his contacts and confidants during the war years. Bonhoeffer also met 
Paul and Marion Lehmann, whose door was always open for him. In addition, Paul 
strengthened Bonhoeffer‟s appreciation for the church and through him Bonhoeffer became 
involved in the fight for civil rights and economic justice. Bonhoeffer also met French 
pacifist Jean Lassere. Practising their English on each other, the two shared hours of 
theological conversation. It was Laserre who challenged Bonhoeffer to a profounder 
understanding of the Sermon on the Mount. During this time, Bonhoeffer also met Reinhold 
Niebuhr, who became one of his mentors. Niebuhr inspired Bonhoeffer to reflect on the 
church‟s involvement in the suffering of society.   
In July 1931 Bonhoeffer made his way back home, finding Germany‟s political, social, 
economic and academic environment dramatically altered. It was during this time that he met 
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Karl Barth and established a life-long friendship with him. For Bonhoeffer, there was no 
other theologian with whom he agreed more, although he never viewed Barth uncritically, 
either in his lectures or writings. He argued with Barth, as he found various things 
unconvincing, especially Barth‟s ethics. During the next month Bonhoeffer joined the 
University of Berlin‟s theological faculty as unpaid assistant lecturer. He was now twenty-
five years old. In the two years that followed, Bonhoeffer presented various courses in 
systematic theology, including “The History of Systematic Theology in The Twentieth 
Century”, “The Idea of Philosophy in Protestant Theology”, “Christology”, “Creation and 
Sin”, as well as “The Nature of the Church”. His second thesis, Act and Being, was published 
two months later.  
On 15 November, 1931, Bonhoeffer was ordained as minster at St. Matthias Church in 
Berlin. He also served as chaplain at the Technical University at Charlottenburg until 1933. It 
was around this time that Bonhoeffer started to participate in the activities of the ecumenical 
movement. He attended various conferences in his capacity as regional secretary for the 
World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, as well as the 
Universal Christian Council for Life and Work. When Hitler came to power in 1933, 
Bonhoeffer‟s academic and ecclesiastical plans were irreversibly altered. From the onset, he 
was involved in the church‟s opposition to Nazism. Unsatisfied with their lack of 
decisiveness, Bonhoeffer left for London in October 1933. He then became pastor of two 
German-speaking congregations – the German Evangelical Church in Sydenham and the 
Reformed Church of St. Paul in London. Not heeding Barth‟s summon to return to Germany, 
Bonhoeffer remained there for the next eighteen months and therefore did not witness the 
formation of the Synod of the Confessing Church in Barmen in 1934. On the Confessing 
Church‟s behalf, however, he rendered support to German pastors in London against Nazism 
and also assisted German refugees arriving in England. During this time, Bonhoeffer met 
George K. A. Bell, Anglican Bishop of Chichester, at an ecumenical conference in Geneva. 
Bell played a significant role in his friend‟s life until his martyrdom in 1945. Bonhoeffer‟s 
ended his pastoral ministry in London after receiving a call from the Confessing Church in 
Germany to serve as director of one of five newly established illegal seminaries.  
4.2.3 Resistance and martyrdom 
Bonhoeffer returned home on 29 April 1935 and became the director of the Zingst seminary 
of the Confessing Church on the Baltic coast of Pomerania. After a few weeks, in June, the 
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seminary moved to a small rural town called Finkenwalde. Most students who attended the 
seminary already received university education and were also on the way to being ordained. 
Upon completion of the first course, a “House of Brethren” was approved, whereby six 
students were allowed to remain at Finkenwalde over the holidays, continuing to work with 
Bonhoeffer. Among the original group were Eberhard Bethge, Winfried Maechler and 
Albrecht Schönherr, who would later embody Bonhoeffer‟s legacy in noteworthy ways. 
Bonhoeffer‟s days at Finkelwalde provided the context of his lectures on discipleship. These 
were later published as The Cost of Discipleship. His classic book Life Together, which is a 
reflection of the spiritual atmosphere at this seminary, also encapsulates all his experiences 
there, including fellowship, Bible study, singing, worship, solitude, mediation, prayer, the 
Eucharist and spiritual care.   
During these years, the seminarians had the opportunity to interact with various Confessing 
church congregations, including relatives and other people on whom they significantly 
depended. Among these were Ruth von Kleist-Retzow and some of her grandchildren, who 
attended the Sunday services in Finkelwalde. Maria von Wedemeyer, one of Ruth‟s grand-
daughters, was eighteen years younger than Dietrich. In the course of the years that followed, 
he visited the von Kleist home on numerous occasions. Being addressed as “Pastor 
Bonhoeffer”, he filled the role of pastor after Maria‟s father and brother were killed. Maria 
later became Dietrich‟s fiancée.  
Bonhoeffer continued using his contacts in the ecumenical movement, especially his friend 
George Bell, to gather support for the Confessing Church‟s opposition to Nazism. 
Furthermore, during August 1936, Bonhoeffer‟s endorsement to teach at the Berlin 
University was repealed. Moreover, after two years of operating illegally, the Finkenwalde 
seminary was closed in September 1937 upon the order of Gestapo. Although twenty-seven 
students had been imprisoned by the end of this year, teaching and learning nevertheless 
continued with Bonhoeffer and his Finkenwalde students continuing their work underground. 
They operated by means of “collective pastorates”, whereby superintendents from Schlawe 
and Gross-Schlönwitz appointed seminarians as assistant clergy. The Schlawe seminary was 
moved to an empty farmhouse in Sigurdshof during 1939, with Bonhoeffer working between 
the two seminaries. The Gestapo did not cease pursuing these illegal pastorates, however, and 
they eventually managed to close down the Sigurdshof group. In addition, all seminarians had 
been summoned for military service by March 1940.  
By the end of the 1930‟s, Bonhoeffer became increasingly frustrated by the Confessing 
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Church‟s lack of defiance in the face of the Nazi‟s unjust and brutal regime. Even the 
notorious “Crystal Night” on 9 November 1938, whereby the Nazi‟s destroyed over seven 
thousand shops, burnt synagogues and Torah scrolls, killed more than ninety Jews and sent 
over 20 000 of them to concentration camps, did not raise significant protest from pastors and 
church leaders. Bonhoeffer was infuriated by the church‟s utter lack of opposition to this 
tyrannical government. The following year, Herr Werner, Minister for Church Affairs, 
appealed to all pastors to take an oath, swearing loyalty to Hitler in commemoration of his 
fiftieth birthday. There was no significant resistance from church leaders and much to 
Bonhoeffer‟s despair, the majority of Confession Church leaders obeyed. He became even 
more outraged by the prospect of his name being listed for German military service. 
Therefore, at the invitation of his friend, Reinhold Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer decided to leave for 
America. He travelled to New York on 2 June, 1939, where Niebuhr had laid plans for 
Bonhoeffer to go on a lecture tour, teach a summer course at Union Theological Seminary, as 
well as various pastoral activities serving German refugees. However, Bonhoeffer was 
overcome with restlessness as he continually thought about what was happening in his home 
country, convinced that he had to share their fate. As a result, the plans that were made never 
materialised, and Bonhoeffer left for Germany by the end of July. He journeyed via England 
to pay a short visit to his twin sister, Sabine, her husband, Gerhard Leibholz and their two 
daughters, Christianne and Marianne, who had moved to England the previous year because 
of Gerhard‟s Jewish descent. This was the last time Sabine ever saw her brother.  
While Hitler and his government continued full steam with their political tyranny, others 
risked their lives by participating in underground resistance movements with the aim of 
overthrowing Hitler‟s power. Bonhoeffer‟s brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi (Christine‟s 
husband), was a leading member of the Abwehr, the counterintelligence agency of the Nazi‟s 
armed forces. The Abwehr was also the centre of the resistance movement in Germany itself. 
For Bonhoeffer, the door was now open to become a civilian member of this German military 
organisation. In September of 1940, Bonhoeffer was banned from speaking publicly and was 
also required to report his activities to the authorities on a regular basis. Fully engaged in the 
battle against anti-Semitism, he consequently decided to join Abwehr‟s resistance movement 
in Munich – led by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General Hans Oster, Colonel General Ludwig 
Beck and Hans von Dohnanyi – who provided cover-ups for resistance activities. In addition, 
they were conspiring to assassinate Hitler. They managed to convince a sceptical Gestapo 
that Bonhoeffer could use his ecumenical contacts for the benefit of gathering information for 
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the intelligence agency. However, Bonhoeffer used his travels to rally support for the 
resistance and strengthen communication between the Allied countries and the resistance 
movement. Apart from travelling to Norway, Sweden and Italy, Bonhoeffer crossed the 
border to Switzerland, making contact with prime ecumenical figures like Karl Barth and W. 
A. Visser‟t Hooft. He was therefore instrumental in “Operation 7”, an Abwehr enterprise that 
managed to successfully smuggle 14 Jews into Switzerland. Bonhoeffer‟s plans and journeys 
were extremely dangerous, yet he was committed to the fight against Nazism.  
It was the year 1942, and Dietrich and Maria von Wedemeyer were very much in love. At the 
time, Dietrich was well over thirty and Maria was just eighteen years old. Although Maria‟s 
mother had reservations about her getting married at such a young age, the couple got 
engaged on 13 January 1943, as Maria agreed to marry Dietrich in a letter written to him. 
Sadly, on 5 April, 1943, just a few weeks after their engagement, Dietrich was arrested 
because of suspicions raised by his travels abroad and his role in Operation 7. He was 
incarcerated at Tegel Prison. Though Dietrich and Maria never joined in matrimony, their 
love for each other deepened through Maria‟s few visits to the prison and their mutual 
correspondence.  
Bonhoeffer was imprisoned for a total of eighteen months at Tegel military prison in Berlin. 
His “home” was cell 92, a six by nine feet room with a plank bed, shelf, stool, bucket and a 
skylight window. From there, he wrote various letters to his parents, Maria and his closest 
friend, Eberhard Bethge, the husband of his niece. One of the guards, Corporal Knobloch, 
agreed to smuggle the letters out of prison. Following the failed attempt on Hitler‟s life on 20 
July 1944, as well as the discovery of secret Abwehr papers and documents, Bonhoeffer and 
other key figures like Hans von Dohnanyi and members of the Bonhoeffer family circle were 
implicated in the resistance and conspiracy. In October 1944, his brother, Klaus and his 
brother-in-law, Rüdiger Schleicher (Ursala‟s husband), were arrested and imprisoned. 
Bonhoeffer was also transferred to the Gestapo prison at Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse. Thereby, he 
and Maria lost contact, yet she desperately, though unsuccessfully, attempted to trace his 
whereabouts. In February the next year he was moved to the Buchenwald concentration 
camp, where he had to endure the most extreme Nazi brutality. On 3 April 1945, Bonhoeffer 
was transported to the Flossenbürg extermination camp. However, the van broke down and 
the prisoners were transported to a little village in Schönberg. They were detained in a 
schoolhouse, and at their request, Bonhoeffer conducted a prayer service, preaching from 
Isaiah 33:5 and I Peter 1:3ff. This was Sunday, 8 April 1945. That night they were moved to 
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Flossenbürg and tried by an SS court. Although the most unthinkable lay before Bonhoeffer, 
he carried himself with dignity, praying calmly to the bitter end. Along with other members 
of the resistance movement, including Wilhelm Canaris, Hans Oster, Karl Sack, Ludwig 
Gehre, Theodor Strunck and Friedrich von Rabenau, Bonhoeffer was hanged on the morning 
of 9 April 1945. On that same day, Hans von Dohnanyi was executed at Sachsenhausen. 
Klaus Bonhoeffer and Rüdiger Schleicher were shot by the SS on the night of April 22-23.  
Just a week thereafter, on 30 April, Adolf Hitler committed suicide. In addition, just another 
week after that, on 7 May, 1945, the war in Europe ended. By then Maria, Dietrich‟s fiancée, 
was still trying to locate his whereabouts in West Germany. She only learned the tragic news 
in June. Klaus and Paula, Dietrich‟s parents, only heard about their son‟s death in the 
following month, when H. B. Gisevius came to Berlin and the BBC broadcasted a memorial 
service for him from London.      
Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s life story encapsulates a wealth of themes. His earthly life was short, 
yet it exemplifies experiences and encounters from all facets of life; family bonds, 
friendships, service to others, love, imprisonment, suffering, and a passion for his fellow 
human beings, which kept him going to the very end. These contexts profoundly influenced 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought, reasoning and beliefs, and resonates in every inch of his writings.  
4.3 Bonhoeffer’s literacy works84 
A scholarly edition of Bonhoeffer‟s literacy works originally published in German, have now 
been translated into English, published as the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (DBWE) by Fortress 
Press. As a result of correspondence that has been hitherto unknown, The English language 
edition contains more material than the German works in a number of instances.  Here is the 
complete list of English works: 
 Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church, DBWE I 
(1998), originally published as Sanctorum Communio: eine Dogmatische 
Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche; 
 Act and Being, DBWE II (1996), originally published as Akt und Sein; 
 Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, DBWE III (2004), 
originally published as Schöpfung und Fall: Theologische Auslegung von Genesis 1-3; 
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  This section draws on the work of Floyd (1999:71-92). 
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 Discipleship, DBWE IV (2001) (formerly translated as The Cost of Discipleship and 
first published in English in 1948), originally published as Nachfolge; 
 Life Together (published together with Prayerbook of the Bible, DBWE V (2005), 
originally published as Gemeinsames Leben and Das Gebetbuch der Bibel; 
 Ethics, DBWE VI (2005), originally published as Ethik; 
 Fiction from Tegel Prison, DBWE VII (2010), originally published as Fragmente aus 
Tegel; 
 Letters and Papers from Prison, DBWE VIII (2010), originally published as 
Widerstand und Ergebung; 
 The Young Bonhoeffer: 1918-1927, DBWE (IX) (2003), originally published as 
Jugund und Sudium: 1918-1927; 
 Barcelona, Berlin, New York: 1928–1931, DBWE (X) (2008), originally published as 
Barcelona, Berlin, Amerika: 1928-1931; 
 Ecumenical, Academic and Pastoral Work: 1931–1932 DBWE (XI) (yet to be 
released), originally published as Ökumene, Universität, Pfarramt: 1931-1932; 
 Berlin: 1932–1933, DBWE XII (2009), originally published under the same title; 
 London, 1933–1935, DBWE XIII (2007), originally published under the same title;  
 Theological Education at Finkenwalde: 1935–1937, DBWE XIV (yet to be released), 
originally published as Illegale Theologenausbilding: 1935-1937; 
 Theological Education Underground: 1937–1940, DBWE XV (2011), originally 
published as Illegale Thelogenausbilding: 1937-1940; 
 Conspiracy and Imprisonment 1940–1945, DBWE XVI (2006), originally published 
as Konspiration und Haft: 1940-1945. 
For the purpose of this project, Bonhoeffer‟s views in Act and Being, Creation and Fall, as 
well as Ethics will be used to construct a detailed analysis of his understanding of the nature 
of sin. The context of these three publications will thus be briefly dealt with here.  
4.3.1 Act and Being 
Following Bonhoeffer‟s pastoral ministry in Barcelona, he returned to the University of 
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Berlin in 1929, noticing the significant political changes. He firmly believed that the church 
should be the one to challenge the state in the face of injustice. The eighteen months between 
Barcelona and New York he dedicated to working on his habilitation thesis 
(habilitationsschrift), originally entitled Akt und Sein and later published as Act and Being. 
Bonhoeffer decided to take up the theme of how revelation is concretised. He believes that 
the place of revelation is the church; the community of faith. This community is concretely 
visible, and hears and believes the Word of God. In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer offers a 
critique of theologians and philosophers who, in his opinion, are guilty of idealism. Strong 
critical questions are directed to Barthians. In addition, he challenges, among others, Luther, 
Heidegger, Husserl, Scheler, Grisebach, Tillich, Bultmann, Schleiermacher and Holl. 
Bonhoeffer completed Act and Being by February 1930. After he submitted it to the 
theological faculty for appraisal, the formalities took its course and it was accepted on 18 July 
1930. This habilitation thesis qualified Bonhoeffer as lecturer in theology at Berlin. At the 
time he was only twenty-four years old. The rector, Erhard Schmidt, invited Bonhoeffer to 
deliver his inaugural lecture. Carrying the title “The Question of Humanity in Contemporary 
Theology”, Bonhoeffer presented his first lecture as qualified teacher on 31 July 1930. 
4.3.2 Creation and Fall   
During the winter semester of 1932-1933, in his capacity of Privatdozent (unpaid lecturer), 
Bonhoeffer delivered a series of lectures entitled “Creation and sin: A theological exposition 
of Genesis 1-3” (Schöpfung und Sünde: Theologische Auslegung von Genesis 1-3). The 
content of these lectures was a response to the social and political turmoil raging at the time. 
For the people of Germany it was an era of restlessness, bewilderment, anxiety, and 
hopelessness as the rise of the Third Reich dawned upon them.  
Not only did Bonhoeffer aim to emphasise God‟s Word as the truth in a time of unrest and 
disorder through these lectures, but he wanted to give fresh insight on the creation narrative. 
While Genesis 1-3 had always been accepted as a true account of the beginning of history, 
people started questioning its relevance by the 1930‟s. As a result, the church was in 
perplexity over the issue of God and creation and moreover, the entire European culture 
expressed difficulty in understanding humankind‟s place in time and history. Themes 
encompassed in these lectures included creation, community, sin, Christology and the 
costliness of discipleship. For Bonhoeffer, the idea of human sin or the fall implies human 
beings wanting to play God, free from all creaturely limits.  
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Bonhoeffer‟s students were intrigued by his unique way of dealing with Scripture, the 
relevance of the topic considering the situation in Germany, the content of the lectures, and 
ultimately, with Bonhoeffer as person. They consequently requested that the lectures be 
published. Bonhoeffer sent a copy of the manuscript to the renowned Christian Kaiser 
Verlag, and although they were initially reluctant, they eventually agreed to publish it. 
Because of Emanuel Hirsch‟s Schöpfung und Sünde (Creation and sin) published in 1931, 
Kaiser Verlag requested that Bonhoeffer‟s work be renamed. It was then published as 
Schöpfung und Fall: Theologische Auslegung von Genesis 1-3 (Creation and Fall: A 
Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3) (1933).  
4.3.3 Ethics 
Since the rise of the Third Reich in 1933, Bonhoeffer actively resisted the policies of this 
regime, with or without the help of the church. He especially challenged theologians and 
church leaders who were congenial toward Nazism and its related social, economic and 
political transformation. Ethics, which is a compilation of thirteen manuscripts, is a reflection 
of Bonhoeffer‟s years of Christian opposition to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism and a 
conspiracy to overthrow this tyrant. 
Bonhoeffer‟s motivation for writing this book was two-fold; his active participation in the 
resistance movement, and his need to contribute to Germany‟s reconstruction after the war. 
Themes encompassed in this work include, among others, creation, worldliness, division and 
conflict, obedience to God‟s command, salvation, the church as the Christ-community, 
reconciliation, and “Natural Life”, whereby Bonhoeffer wrestles with Nazi laws that infringes 
on the rights of personal life. Ethics thus needs to be understood within the context of not 
only Bonhoeffer‟s theological development, but also in the light of the raging war, his 
resistance to an unjust government and the conspiracy to overthrow it.  
Following his arrest and imprisonment in 1943, these unfinished manuscripts were still lying 
on Bonhoeffer‟s desk as the time. These fragments were pieced together, although not in the 
manner which the author intended, and were edited by Eberhard Bethge. His Ethik was first 
published posthumously in 1949, and is widely recognised as Bonhoeffer‟s magnum opus. A 
first English translation appeared in 1954. 
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4.4 Bonhoeffer’s legacy85 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer is not only commemorated as a prominent theologian, but also as pastor, 
spiritual writer and martyr. Much inspiration is drawn from his life and work, which has been 
and continues to be influential among religious and non-religious circles. What follows is a 
brief discussion of his legacy.  
4.4.1 Reception and interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s theology86 
Before Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s death, he was relatively unknown outside a small circle of 
friends. He was renowned, however, in ecumenical circles through an established network of 
contacts in Europe, England and the USA. In his home country, he became established for his 
authorship of Discipleship and Life Together. After his death in 1945, he also became known 
for his martyrdom as part of the Confession Church‟s struggle against German nationalism.  
The posthumous publication of Ethics in 1949 was well received by readers. Yet, it was 
difficult to understand the development of his theology because of the fragmentary nature of 
his writing, and the fact that his first two books, Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, 
were not received with the same enthusiasm and only became widely known in the 1960s. 
Though it was never intended for publication, Letters and Papers from Prison, which is a 
collection of correspondence between Bonhoeffer and his family, friends, his fianceé Maria 
von Wedemeyer and his closest friend Eberhard Bethge, was first published in German in 
1951. This stimulated some new interest. It was, among others,
87
 John Robinson‟s Honest to 
God, published in 1963, that sparked debate on Bonhoeffer‟s writings. In this book, Robinson 
interprets Bonhoeffer based on his fragmented theological thoughts. A heated debate on 
Bonhoeffer‟s themes of “secularisation” and his “theology of the death of God” in the 1960s 
contributed to Bonhoeffer‟s fame.88 By the late sixties, the political significance of 
Bonhoeffer‟s life and work became recognised in the context of various debates, for example 
Christian-Jewish dialogue, the civil rights movement, the struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa, the confessing church movement in South Africa and in widening circles elsewhere.  
Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer‟s close friend and also his niece‟s husband, was most 
influential in the transmission of Bonhoeffer‟s legacy. In addition, he played a noteworthy 
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    For further reading on Bonhoeffer‟s Legacy, see Klaasen (1981). 
86
  This section draws on the work of De Gruchy (1999) and Nelson (1999).  
87
  See Hamilton (1962), Van Buren (1963), Altizer (1966) and Smith (1967).  
88
  See Müller (1966), Godsey (1960) and Dumas (1971).  
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role in enabling the world to understand the relevance of Bonhoeffer‟s theology for various 
contemporary issues, especially the church‟s witness in the world. Bethge‟s monumental 
biography on this theologian‟s life, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian, Christian, 
Contemporary (1977), immensely contributed to the reception of Bonhoeffer‟s theology. 
Konrad Raiser, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, comments as follows: 
“[M]ost of what we know about Bonhoeffer has come to us through Eberhard Bethge” 
(quoted in De Gruchy 1999:97). 
4.4.2 The International Bonhoeffer Society (IBS) 
On the basis of Bonhoeffer‟s far-reaching influence on scholarly inquiry, the International 
Bonhoeffer Society (IBS) was established in 1971. Being a non-profit, ecumenical and 
interfaith educational and scholarly organisation, its purpose is to preserve his legacy and to 
also increasingly develop knowledge of his legacy through promoting research on his life, 
ethics and theology.    
The IBS English Language selection has members across the globe, including Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Holland, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Its first president was Roman Catholic lay theologian Ernst Feil (1932-
2013), who was until recently a member of the IBS Germany section board of directors. Fail 
played a significant role in the formation, as well as the support of the organisation. The IBS 
presently consists of a board of directors
89
, an editorial advisory board
90
 and emeriti.
91
 The 
current president is Gaylon Barker, with Stephen Plant as vice-president.  
The IBS functions primarily through meetings and conferences held locally and 
internationally. Since its founding in 1971, it has come together every four years, where 
various academic papers on Bonhoeffer‟s work are presented. Such conferences were held in 
various countries, among others, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, South 
Africa and Netherlands. Apart from that, The English Language Section conducts an annual 
                                                 
89
  Gaylon Barker (president), Keith Clements, Clifford Green, Lori Brandt Hale (secretary), Barry Harvey, 
Jenny McBride, Stephen Plant (vice-president), Mark Randall (treasurer), Craig Slane, Anna Mercedes, 
Jeffrey Pugh and Peter Frick. 
90
  Lori Brandt Hale, John Matthews (chairman) and Clifford Green. 
91
  John Matthews, Jim Burtness, John Godsey, Dan Hardy, Pat Kelley, Geffrey Kelly, Michael Lukens, Bill 
Peck, Larry Rasmussen, Deotis Roberts, Martin Rumscheidt, Charles Sensel, Charles West and Ruth Zerner. 
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meeting at the American Academy of Religion. The affairs of the IBS are addressed and 
papers are also read.  
The IBS regularly publishes newsletters, as well as books. In addition, it co-sponsored the 
Scholars‟ Conference on the Church Struggle and the Holocaust. Since the 1990‟s, the IBS 
embarked on translating Bonhoeffer‟s sixteen-volume works, now published as the Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works English Edition (DBWE).  
4.4.3 Bonhoeffer’s relevance for ecology, politics and other contemporary issues 
Increasing scholarly engagement in Bonhoeffer‟s work begged questions about continuity 
and discontinuity in his theology; at first more emphasis was placed on discontinuity, given 
the emphasis on Letters and Papers from Prison. Later several scholars pointed out the 
continuity of his later writings with his early work. More recently, a plethora of specific 
interests emerged in fields such as literature, music, drama and film, science and ecology. 
With reference to the latter, for example, Larry L. Rasmussen (1996:295-316; 2013) 
highlights and acclaims Bonhoeffer‟s role as ecotheologian. Stephen J. Plant (2012), on the 
other hand, employs Bonhoeffer‟s writings to illustrate the notion of redemption for the entire 
creation, human and non-human. Peter Scott (2000:371-384) also employs Bonhoeffer‟s 
writings to reconstruct the meaning of humans in the image of God in a technological society, 
while Rodney D. Holder (2009:115-132) analyses Bonhoeffer in the context of discourse on 
science and religion and based on Bonhoeffer‟s references to the work of scientist Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer has left the world a living legacy, and his example is counted among that 
of other prominent leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
Bonhoeffer‟s life and work continue to be influential not only among scholars, but also 
among those engaged in the struggle for liberation and justice. Martin Doblmeier, director of 
“Bonhoeffer”, a critically acclaimed documentary featuring this martyr‟s life and death, is 
quoted in saying:  
In the world of religion and spirituality, Bonhoeffer is clearly one of the most 
inspiring writers of the 20th century ... and his life and work continue to have 
universal appeal ... Conservative Christians are attracted because Bonhoeffer was 
so Christ-centered and Bible-based. The progressive wing of the church is 
attracted to his commitment to social justice. In our language of today, he was a 
man who not only “talked the talk”, but walked the walk (in Hames 2006). 
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In his struggle for racial equality in America, Martin Luther King Jr., for example, has drew 
much inspiration from Bonhoeffer‟s tireless efforts and martyrdom, motivating him to 
continue fighting for this cause. More closely to home, Bonhoeffer‟s legacy also had a 
profound influence on former Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the context of the church‟s 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Nevertheless, De Gruchy (1999:104) maintains 
that Bonhoeffer‟s legacy receives appropriation not only in the political arena, but also carries 
immeasurable relevance for various contemporary issues. Bonhoeffer for a New Day: 
Theology in a Time of Transition (1997a) is a compilation of the papers presented at the 
Seventh International Bonhoeffer Congress, held in Cape Town in 1996. Scholars from 
around the globe gathered to present their views on the theme, “Are we still of any use”, 
Bonhoeffer‟s “soul-searching” question to his fellow conspirators (De Gruchy 1997c:1-2). 
Participants presented papers on this renowned theologian‟s relevance for a number of issues 
including, among others, Christianity, the Church, ethics and human rights in South Africa, 
civil rights and race relations in America, the ecumenical movement, environmental issues, as 
well as the apartheid struggle and the reconstruction of post-apartheid South Africa. An 
interesting example is Asian eco-feminist Chung Hyun Kyung‟s “letter” to Bonhoeffer, 
commending his significance for the Korean Student Christian Movement (Kyung 1997:9-
19). A noteworthy example for the South African context is John de Gruchy‟s article entitled 
“Bonhoeffer, Apartheid, and Beyond: The Reception of Bonhoeffer in South Africa”. Here, 
De Gruchy (1997b:353-365) highlights Bonhoeffer‟s significance in the South African 
apartheid struggle and his relevance for post-apartheid South Africa. He employs the 
testimony of Beyers Naudé who, like Bonhoeffer, remained true to the gospel of Christ in the 
midst of political and social turmoil. De Gruchy holds that Naudé fulfilled a “Bonhoeffer-
like” role in the fight against an unjust government‟s systems of racism, oppression and 
injustice and emphasised the need for developing a “confessing church” in South Africa. De 
Gruchy concludes his article with a discussion on how the church can follow Bonhoeffer‟s 
example and remain faithful to its Christian witness in our post-apartheid, multi-faith and 
multi-cultural South Africa.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter serves as introduction to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, his life, work and legacy. The 
aforementioned information clearly indicates why this theologian has and continues to have 
such noteworthy impact on people from all walks of life. It also functions as a signpost as to 
why I specifically chose to analyse this particular theologian‟s views; he was a passionate 
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fighter and beacon of hope, holding firm to his Christian principles, in the midst of adversity 
and calamity. A retrieval of his insights will thus serve as an appropriate resource in the light 
of our pressing ecological crisis.  
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Chapter 5 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the nature of sin 
5.1 Introduction 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s work is considered a vital source for gaining an understanding of the 
concept of sin. He discusses this topic in a number of his publications, among others 
Sanctorum Communio, Discipleship, Life Together and Letters and Papers from Prison. For 
the purpose of this chapter, emphasis will be placed on his views on the nature of sin in Act 
and Being, Creation and Fall, and Ethics.  
Bonhoeffer‟s interprets the nature of sin within the framework of the classical understanding, 
i.e. sin as pride, greed, moral failure and deprivation of the good. In Act and Being, 
Bonhoeffer discusses sin in terms of sinful deeds (acts), as well as sinful nature (being), 
whereas in Creation and Fall, he primarily deals with sinful being that leads to sinful acts. In 
Ethics, he focuses on the sinful being of human beings. Although Bonhoeffer‟s views on the 
nature of sin are diverse, there is a discernible pattern in his arguments; he understands sin as 
being in disunity with God – human creatures alienated from the Creator. His Christology is 
indispensable for understanding his hamartology and in all instances he sees faith in Christ as 
the only solution to the overall problem of sin and evil. 
When analysing Bonhoeffers‟s views on the nature of sin it is important to consider the 
context in which the particular work was written. This was dealt with in the previous chapter. 
This chapter offers an analysis of Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of sin, firstly in Act and Being, 
then in Creation and Fall and finally, in Ethics. The analysis is brought to a close by means 
of a short conclusion.  
5.2 Bonhoeffer’s understanding of sin in Act and Being (1996) 
5.2.1 Act and being: “in Christ” vs. “in Adam”  
In order to understand Bonhoeffer‟s views on the nature of sin in Act in Being, there are a few 
basic concepts that shape the context of his ideas, which need to be understood. The first is 
the Heideggerian term Dasein,
92
 translated as “human existence” or “being” (1996:109). 
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“Being”, on the one hand, is the ground of existence; “act”, on the other hand, descends from 
being, in the same way that act gives rise to being (1996:122). Second is the idea that Dasein 
can only be perceived “from outside”, through revelation. As such, the only place where 
Dasein can be understood is the church, the community of faith, proclaiming Christ‟s death 
and resurrection (1996:109-116). Accordingly, any existence apart from Christ is 
“inauthentic”. Existence encountered with Christ has been rejected and accepted in its 
entirety, and therefore existence can only be sinful and forgiven. This follows that only 
through faith – only through Christ – can there be an understanding of Dasein and ultimately, 
an understanding of sin (1996:116-118). The third aspect is that the old humanity is ensnared 
by sin and guilt, and only through faith in Christ can they bear the new humanity (1996:120). 
Faith is the act and also the being of the new humanity – those in Christ, while unfaith is the 
act and being of the old humanity – those without Christ. Being is therefore grounded in 
either faith or sin. Temptation, which lures us into sin, away from God‟s community, is only 
nullified through faith (1996:122-123). Being can therefore be distinguished into new  human 
beings “in Christ” and old human beings “in Adam”. The latter constitutes the groundwork 
for Bonhoeffer‟s views on the nature of sin in Act and Being.  
5.2.2. Unfaith: Act and being “in Adam” 
Bonhoeffer (1996:136-137) initially provides a brief account of the knowledge of sin. In his 
view, which is based on Luther‟s, human beings would not be able to know that they are 
sinners, except through revelation. Therefore, knowledge of sin is only possible through faith 
in Christ. He maintains that the whole being of human beings are sinful, no part is left 
unaffected. Accordingly, only through faith can the totality of our being be placed in truth, 
thus making knowledge of sin accessible. In faith, Dasein is no longer in the power of 
Wiesein (“how-it-is”) (1996:138).  
In Bonhoeffer‟s view, one could either be in faith or unfaith – the latter referring to the state 
of being “in Adam”, in sin. This state of “untruth”, Bonhoeffer (1996:137) also refers to as 
the “culpable perversion of the will ... of human essence”. To be in a state of sin implies 
being turned into the self, that the heart is not directed towards God. Having separated 
themselves from God, as well as from community with others, humans stand alone in untruth. 
The world is considered “their” world, whereby they are their own creator and lord, having 
their beginning and end in themselves. In this state of self-glorification, God is no longer the 
                                                                                                                                                        
exists”. Wiesein is thus “Dasein‟s being-how-it-is”. 
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source of life but has become a mere religious object.  
This follows that sin is the violation of Dasein by Wiesein, the violation of being by “being-
how-it-is”, of human existence by the actual form in which it exists (1996:137-138). 
Bonhoeffer (1996:138-141) argues that in the face of sin, the line between the two is blurred 
because the self has taken possession of its Dasein and has thereby become its own master. 
Thus, having to bear the weight of being creator and bearer of its world, trapped in aloneness, 
human beings become terrified of themselves. As such, they rise and proceed toward 
charging themselves – dressed in the language of conscience – by becoming their own 
ultimate judge. Their response is active repentance (contritio activa).
93
 Being in Adam, being 
in sin, human conscience and active repentance implies grasping at the self, and confirm and 
justify human beings‟ self-glorifying loneliness. They make themselves the defendants and 
thereby appeal to their better selves in a world where the self reigns and justifies. Being in 
sin, they misinterpret their condition, and thereby seek themselves not in Christ but in 
themselves. They hope that their repentance will save them from their sinful reality, but only 
keep their sins because these are perceived through the conscience, which imprisons them 
and orders them to continuously behold their sin. Not realising that there could never be 
sufficient penitence for sin, sin only increases when perceived through the conscience, 
punishing the self. Conscience in this sense is therefore from the devil, torturing and driving 
humans to despair. Being unable to bring death upon themselves, they latch onto themselves, 
with their knowledge of themselves trapped in untruth.  
Bonhoeffer (1996:144-145) holds that an act of sin – “misconstruing the self that takes place 
when Dasein is violated by its being-how-it-is as one who falsely claims to possess full 
power of the self” – corresponds to being-in-sin. Thus, sin should be understood in two ways; 
on the one hand, as an act, and on the other hand, as being. As act, the distinguishing feature 
of sin is inexcusable guilt. Sin is the turning in of the human will or essence into itself and as 
such, any self-seeking decision is deemed to be an act of sin. Conscience plays a significant 
role here, in the sense that decisions are intentionally taken against God. 
Bonhoeffer (1996:145) maintains however, that sin could never only be a free act at a 
particular point in time. Otherwise, it would be possible for humans to withdraw into 
sinlessness. In addition, human essence in its totality is affected by sin. Apart from the act, 
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sin thus also needs to be recognised as being, which could be done in two ways. In the first 
instance, the continuity of sin is sanctioned by nature in the sense of original sin. In this 
regard, sin is a human-bred product and thereby remains a part of human nature. In the 
second instance, sin could also be “a pretemporal deed that gave rise to sin in the present”. 
Sin as entity – an ontologically prior deed – precedes the act of sinning. Bonhoeffer 
(1996:145) believes that in this regard sin cannot touch humans existentially: It is 
transcended within them; they remain in control of it even when it subdues them. Sin as 
entity therefore absolves humans of their guilt, as it is “the master into whose hands human 
beings are utterly delivered” (1996:145).  
Aligning himself with the view of Luther, Bonhoeffer (1996:146-147) understands sin as 
both original sin and as egocentricity. Sin as being is rooted in “being-a-person”, whereas sin 
as act is constituted by the self seeking itself. In their whole sinful being, humanity is guilty 
of their false, self-seeking decisions. Humanity and the individual are therefore one – in the 
individual fall, humanity falls. The humanity of Adam filters down into the individual 
human‟s incomprehensible acts of sin. While the individual is responsible for each sinful 
deed, the humanity of Adam within is committing theses. The individual act is 
simultaneously the deed of humanity and therefore, each person bears the guilt of all 
humanity. The entire being of humans is in the humanity of Adam and as such, there can be 
no retreat from individual sinful acts into a sinless being. In Adam, act constitutes being in 
the same way that being constitutes act. The two are effectively interrelated, and because of 
this, both act and being carry guilt.  
Bonhoeffer (1996:147-149) furthers his analysis of human beings “in Adam” by discussing 
the terms “everydayness”, “conscience” and “temptation”. He states that guilt is the 
“everydayness” of those in Adam. It is a continual decision for solitude and “a coercive 
seeking after pleasure in the creature” (1996:147). As such, they are constantly engaging in 
the (hopeless) flight from the right knowledge that appropriately marks the limits of pleasure. 
Everydayness of those in Adam only escalates, because the wilder they flee, the more 
oblivious they become to their hopelessness. This superficiality – which appears to be life-
orientated, but in reality has its beginning and end in death – conceals their solitude.  
According to Bonhoeffer (1996:148), “conscience” in Adam is not an authentic conscience, 
but rather the point where in desperation and solitude, human beings become aware of 
themselves, thereby attempting to overcome them. What arises is only a general 
consciousness of their aloneness – not authentic consciousness – and this is precisely what 
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conscience seeks to abolish by the restoration of human beings to themselves. Law and death, 
the powers of this world, overpowers them, causing anxiety. Human beings are thereby not 
able to be freed from the self. They consider themselves immortal and have to endure their 
endless solitude. Bonhoeffer (1996:142) holds that there is another type of conscious, 
however, which he describes as “the voice of God ... insofar as conscience is the place where 
Christ, in real temptation, kills human beings in order to give them life or not”. Conscience 
other than this is therefore unfaith.  
Bonhoeffer (1996:142) distinguishes between two kinds of “temptation”; temptation as the 
work of Christ, in which human beings die of the law, and temptation as the ultimate grasp 
for the self, “seeking the self in oneself”. Furthering his argument, Bonhoeffer (1996:148-
149) states that is the first kind of temptation that reveals the guilt character of the solitude of 
those in Adam: They “are forced to recognise that their guilt and death are the ground and the 
end of their flight”. Also, they become aware that God is not the source of their life and that 
that their knowledge and will is now rooted in death. Anxiety is tied with this recurrent death. 
Human beings are no longer in solitude, as everything now speaks to, accusing them, yet they 
remain defenceless and alone. This temptation, where those in Adam die through Christ, is 
their end of sinners – it is their death – which either brings eternal death or eternal life. Life 
that comes from death is therefore God‟s free gift to those who believe. “For then God turns 
one‟s eyes away from oneself, and gives them God‟s own orientation ... towards Christ, the 
crucified and risen one who is overcoming the temptation to death” (1996:149-150).   
5.2.3. Faith: Act and being “in Christ”  
The truth of human sin could only be discovered through the encounter with Christ, at that 
moment where he breaks through the solitude of those in Adam. Passive repentance (contritio 
passiva
94
) is therefore only possible through faith (1996:141).  
Bonhoeffer‟s analysis of sin closes with a discussion of the human being “in Christ”. As 
opposed to being “in Adam”, being “in Christ” implies the seeking of the self only in Christ, 
being directed only toward Him. Whereas in Adam, being (Dasein) is violated by the form in 
which it exists (Wiesein) because humans seek the self in themselves, in Christ, Dasein is 
freed from the power of the self and is now under the power of Christ. Here, human beings no 
longer consider themselves to be lord and creator, but recognise their being as God‟s 
                                                 
94
  In contrast with active repentance (contritio activa). See discussion on page 80.  
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creatures. As such, they no longer live in unfaith but in faith, being directed toward Christ. 
They cease living under the conscience of their own voice but continue under conscience as 
the voice of God. It leads them to Christ and to a repentance which is not a grasp for the self 
but a repentance rooted in forgiveness. They do not continue losing themselves in the self, 
but instead look for and find themselves in Christ (1996:150-157). Bonhoeffer (1996:157-
159) concludes his arguments, stating that those in Christ is now no longer estranged from 
God, fellow human beings and the rest of creation, but find themselves in the community of 
faith. Reference to “I” is replaced with “Christ as Lord and God”. Seeking His revelation and 
not themselves, Dasein and Wiesein are restored to their proper status: 
Home is the community of Christ, always „future‟, present „in faith‟ because we 
are children of the future – always act, because it is being; always being, because 
it is act (1996:159).  
5.3 Bonhoeffer’s understanding of sin in Creation and Fall (2004) 
5.3.1. The Beginning 
In the introduction of Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer (2004:21) refers to the world as the “old 
world”. Some, belonging to the “old world”, want to claim the promises of the church – the 
new – but do not want to leave their old (sinful) ways behind, and thereby deny Christ as 
Lord of the new. Only the church knows the beginning of all things, because it knows Christ, 
through whom everything (even sin) is revealed (2004:21-22). 
In the first chapter, Bonhoeffer touches only once on the concept of sin with the statement, 
“... those who know only in their sin about having been created by God ...” (2004:31), but 
states that this concept will be discussed later in his exegesis. A significant aspect enlightened 
in this chapter is Bonhoeffer‟s view on the beginning of creation. An interesting point that he 
addresses is our continual questions about the beginning of all things. He argues that asking 
(and attempting to answer) such questions are futile, as “the beginning is infinite ... [and] 
endless and so ... has no beginning” (2004:26). Because Bonhoeffer refers here to the 
beginning of creation, one can deduce that he refers to the beginning of all things, including 
sin. Based on Bonhoeffer‟s response to questions regarding the issue of “the beginning”, one 
can therefore also construe his response to the question as to the beginning or origin of sin. 
He argues that such questions could never be answered, as it only leads to more questions, 
stating that: “We exist in a circle ... the beginning is everywhere ... for that very reason there 
is no beginning at all” (2004:26). He further holds that answering such questions replaces 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
God with human reason (2004:27), and believes that such questions are “godless” (2004:31). 
In this instance, he makes reference to Luther‟s response to the question as to what God was 
doing before the world was created: “God was cutting sticks to cane people who ask such 
questions” (2004:31). In Luther‟s answer he recalls Augustine, who states that God “was 
preparing hell for those who pry too deep” (2004:31). On his part, Bonhoeffer‟s maintains 
that such questions imply that we seek to “go behind the creating God ... behind the 
beginning” (2004:30-31). To question the origin of sin is thus as futile, as it is sinful.  
In furthering his argument on the issue of “the beginning”, Bonhoeffer (2004:28-31) states 
that there are only two parties that can speak of the beginning, namely God and “the evil 
one”. Us humans, being in the “middle”, have no authority to speak of the beginning (or the 
end). God reveals truths about the beginning through the Scriptures – to the extent that it is 
His Word. However, the evil one, “who has been a liar from the beginning”, deceives us 
human beings with lies that he portrays as the truth: “Believe me ... and you will be in the 
beginning and will be lord of the truth” (2004:29). Attempting to answer questions on the 
beginning, including the beginning of sin (evil), Bonhoeffer argues, can only be achieved by 
means of a lie. One may note in this regard that although Bonhoeffer refrains from explicitly 
addressing the origin of sin, it could be argued that he implicitly does so by addressing the 
origin of evil. In his view, although there was no sin committed yet, evil was there, existing 
alongside God. Although “the evil one” does not cause us to sin he deceives us with lies, and 
in our creaturely freedom we choose to sin by believing his lies.  
Another significant aspect that Bonhoeffer (2004:33-36) calls attention to in the first chapter, 
is the issue of “nothingness”. He believes that this is what lies behind the beginning – just 
“nothingness” or “non-being”. Furthermore, for Bonhoeffer this “nothingness” is the ultimate 
attempt at explaining questions about the beginning, including the beginning or origin of sin. 
This is because sin in itself is nothingness – “the nihil privatum” (2004:34) – implying a state 
of deprivation. Yet God is forever Lord over this nothingness.  
5.3.2. God’s word and work 
In analysing Genesis 1:3, Bonhoeffer (2004:41-43) states that God‟s Word – the fact that he 
spoke creation into existence, implies that He acted out of freedom and omnipotence. At His 
command everything was called into existence. Creation as God‟s work is not the “effect” of 
His word – His word (or command: the imperative) already represents the work (or what 
takes place: the indicative). Because we humans are fallen, because we do not continue to 
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exist in the unity of God‟s active word, we are unable to discern the inseparability of the two 
and rather see the creation as a matter of cause and effect. Bonhoeffer (2004:43) further holds 
that God‟s word gives form: “It outlines and limits the individual”. Thus, our whole 
creaturely being, the whole human condition, is shaped by the Word and it is the light that 
creates form; that turns chaotic and disordered matter into an ordered world. Bonhoeffer 
(2004:44) bluntly states: “Without the light we would not exist, because without the light 
things do not exist over against each other – for then no form exists. But without existing 
over against one another there is no freely worship of God ... In the light ... form becomes 
aware of existing over against something else and so becomes aware of its own existence; 
and it gives all thanks for this to the Creator.” Only through the light can we distinguish the 
darkness; only through good can we distinguish evil. Christ is this light. Only through His 
gracious and redemptive character can we recognise our own guilt as sinners and thereby 
worship God.  
On Genesis 1:4, “And God saw that the light was good”95, Bonhoeffer (2004:42-43) 
comments that God looks at the created world and sees it as good, in spite of the idea that it is 
a fallen world. “God loves God‟s work and therefore wills to uphold and preserve it ... What 
is meant here is a goodness that has not yet been distinguished as such over against evil” 
(2004:46). Bonhoeffer maintains that creation – the work – is the embodiment of God‟s 
(good) will, and therefore the work – and not only the will – is good.96 97 His exegesis of 
Genesis 1:11-13 and 20-25 closely links with this idea. Bonhoeffer (2004:59) believes that 
the meaning of the statement, “... and God saw that it was good ...”, is two-fold: “One the one 
hand God‟s work in the unspoiled form in which God‟s will has shaped it is good. On the 
                                                 
95
  The biblical translation quoted throughout Creation and Fall is the one that Bonhoeffer uses in this book and 
not the New International Version, which I use in the rest of this thesis. In this regard, Bonhoeffer (2004:19) 
states: “The translation of the biblical text conforms as closely to Luther‟s version as the original seemed to 
allow; where it diverges from this, it essentially follows the version of Kautzsch”.  
96
  As opposed to the Kantian idea that only the will is good. In response to this, Bonhoeffer (2004:46) argues 
that: “It is not correct that only the will can be good. A state of things can also be good: God‟s creation was 
as such „very good‟. Even in the fallen world a state of things can be good – never in and through itself but 
always only with God‟s own act, the new creation, in view.” With reference to the aforementioned comment 
on the “light”, this statement by Bonhoeffer reiterates the notion that only through the light is the darkness 
recognised – only through God‟s grace are we able to know and confess our guilt. 
97
  Here, the issue of theodicy surfaces. If God created the world good, where does evil come from and how was 
humans plunged into sin? 
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other hand it is „good‟ only in the way that the creaturely can be good, that is, by the 
Creator‟s looking upon it, acknowledging it as the Creator‟s own, and saying about it, „It is 
good‟.” Only in the light of God‟s goodness is what has been created good, as Bonhoeffer 
closes this chapter by stating: “It never knows about its own being except by looking at the 
word of God, at the freedom with which God creates and upholds” (2004:59). Thus, sin could 
never exist on its own – as the privation of the good, it depends on what is good. Only 
through God‟s goodness can it be known. 
5.3.3. Human beings in the image of God 
In Bonhoeffer‟s analysis of the creation of humankind, two significant aspects of the human 
condition receive attention, namely human freedom and the human body. Scripture holds that 
humans are made in the image of God. Why is it that among all other creaturely beings, only 
humankind is made in the Creator‟s likeness? The first and foremost reason pertains to the 
notion of freedom. Bonhoeffer (2004:60-61) states that the rest of God‟s work – the earth and 
all its beings – are conditioned and therefore not free. As Bonhoeffer states, it is “torn away 
from, and alien to, to the Creator; it is no longer the Creator” (2004:60). However, because 
God wants to create beings in His own image, he must create them free, resembling the 
freedom with which He creates, free to worship Him. For Bonhoeffer (2004:63), “freedom” 
implies “not a quality ... a possession ... [or] an object ...” Rather, it implies a relation 
between human beings. He defines it “in terms of the existence of human beings over-
against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another” (2004:64). 
Humans are thus free for each other and their Creator. Yet, because they are created in God‟s 
image, they are “commissioned and empowered” (2004:66) by Him to rule over the rest of 
creation – to be “its lord” (2004:66). Therefore, humankind is free from the rest of the created 
world. This constitutes the first aspect of humans created in the Creator‟s image; the fact that 
humans are free “for God and the other person” and free “from the creature in dominion over 
it” (2004:67). Considering these aspects of human freedom, it is clear that humans are created 
free, endowed with the divine ability to choose. They are free – free to worship God and 
likewise, also free to serve the evil one and sin against each other and against God. This is 
what makes humankind distinct from the rest of creation.  Bonhoeffer (2004:66-67) 
powerfully captures the essence of sin as estrangement, which flows from humanity‟s selfish 
ruling over the earth, in the following assertion: 
We do not rule; instead we are ruled. The thing, the world, rules humankind; 
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humankind is a prisoner, a slave of the world, and its dominion is an illusion. 
Technology is the power with which the earth seizes hold of humankind and 
masters it. And because we no longer rule, we lose the ground so that the earth no 
longer remains our earth, and we become estranged from the earth ... [W]e fail to 
rule ... because we do not know the world as God‟s creation and do not accept the 
dominion we have as God-given but seize hold of it for ourselves ... There is no 
dominion without serving God; in losing the one humankind necessarily loses the 
other ... [I]n shying away from exercising dominion over the earth ... human 
beings have forever lost God and their brothers and sisters. God, the brother and 
sister, and the earth belong together. 
Before addressing the second aspect of human beings created in God‟s image, Bonhoeffer 
(2004:68-69) briefly pays attention to the blessing that God lays upon humankind in Genesis 
1:28-31. He believes that this blessing remains until it is replaced by a curse. God places on 
humankind burdens of blessings and curses, which “are inherited from one generation to 
another, often not understood ... [yet] altogether real ...” In this statement, we discern the 
notion of “original” sin – the curse of sin laid upon Adam and inherited by the entire human 
race, manifested in its inclination to sin.  
“... God fashioned humankind out of dust from the ground, and blew into its nose the breath 
of life ...” (Genesis 2:7). The second reason why it is said that humans are created in God‟s 
likeness is found in this scripture: The human body is the only creaturely being endowed with 
the Spirit of God (2004:78-79). The idea that we humans are “born from the ground” 
prominently stands out here. In the words of Bonhoeffer (2004:76): “Humankind is derived 
from a piece of earth. Its bond with the earth belongs to its essential being. The „earth is its 
mother‟; it comes out of her womb ... From it human beings have their bodies.” Bonhoeffer 
(2004:76-77) maintains that the human body is part of a person‟s essence and is not merely 
the representation of a person‟s exterior. A person is body and soul – they do not simply have 
a body and soul. Bonhoeffer thus believes that our earthly bodies are the essence of our 
existence. He states: “Human beings have their existence as existence on earth. The do not 
come from above; they do not have some cruel fate been driven into the earthly world and 
been enslaved by it” (2004:77).98 Bonhoeffer (2004:78-79) further states that God is glorified 
                                                 
98
  The statement here denies the Gnostic idea of a pre-cosmic fall preceding the beginning of the world and 
human existence (2004:77). 
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in the human body. This is because it lives solely by His spirit, and that is the essential being 
of the human being. The human body, the Spirit of God and the rest of creation are 
intertwined: 
For in their bodily nature human beings are related to the earth and to other 
bodies; they are there for others and are dependent upon others. In their bodily 
existence human beings find their brothers and sisters and find the earth. As such 
creatures human beings of earth and spirit are „like‟ God, their Creator (2004:79).  
For this reason, Bonhoeffer (2004:77) argues that those who reject their earthly bodies sin 
because they reject their very existence before their Creator. Bonhoeffer (2004:78) rejects 
this sinful idea and thereby states: “Flight from the body is as much flight from being human 
as is flight from the spirit. The body is the form in which the spirit exists, as the spirit is the 
form in which the body exists.” 
5.3.4. The two trees, the woman and the serpent 
In analysing Genesis 2:8-25, Bonhoeffer links the chain of objects and related activities that 
eventually leads to the first human sin; the act of “reach[ing] out for the fruit of an enchanted 
tree and in that moment [being] displaced from paradise”. This is an act that affects the entire 
course of history and yet, it is not only an act on the part of Adam, but also on the part of the 
whole of humankind, an act which represents each individual‟s “beginning, destiny, guilt and 
end” (2004:82). Bonhoeffer (2004:83) states that because we all have sinned, it is a story not 
just about the first humans, but about all of humanity.  
Attention is paid first to the tree of life, then to the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and 
then to the creation of the woman, while the role of the serpent is highlighted in Bonhoeffer‟s 
analysis of Genesis 3:1-3. While no prohibition is attached to the tree of life, there is one 
attached to the tree of knowledge: The human is prohibited from eating its fruit because it 
carries with it the threat of death. Bonhoeffer (2004:83) states that life, knowledge and death 
are here spoken of as if they are somehow connected, and he dedicates the rest of his 
exposition to analysing this connection.  
The tree of life – at the center – is equated to God, the center or source of life. Adam‟s life 
revolves around this center “in the unity of unbroken obedience to the Creator” (2004:84). 
Being innocent and oblivious to disobedience, Adam possesses life in freedom, before God. 
Adam has therefore no desire to take possession of or to seize hold of this center. He is 
completely oriented towards the source of life. Bonhoeffer (2004:84) states that while the tree 
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of life may not be threatened by a desire to be seized by Adam because he already possesses 
life, the tree of life is endangered by the tree of knowledge of good and evil, that is the 
freedom in which Adam has life. Yet, in what way is it endangered?  
According to Bonhoeffer (2004:84-85), the prohibition and the threat of death attached to the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil are of great significance. For Adam, who lives in 
unbroken obedience to his Creator, the concepts of “death”, “good and evil” and 
“prohibition” are incomprehensible. However, as a human being, Adam does understand that 
this commandment confronts him and indicates his boundary. It challenges his freedom and 
creatureliness (limit). Bonhoeffer (2004:85) restates the meaning of the prohibition as 
follows: “Adam you are who you are because of me, your Creator; so now be what you are. 
You are a free creature, so now be that. You are free, so be free; you are a creature, so be a 
creature.” So while the tree of knowledge of good and evil – the human being‟s boundary or 
limit – stands at the center, the tree of life – God, the source of life – also stands at the center. 
This implies that God is both the boundary and the center of human existence (2004:86). 
Adam knows only his creaturely limit because he knows God, but at this stage he knows 
nothing about evil and therefore does not understand the prohibition as a commandment that 
can be transgressed. For Adam, grace is the basis of his freedom and creatureliness, and as 
such he understands the prohibition only in terms of “the grace of the Creator toward the 
creature” – “only as a renewed gift” (2004:87). While only God possesses knowledge of good 
and evil, Adam lives in the unity of disobedience, and therefore does not understand that 
which is twofold, or the split of knowledge into good and evil. He cannot comprehend either, 
and therefore “lives in the strictest sense beyond good and evil”. 
So, inevitably, what Bonhoeffer (2004:88-93) substantially emphasises next is the concept of 
good and evil – “tob and ra”, tob meaning “pleasurable” and ra meaning “painful” 
(2004:88).
99
 For Bonhoeffer (2004:88), tob and ra implies the “ultimate split ... the deepest 
divide in human life”. Bonhoeffer further states that in being split apart, they essentially 
belong together, as the one cannot exist without the other: “There is no tob, nothing that is 
pleaurable/good/beautiful, without its being already immersed in ra, in that which is 
painful/evil/base/false” (2004:88). What is good or pleasurable has essentially passed through 
and has overcome evil, and likewise, what is evil or painful is strengthened by the good 
                                                 
99
  Tob is the Hebrew word for “good, pleasant, delightful, delicious, happy, glad, joyful”, while ra is the 
Hebrew word for “bad, evil, disagreeable, displeasing, unpleasant, harmful” (2004:88).   
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through which it becomes possible (2004:88-89). Bonhoeffer (2004:89) makes this 
provocative statement: 
Healthy human beings in pain are borne up and nourished by what brings 
pleasure; in their experience of pleasure they are churned up by what is painful, in 
good by evil, in evil by good. They suffer from an inner split.  
But how is this “inner split” within humans effected? This inner split is established once 
human beings gain knowledge of good and evil; not only Adam, but each one of us who eats 
from the tree of knowledge, and then dies because of the threat of death attached to the 
prohibition. This implies that the tree of knowledge is then also the tree of death, which 
stands in opposition to and endangers the tree of life. Sin implies that humans transgress the 
established boundary and center and thereby lose their life (2004:89). Bonhoeffer (2004:90) 
further explains the state of this human divide: “A human being who knows about tob and ra 
knows immediately about death. Knowing about tob and ra itself constituted death ... 
Humankind is dead in its own good and in its own evil.” Being dead in this sense does not 
mean the end of one‟s physical life or existence, but rather the inability to live before God 
and yet having to live before Him. Death here implies “standing before God as an outlaw, as 
one who is lost and damned ... receiving life from God no longer as grace ... but as a 
commandment that stands in one‟s way and with a flaming sword denies one any way of 
retreat” (2004:90). It implies no longer gracefully possessing life in freedom, but living by a 
commandment, which demands what one is unable to fulfil; no longer living from the centre 
or source but living out of oneself, one‟s own resources and one‟s own knowledge of good 
and evil, yet being unable to do so. Bonhoeffer (2004:91) sums this up cycle of sinfulness up 
in the following statement:  
Humankind lives in a circle; it lives out of its own resources; it is alone. Yet it 
cannot live, because in fact it does not live but in this life is dead, because it must 
live ... must accomplish life out of its own resources and just that is its death (as 
the basis at once of its knowledge and of its existence!). 
Bonhoeffer (2004:92) describes humanity‟s fallen condition as a state of disunity. As such, 
humans remain in a split-apart world because their lives are rooted in antithesis and 
contradiction. We could never escape to or even comprehend living beyond good and evil. 
Only through Christ can we overcome living by the commandment, be freed from the curse 
of death and live a life by grace. What now remains is the question as to how we humans fall 
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away from God and create this world of contradiction for ourselves.  
Perhaps the answer to this becomes more apparent in analysing the next aspect that 
eventually leads to the first human sin, the incomprehensible act of seizing the tree of 
knowledge and the tree of life; the creation of woman. Bonhoeffer (2004:96) believes that 
each person, in their own way, is alone. Like we are alone in evil and hopelessness because 
we have hated others and pushed them away, Christ was also alone in the fullness of deity, 
just like Adam was alone in hope of community. While no suitable partner for Adam is found 
among the animals – which are formed from the ground – God eventually creates a helpmate 
for him from Adam‟s own human flesh. Adam understands the uniqueness of Eve, but the 
fact that she has been formed from his flesh is no cause for pride or for him wanting to claim 
her for himself. Instead, Adam accepts her in gratitude as a gift from God. Adam understands 
the unique bond between them as him belonging to her and her belonging to him (2004:97).  
So in what way is Eve a helper and partner to Adam? Bonhoeffer (2004:98) argues that she 
fulfils this duty in the sense of helping him bear the limit imposed on him, the limit that he 
alone, in unbroken obedience, had to bear in his human freedom and creatureliness. Although 
Adam continued to live his life within this boundary and although transgressing it was 
incomprehensible to him, he could not really love this life. God knew that Adam could only 
bear life in its boundedness if it is borne in love. For this reason God created Eve, who 
becomes the boundary and object of Adam‟s love, as Bonhoeffer (2004:98) states: “Indeed 
love for the woman was now to be the human being‟s very life (in the deepest sense of the 
word).” Adam‟s love for Eve, his helper and partner, thus helps him to bear the limit. She is 
grace to him as the prohibition was grace to him – she is the limit imposed by God on him, 
the limit that he loves and will not transgress. This is the instant where the sinful concept of 
falling away from God is illuminated. Bonhoeffer (2004:99) described this act as “the point 
where love for the other is obliterated”.  This implies that the desire to seize the tree of 
knowledge and the tree of life is produced once love for the other is abolished. As a result, 
the human being can only hate the limit and longs – uncontrollably – to either possess or to 
destroy the other. God‟s grace, the creation of a partner to help us bear the limit and live 
before Him in community, becomes a curse. The very thing that we accepted in humility in 
grace now becomes the foundation for our pride and rebellion, as we insist on our 
contribution to the other‟s making, lay claim upon them and adamantly maintain that they are 
derived from us. The very other who is supposed to deepen our love for the Creator 
reinforces our hatred for the Creator. Bonhoeffer (2004:99-100) explains: 
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The power of the other which helps me to live before God now becomes the 
power of the other because of which I must die before God. The power of life 
becomes the power of destruction, the power of community becomes the power 
of isolation, the power of love becomes the power of hate. 
Bonhoeffer (100-102) further maintains that the ultimate belonging to one another finds 
expression in human sexuality – another concept highlighted in his analysis. Genesis 2:25, 
“And they were both naked, the man and his woman, and they were not ashamed”, means 
that in the unity of unbroken obedience – where a person essentially understands their own 
being as derived from the other, belonging to the other and destined for the other – there is no 
guilt, no shame. However, shame is the product of a torn-apart world, of antithesis, of 
contradiction. It is caused by the knowledge of dividedness; humankind‟s, the world‟s and 
one‟s own dividedness. In this state of guilt and shame we no longer accept the other as 
God‟s gift, but obsessively desire them for our own selfish purposes. Correspondingly, the 
other person is no longer satisfied with belonging to us, but solely desires to gain something 
from us. Bonhoeffer (2004:101) sums this up by stating that: “Shame is a cover in which I 
hide myself from the other because of my own evil and the other person‟s evil, that is, 
because of the dividedness that has become between us.” As a result, the relation between 
knowledge, death and sexuality forms an indispensable part of Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of 
evil and sin. 
Therefore, what now follows is the final link in the chain of activities leading to that first 
sinful act – the serpent. The endangerment of the tree of life by the prohibition attached to the 
tree of knowledge, as well as the creation of Eve, was dealt with in the preceding. The 
serpent‟s “pious” question to the woman is the last activity, chained with the previous ones, 
which eventually leads to the first human sin. In his analysis of Genesis 3:1-3, Bonhoeffer 
(2004:103) states that the prohibition, the woman, as well as the serpent, all come from the 
Creator. However, somehow these blessings are turned into curses as “now, strangely, they 
form a common front with humankind” against God: The prohibition that Adam accepted as 
grace now becomes a wrath-provoking law; the woman, man‟s helper and partner in bearing 
his limit now leads him off the right path; and the serpent, a very creature of God, now 
becomes an object of evil.  
Bonhoeffer (104) states that the Bible only offers a strange, indirect answer to how this 
comes about: Sin is a result of human guilt. On the one hand, to blame sin on the devil, while 
on the other hand, to blame sin on human freedom used in the wrong way both imply a 
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misinterpretation and misconstrual of the Scriptures, as well as an apology for sin. The 
essential aspect here is that this hideous act occurs in God‟s creation, through God‟s 
creatures. Bonhoeffer (2004:104) thus believes there is only one explanation for sin; “truly to 
lay all the guilt on human beings and at the same time to express how inconceivable, 
inexplicable and inexcusable that guilt is”.  The fact that humans – God‟s creatures – oppose 
God and do evil is what makes it so inexcusable. Human sin cannot be blamed on the devil, 
or an “imperfect” creation, or an evil force or “the fall of the angels”: “The guilt is mine 
alone; I have committed evil in the midst of the original state of creation” (2004:105). The 
fall takes place in God‟s created world, through His creatures, and that is what makes it 
inexcusable.  
Bonhoeffer (2004:105-106) notes that in this biblical account, the devil is nowhere 
introduced in bodily form, yet evil comes to pass through God‟s created beings – humankind, 
the serpent and the tree. The serpent uses the very word of God against Him, and thereby 
opens humankind‟s mind to questioning God‟s word: “Did God really say, You shall not eat 
from every kind of tree in the garden?” This question immediately places God‟s word in 
dispute; as if God would not impose such an unfair thing on humankind because it would 
imply that God‟s love is limited. It therefore awakens in humans the desire to go behind 
God‟s word and thereby provide a human understanding of God‟s character. Furthermore, 
this question appears to defend God‟s cause; to clarify God‟s “false” words. Evil only has 
power to the extent that it stands for God‟s cause: “In posing its question it derives its 
existence from the power of God alone, and is able to be evil only where it is pious” 
(2004:106-107). Bonhoeffer (2004:107) therefore believes that evil in its overt form is 
powerless; only to the extent that it hides under good – where it “is veiled in the garb of 
piety” – does it have any real power. What appears to be pious is entirely godless as it calls 
the whole of God‟s word into question: “Did God really say ...?”100 It is “godly” questions 
like these, states Bonhoeffer (2004:107), through which we give into evil and become 
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  Here, Bonhoeffer (2004:107) poses a list of questions to illustrate his argument: “Did God really say that 
God is love, that God wishes to forgive us our sins, that we need only believe God, that we need no works, 
that Christ died and was raised for our sakes, that we will have eternal life in the kingdom of God, that we 
are no longer alone but upheld by God‟s grace, that one day all grieving and wailing shall come to an end? 
Did God really say: You shall not steal, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not bear false witness....? 
Did God really say this to me? Or does it perhaps not apply to me in particular? Did God really claim to be a 
God of wrath toward those who do not keep God‟s commandments? Did God really demand the sacrifice of 
Christ –  the God whom I know better, the God whom I know to be the infinitely good, all-loving Father?”  
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disobedient to God. Had such questions not been veiled under good, we would be able to 
resist them: “But Christians are not open to attack in that way; one must actually approach 
them with God, one must show them a better, a prouder, God than they seem to have, if they 
are to fall.”  
Bonhoeffer (2004:107-109) maintains that the real evil is not the serpent‟s question as such, 
but the fact that the question itself already contains the wrong answer: “No, God naturally did 
not say that” (2004:109). The woman therefore acknowledges this and is thereby from the 
outset won over by the serpent. This question therefore lures humankind into sin by obliging 
them to pass judgement on the word of God, rather than listening to it and obeying it. They 
use some principle or notion of God to rebel against His word, and “at that point they have 
become God‟s master, they have left the path of obedience, they have withdrawn from being 
addressed by God” (2004:108). In hiding under good, in appearing to be defending God‟s 
cause, Adam understands the question as such and thereby makes his own discovery, based 
on his own knowledge, of “being for God”. The serpent uses what is false to cause the demise 
of what is true. Bonhoeffer (2004:109) therefore warns us: “May we be on our guard against 
such cunning exaggerations of God‟s commandment. Evil is certainly at work in them.” He 
argues that although the serpent is not Satan, the question that he poses is certainly “the 
satanic question”, which deprives God of His honour and causes humans to wander away 
from Him and go behind His word (2004:109-110). Bonhoeffer (2004:110) believes that 
human beings have no defence against such “pious” attacks, other than with an “Away from 
me, Satan”101 (Matthew 4: 10). 
5.3.5. “Sicut Deus”: Being like God – knowing good and evil 
In Bonhoeffer‟s exposition of Genesis 3:4-5, he continues to analyse the conversation 
between the serpent and Eve. Her reply to the serpent‟s question, “We do eat from the fruit of 
the trees in the garden; but of the fruit of the tree in the centre of the garden God has said, Do 
not eat from it, and do not even touch it, lest you die”, does not prevent the serpent from 
trying again and continuing his conversation about God (2004:111). This is a clear 
illustration of how sin lures us with persistence, just as it has done with Jesus in the 
wilderness, and in this case with the first human beings. Bonhoeffer (2004:111-112) states 
that by Eve allowing herself to continue with the conversation, the serpent identifies the 
opportunity to launch his real attack. In replying, “You will not die at all. Instead God knows 
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that on the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God and know 
what good and evil is”, the serpent speaks as if he possesses a profound knowledge of God‟s 
character. Bonhoeffer (2004:112) believes that there are some implicit statements in this 
reply:  
But why did God say it...? ... God said it out of envy....God is not a good but an 
evil, cruel God; be clever, be cleverer than your God and take what God 
begrudges you....God did say it, yes, indeed you are right, Eve, but God lied; 
God‟s word is a lie...for you will not die at all.... 
In Bonhoeffer‟s view, this is the ultimate form of rebellion – the fact that the lie reveals itself 
as the truth and denounces the truth as a lie. The fact that God attaches to the tree the decree 
of death is portrayed as a lie, and the fact that the serpent attaches to the tree the promise of 
being like God is portrayed as the truth. Yet, God‟s truth triumphs over the lie – even in its 
pretence of being the truth – because God‟s inescapable word holds true that whoever 
becomes like Him will certainly face death (2004:112). Sin causes us to become something 
“good”, while we in fact die in the process. Bonhoeffer (2004:112-113) maintains that this 
whole process is entirely “inconceivable and unpardonable”.  
Bonhoeffer (2004:113) further holds that the point where Satan‟s word stands in opposition 
to God‟s word is where the human inner split (referred to above) starts to surface: “You will 
not die at all” against “You shall die”; God‟s truth, linked to the prohibition, pointing to our 
human limitedness, and God and humans in the His image against the serpent‟s truth, linked 
with the promise, pointing to our human unlimitedness and God and humans being like him; 
Imago dei – humans in God‟s image, being for God and others, in all their creatureliness and 
limitedness bound to God‟s word and deriving life from Him and living as creatures in 
unbroken obedience against sicut deus – humans like God in their own knowledge about 
good and evil, being alone and against God, in their unlimitedness deriving life from their 
own resources and living as “creator-creatures” on the foundation of the split between good 
and evil. Adam, who possesses no knowledge of evil, cannot understand the serpent‟s 
promise as rebellion against God‟s word however, but only comprehends it in terms of a 
“deeper kind of creatureliness [that] must be won at the cost of transgressing the 
commandment” (2004:113-114). It is precisely this standing between God and a false god – 
who pretends to be the true God – that causes Adam to fall into sin (2004:114).   
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5.3.6. The fall into sin 
In Bonhoeffer‟s analysis of the remainder of Genesis 3, he comprehensively explores the 
essence of sin. With reference to verse 6, “And the woman saw that it would be good to eat 
from the tree and that it was beautiful to look at, and that it was an enjoyable tree to be 
desired because it would make one wise, and she took of its fruit and ate and also gave to her 
husband and he ate”, he states that without any further reply on the serpent‟s comment, the 
woman falls into sin. In response to how this comes about, Bonhoeffer (2004:115-117) holds 
that having eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, humankind is now 
sicut deus – the limit in the centre has been transgressed, humankind in its unlimitedness now 
stands in the middle, no longer living from its Source but living from its own resources, no 
longer needing the Creator because it creates its own life – being alone. Being sicut deus 
implies that humankind in its own attempt to be for God gains its own knowledge of God by 
going behind His spoken word, rejecting this Word spoken from the center, abandoning the 
life coming from the center and grabbing for it themselves – standing in the center. “This is 
disobedience in the semblance of obedience, the desire to rule in the semblance of service, 
the will to be creator in the semblance of being a creature, being dead in the semblance of 
life” – the lie portrayed as the truth. Humankind has lost it creatureliness, because it is now 
limitless, and as such cannot to any further extent be addressed in its creatureliness or even be 
recognised as humans in their creatureliness – precisely because it no longer desires to be 
creatures. Only God can do so through the atoning power of Christ. Bonhoeffer (2004:117) 
believes that in order to fully understand how things eventually leads to this sinful act, three 
aspects need consideration, namely a recollection of the events leading to sin, the endless 
split between these events and the actual deed, and extracting the real question at issue in this 
regard.  
With regards to the first aspect, Bonhoeffer (2004:117-119) argues that the chain of events 
leading to the sinful deed could never in itself be responsible for the deed. The only way in 
which these preceding events could be related to the deed is to the extent that one identifies 
the complete incomprehensibility of how the evil deed eventually comes about.  The first link 
in the chain of events is the prohibition laid on Adam, revealing his creatureliness and 
freedom, which is understood solely as freedom from God. Whereas this prohibition could 
only make God‟s grace more apparent to Adam, it instead demarcates his distinct existence as 
creature from that of the Creator and thereby increases Adam‟s awareness of the distance 
between the two. The second aspect that increases this awareness is the creation of Eve from 
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Adam‟s flesh – his limit taking on bodily form, becoming more distinct. Adam‟s love for the 
other could only increase his understanding of the depth of God‟s grace. Instead, for Adam 
this more greatly implies that he should transgress his limit, and he accordingly also harms 
the creatureliness of the other. Finally, the serpent‟s conversation with Eve increases 
humankind‟s awareness of its freedom in unbroken obedience as something over and above 
and in addition to its creatureliness. This freedom is understood as belonging to its 
creatureliness, and exercising it thus implies being in the service owed to God. Instead of 
understanding Eve‟s deed as pointing to his Creator, Adam only understands it in terms of a 
fortification of the serpent‟s words emphasising his freedom and creatureliness. Eve has 
fallen, and so does Adam – they fall because of each other, yet they bear their own individual 
guilt. 
Pertaining to the second aspect, Bonhoeffer (2004:119-120) identifies the nature of the sinful 
act: It is inconceivable and inexcusable; it is final and cannot be done away with; and finally, 
it is a human deed. To deny any of these would imply making an excuse for this guilt. 
Because of the inconceivability and inexcusability of this sinful act, not even the term 
“disobedience” could adequately describe it. Instead, rebellion represents a more proper 
description, as it points toward the destruction of creatureliness whereby the creature 
becomes creator; “a defection, a falling away from being safely held as a creature ... a 
continual fall, a dropping into a bottomless abyss, a state of being let go, a process of moving 
further and further away, falling deeper and deeper ... not merely a moral lapse but the 
destruction of creation by the creature” (2004:120). The degree of this sinful act is so severe, 
to the extent that the entire world is affected by it, and as such, produces this “fallen-falling” 
world we know.  
Considering the last aspect, the real issue at stake, Bonhoeffer (2004:120) believes the 
theological question should be distinguished from the speculative one. In the latter case, the 
question is why there is evil; what is its origin? For Bonhoeffer, this is not a theological 
question, as it assumes the possibility of going back behind existence, thereby removing our 
guilt as sinners and blaming something else. Instead, the real issue in this regard is the 
question as to how evil can be overcome through Christ‟s sacrifice on the cross, as it “seeks 
the real forgiveness of guilt and the reconciliation of the fallen world” (2004:120). 
While it is apparent that Bonhoeffer has thus far explored the nature of sin in terms of pride, 
moral failure and deprivation of the good, he now approaches this matter from a different 
perspective – sin as desire (concupiscence), which he believes is essentially at issue in this 
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regard. For Bonhoeffer (2004:122), the statement, “Then their eyes were opened and they 
became aware that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves 
an apron” (Genesis 3:7) implies that the fundamental concern here is the problem of 
sexuality. The split of human knowledge into tob and ra intially finds expression in Adam‟s 
relation to Eve. Whereas he loved her as the limit imposed by God, he has now transgressed 
this boundary, no longer accepting it as God‟s grace but hating it, understanding it as God‟s 
wrath and abhorrence. As such, the limit now represents dividedness. For Bonhoeffer 
(2004:123-124) this dividedness essentially means two things. In the first instance, he 
emphasises the idea of unrestraint desire, which is more specifically expressed through sexual 
desire. Desiring to be without any limit – hating boundedness – a person claims to possess the 
other and in the process, destroys the other‟s creaturely nature. Furthermore, this sexual 
desire is rooted in the person‟s self-will, which obsessively longs for unity in a split-apart 
world, and attempts to preserve their own life by destroying the other. In re-producing life, it 
thus essentially destroys life. Bonhoeffer (2004:123) states: “Human beings create by 
destroying ... preserves itself while it destroys. Unbridled sexuality is therefore destruction ... 
a mad acceleration of the fall ... It is affirming oneself to the point of self-destruction.” He 
thus believes that the fruits of the tree of knowledge of good and evil are obsessive desire and 
hatred. The other aspect implied by this dividedness is that human beings, in their guilt of 
hatred and unrestraint desire, attempt to cover themselves, to cover their shame. They do not 
wish to be seen in their nakedness, because nakedness implies innocence, unity, respecting 
the limit, recognising the other‟s rights and believing in grace. The opposite of this is to cover 
one‟s nakedness in guilt; hating the limit; in shame hiding one‟s nakedness. Considering 
Bonhoeffer‟s remarks in this regard, it therefore comes as no surprise that he does not dismiss 
church dogmatics, which often regards sexuality the essence of original sin. Bonhoeffer 
(2004:124-126) himself believes that knowing about tob and ra begins with sexuality, which 
he sees as a perversion of a person‟s relation to the other.  Because sexuality involves 
creating
102
 while destroying, the essence of original sin can be perceived in procreation, the 
preservation of human life from one generation to the next. In a torn-apart world, all of 
humankind has lost its creaturely nature by becoming sicut deus. The only way to cover this 
shame and therefore sanctify sexuality is through the community of marriage, to be under 
restraint. As a result, the entire world is now veiled, hiding its state of being sicut deus.  
Further exploring the essence of sin, Bonhoeffer (2004:127-128) holds that being limitless, 
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having fallen into dividedness, having overstepped the boundary and now hating the limit – 
knowing tob and ra – humankind now finds itself in a continual flight from the Creator. This 
he deduces from Genesis 3:8-10: “And they heard the steps of Yahweh God ... And Adam hid 
himself with his woman ... And Yahweh God called Adam and said to him: Where are you? 
And he said: I heard ... your steps ... and I was afraid, for I am naked, and so I hid myself.” 
This flight of fallen humanity, still falling away from God, is called conscience, which is 
humanity‟s resistance against the Creator‟s voice. Human beings are chased by this 
conscience to their own hiding place in an attempt to flee from God – a place where they can 
be their own judge and thus escape God‟s judgement. As such, they live from their own 
knowledge of good and evil and out of their own resources – divided from themselves and 
their Creator. Conscience is thus being ashamed before God, yet a self-justification attempt 
by covering – in shame – one‟s own iniquity. This Bonhoeffer (129) gathers from verse 11-
13: “And God said: Who told you that you are naked? You have not eaten from the tree 
which I commanded you – You shall not eat from it – have you? So Adam said: The woman 
whom you made my companion gave to me from the tree, and I ate. Then Yahweh God said 
to the woman: Why did you do this? The woman said: The serpent beguiled me; that is why I 
ate.” While they confess their sin, they still seek to flee from God by justifying themselves, 
and based on their own knowledge of good and evil, ultimately blaming God for their sin. 
Bonhoeffer (2004:130) argues that this is therefore not a true confession of sin. Whereas 
God‟s call should be seen as grace, it is only seen as wrath and hatred, as in their rebellion 
they seek to escape from God and thereby continue to fall.  
5.3.7. The effects of the fall 
The creation narrative follows that God curses not only the serpent and humankind, but also 
the ground itself. Bonhoeffer (2004:132-135) holds that having sinned, human beings now 
find themselves in a state between curse and promise, between tob and ra: The curse being 
that fallen humans have to continue living in a fallen, destroyed world; the promise being that 
God allows them to continue living in the world without depriving them of His word. In this 
divided world, between curse and promise, humankind is alienated from God, not able to 
uphold His word peacefully, but facing the continual temptation of godlessness. As 
previously stated, the fruit of the tree of knowledge is shame and unrestrained desire, 
humankind coming under the law of tob and ra: The very pleasurable community with the 
other that was so obsessively desired has afflicted pain. Although the man and the woman can 
now belong to each other, this very belonging is both a promise and a curse. The world is 
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destroyed and divided, and alienation is manifested in three ways; their relationship with 
God, their relationship with each other and their relationship with the rest of nature. 
Bonhoeffer (2004:133-134) pays special attention to the latter, and states that because of 
humankind‟s sin, the ground is now also cursed. There is thus enmity between humans and 
the rest of creation: 
The other created things rebel against ... the creature that thinks it can live out of 
its own resources. They ... become mute, enigmatic and unfruitful. With the fall 
of humankind, however, they themselves, as creatures made subject to 
humankind, fall into dividedness as well; they become nature without a master 
and thus in rebellion and despair, nature under the cursed, accursed ground ... 
[O]ur earth ... is cast out of the glory of its created state ... (2004:134). 
Bonhoeffer (2004:135) maintains that humankind has indeed become sicut deus, and has 
therefore died. This does not imply death in the sense of the end of physical existence, but 
rather having to live from its own resources; not being able to live, yet being forced to live; 
being cut-off from the tree of life. Bonhoeffer (2004:139-140) holds that God is now the 
preserver of the fallen, sinful world. While God affirms their sinfulness, he does not expose 
their nakedness: “And Yahweh God made cloaks of skin for Adam and for his wife and 
clothed them with these” (Genesis 3:21). In the fallen world, He thereby restrains 
humankind‟s obsessive desire and imposes order by showing their limits. “Humankind 
remains between tob and ra, remains split; even with its tob-good it remains beyond God‟s 
good. With its whole existence [Dasein], split as it is between tob and ra, it remains far away 
from God, continuing to drop downward, in the fallen and falling world” (2004:140). 
However, God preserves the fallen world for death, and thus, for the resurrection with Christ 
and the new creation.   
The creation narrative ends with God giving instructions for the tree of life to be guarded, 
“lest [Adam] stretch out his hand and pluck from [it] as well, and eat, and live forever” 
(Genesis 3:22). Although little has been said about this tree previously, Bonhoeffer 
(2004:141-144), in concluding his exegesis, discusses its significance. He states that it is now 
clear why the tree of life is endangered by the tree of knowledge. Whereas humankind in the 
imago dei lived from God, the centre, where the tree of life stands, humankind sicut deus – 
having eaten from the tree of knowledge of good and evil – is dead. “It is alone by itself ... it 
no longer needs any others, it is the lord of its own word ... the solitary lord and despot of its 
own mute, violated, silenced, dead, ego-world” (2004:142). It no longer receives life from 
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God and is therefore forced to live, finding itself in continual rebellion against existence. As a 
result, humankind grabs for the tree of life in an attempt to grasp “the life that would put an 
end to this life, that would be the new life” (2004:142-143). Being sicut deus – being dead – 
being its own god and source of life, humankind only desires itself. However, this solitude in 
the self is the very thing which creates the insatiable, eternal thirst for life. Bonhoeffer 
(2004:143) maintains that the same manner in which sinful humanity flees from life and 
grabs for life at the same time, likewise it flees from God while yearning for Him.  
5.3.8. Overcoming sin through the Cross 
Bonhoeffer (2004:145-146) concludes his exegesis on Genesis 1-3 with the revelation that the 
tree of life is in fact the cross. Just as the tree of life is humankind‟s only hope for life, this 
dead, sinful world can only be made alive and sanctified by the redemptive power of Christ: 
And under the whirling sword, under the cross, the human race dies. But Christ 
lives. The trunk of the cross becomes the wood of life, and now in the midst of 
the world, on the accursed ground itself, life is raised up anew. In the center of 
the world, from the wood of the cross, the fountain of life springs up. All who 
thirsts for life are called to drink from this water, and whoever has eaten from the 
wood of this life shall never hunger and thirst (2004:145-146).   
Just as Bonhoeffer‟s interpretation of the creation narrative starts with Christ, so it ends with 
Christ.  
5.4 Bonhoeffer’s understanding of sin in Ethics (2005a) 
5.4.1. The centrality of Christian Ethics 
For Bonhoeffer, Christian ethics centres more on being good than on performing acts of 
goodness. In his opinion, being good implies a state of the human person in unity with God. 
Bonhoeffer continually returns to this theme, as he believes in this lies the solution to the 
problem of sin and evil. As such, being in disunity with God – being alienated from Him and 
consequently also from fellow humans and the rest of creation – is the essence of sinful 
being. His interpretation of the nature of sin in Ethics revolves around this central idea. 
5.4.2. Resisting realm thinking 
Bonhoeffer (2005a:60-61) strongly opposes the idea of thinking in terms of realms or 
dualism, which is equal to legalistic thinking in his opinion. To speak of the world as “evil” 
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or being “under the power of the devil”, implies that God did not reconcile the world to 
Himself. He therefore argues that we cannot speak of the world as something to be retreated 
from: “Human beings, with their motives and their works, with their fellow humans, with the 
creation that surrounds them, in other words, reality as a whole [are] held in the hands of God 
... Human beings are indivisible wholes, not only as individuals in both their person and 
work, but also as members of the human and created community to which they belong” 
(Bonhoeffer 2005a:53). Bonhoeffer (2005a:61-66) holds that an evasion of the world in the 
end results in a sinful surrender to the world. This is because of the fact that where sexual 
sins are overcame, other sins – which are also abhorrent like sexual sins but is regarded as 
less severe by the world, for example greed – will thrive. The world, or sinful reality, is not 
something that exists in opposition to the church. It is precisely static thinking, which splits 
the world into the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of the devil that is the real enemy here. 
The world is not divided between Christ and the devil. While there is a certain love of the 
world that implies hatred toward God, the whole world belongs to Christ. Static division 
between the two denies the fact that God has reconciled the world to Himself. The church 
therefore needs to proclaim this reconciliation.  
Bonhoeffer (2005a:67-68) further argues that the world already belongs to Christ, while the 
church community is the body who calls the world into the very community to which it 
already belongs. Only through Christ – through the cross – is the world exposed in its sin and 
submission to God‟s love. Thus, faith in Christ is the sole source of all goodness. Bonhoeffer 
(2005a:75) believes that one could either be in the wholeness of Christ or be torn apart by 
many influences.  
5.4.3 Attempting to know good and evil: The sin which separates humans from God 
The distinction between being sinful or evil and sinful or evil acts constitutes a significant 
part of Bonhoeffer‟s argument. In his opinion, it is worse to be evil than to do evil; for a liar 
to tell the truth than for a lover of truth to lie; for a hater to love than for a lover to hate. He 
further holds that one sin is not like another – they carry different weights. Therefore, some 
sins are deemed more serious than others; “[f]alling away is far more serious than falling 
down” (2005a:77).  
Bonhoeffer (2005a:77-78) maintains that the fact that evil conceals itself with good or 
appears in the form of light proves its profoundness. Especially ethicists, “who are so 
committed to an ethical agenda of what is right and wrong” and so busy judging others do not 
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recognise this evil. What they do not realise is that ethical reality is only recognisable by 
looking at it through God‟s truth. Bonhoeffer (2005a:78-80) continues to name and discuss 
six different ethical types which all attempt to deal with evil – each in a specific way – but 
fail to do so. This is exactly because they are caught in the very sin that is condemned, which 
separates us from God and ultimately brings death: Wanting to know good and evil. Thus, by 
attempting to avoid evil, by being “pious”, they fall into the trap of evil. People of reason 
cannot discern either evil or holiness. Wanting to be fair to both sides, they are crushed in-
between. They perceive the world as unreasonable and themselves ineffective and 
consequently, give in to submission to the stronger side. Fanatics think they can conquer evil 
with the “purity of their will and their principles”. However, they miss their goal. Being so 
occupied with issues of truth and justice, they get caught up in trivial matters and thereby fall 
into evil. People of conscience only have their conscience to support them when making 
decisions. They are therefore torn to pieces. Evil approaches them in “seductive disguises and 
masks”, making their conscience anxious. They settle for an “assuaged” conscience, instead 
of a good conscience. Their conscience is deceived, which is worse than a bad conscience. 
People of duty are extremely focused on responsibility. They choose duty as an escape from 
decisions. The command is grasped at as being the most certain thing. Those in command 
take responsibility for the order, not those who act, and therefore those that act will never do 
something that rests on their own responsibility, which is the only way in which evil can be 
met and overcame. They will continue to fulfil their duty, even if it means to the devil. Those 
who live by free responsibility
103
 live by their own freedom. They consider actions higher 
than a clean conscience, and will “sacrifice a barren principle to a fruitful compromise or a 
barren wisdom of the middle way to a fruitful radicalism”. They should be careful because it 
is exactly their freedom that causes them to fall. They will give into the bad, knowing it is 
bad, to prevent the worse. What they do not realise is that the worse at the end of the day may 
have been the better option or choice. Bonhoeffer (2005a:80) remarks that: “Here lies the raw 
material of tragedy”. Finally, those who conform to private virtuousness perform good deeds 
according to their abilities. They neither steal, murder or commit adultery. In giving up public 
life, they always know the limits, which protect them from conflict. As a result, they always 
have to “close their eyes and ears” to the injustices surrounding them. Only by deceiving 
themselves can they be kept clean from the “stains of responsible action in the world”. Unrest 
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the text, this is the only instance where he criticises this position (2005a:79). 
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overpowers them because of what they fail to do. Accordingly, this unrest either demolishes 
them or they end up yielding to hypocrisy.  
Bonhoeffer (2005a:80-81) states that these ethical types deal with sinful misdeeds as opposed 
to sinful being. Because of this they fail to address the problem of evil. He maintains that the    
only solution to overcome evil is combining simplicity with wisdom – keeping “in sight only 
the single truth of God”. Thus, unity with God is the remedy to evil. Human beings in unity 
with God do not have a “double-psyche” or an “undivided heart”. They are not bound by 
ethical principles, but by God‟s love. For this reason they are freed from the conflicts of 
ethical decision. They stand next to God, not looking at the world, but seeing reality as it is. 
Pure principles or a will could therefore never even begin to solve the problem of evil – only 
faith in Christ can. 
5.4.4 Humans in disunity with God 
For Bonhoeffer (2005a:84) there is no doubt that God is the God of love, wanting to be in 
unity with the world. His love and affection for us is manifested in the fact that He becomes 
human. He wills for us to be truly humans. Humankind on the other hand, desire to be more 
than human or creaturely beings. We desire to differentiate between holy and ungodly, 
honourable and despicable, between good and evil. We want to judge and divide the world 
according to our own set of principles.  
Bonhoeffer (2005a:88-90) believes that another aspect that creates disunity between God and 
humankind is the issue of success. People hold firmly to, and is even overcame by the notion 
of success. However, for those whom success is the yardstick of all things, the person of 
Christ “remains alien, and at best pitiable”. Success can even be a justification for injustice, 
and [g]uilt is scarred over ... by success”. Bonhoeffer (2005a:88-89) comments as follows: 
It is pointless to reproach the successful for their methods. This only holds us in 
the past, while the successful ... win the future, and make the past unchangeable. 
The successful create facts that cannot be reversed. What they destroy cannot be 
restored ... No condemnation can make good the wrong that the successful 
commit. The condemnation is silenced by the course of time; the success remains 
and determines history. The judges of history play a sad role alongside those who 
make history; history rolls over them. No earthly power can risk appropriating the 
saying that the end justifies the means in the way that history so freely and 
naturally does.  
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Bonhoeffer (2005a:89-90) lists and criticises three views of success. The first kind of people 
is those who idolise success. They are not able to distinguish wrong from right, untruth from 
truth or malice from decency. They lack judgement and are not able to recognise guilt. 
“Success per se is good”. Only through hypocrisy and self-deception can they maintain their 
sobriety. The second type is people who believe that only the good are successful. While they 
do not lack judgement and the laws of justice, truth and order, their optimism is a source of 
deception. On the one hand, historical facts need to be forged to lay bare evil‟s 
unsuccessfulness, which ultimately leads to the opposite stance that only the successful is 
good. Alternatively, their optimism crumbles and thereby they condemn all historical success. 
The third type of people is those who hold the notion that all success is evil. Because of their 
“unfruitful pharisaical criticism”, they do not get to the point of acting and achieving success, 
which only confirms their view of success. They too, although in a negative sense, measure 
everything by success. Bonhoeffer (2005a:90) rejects all three these views because success, 
according to his understanding, is a denial of God‟s judgement and it is only in this 
judgement that one finds reconciliation.  
Linked to the idea of success, which is the root of disunity between humans and God, is the 
concept of secularisation. Bonhoeffer (2005a:126-128) highlights the godlessness of the 
Western world because of its estrangement from God, stating that they are confronted by 
nothingness because they have lost their unity with the Creator. Bonhoeffer (2005a:128) 
describes this nothingness by means of the following the remark: 
[This] Western nothingness [is] a nothingness that is rebellious, violent, anti-God 
and anti-human. Breaking away from all that is established, it is the utmost 
manifestation of all the forces opposed to God. It is nothingness as God ... Its rule 
is absolute. It is a creative nothingness that blows its anti-God breath into all that 
exists, creates the illusion of waking it to a new life, and at the same time sucks 
out its true essence ... Life, history, family, people, language, faith – the list goes 
on forever because nothingness spares nothing – all fall victim to nothingness.  
Bonhoeffer (2005a:131-132) is of the opinion that only two things can salvage this situation; 
“the miracle of a new awakening of faith”, which is God‟s redemptive power that “creates 
new life out of nothingness, and a “restraining power” represented by the church and the 
state, whose rule “sets limits to evil”. 
Because Bonhoeffer‟s analysis of the nature of sin extensively deals with the idea of humans 
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in disunity with God, he proceeds to discuss the state of those in sin. They have fallen away 
from the Creator and thus, away from their creaturely nature and have become their own 
creator, their own judge and their own source of renewal (2005a:134). Because he sees the 
church as the only body who can truly proclaim unity with God through the redemptive 
power of Christ, Bonhoeffer (2005a:135-136) argues that the church is the place of rebirth 
and renewal of those who have fallen away and as such, the place where “the possibility of 
forgiveness [for sin] is opened”. Bonhoeffer (2005a:136-137) holds that sin is a deeply 
personal issue, which stains the community with its guilt. He states: “I am guilty of inordinate 
desire ... of cowardly silence when I should have spoken ... of untruthfulness and hypocrisy in 
the face of threatening violence; of disowning without mercy the poorest of my neighbours ... 
of disloyalty and falling away from Christ.”    
Yet another aspect which causes division between God and humankind is the issue of 
Christian radicalism. Bonhoeffer (2005a:154-157) rejects this quest for being a “pure” human 
being and believes that radicalism is a sinful ideology. He argues that it stems from the hatred 
of creation because of the evil in the world. For people who hold this view, reconciliation 
with the world implies betrayal and therefore a denial of Christ. Christian radicals‟ love is 
limited “to the closed circle of the pious”; it is a “pharisaical refusal of love for the wicked” 
(2005a:155-156), showing nothing but contempt and suspicion for the world. On the other 
hand, Bonhoeffer argues (2005a:156), is the “Christian spirit of compromise”. Those who 
conform to this view always hate the ultimate. They despise the idea of justification for the 
sinner solely by grace, and freedom and refusal of the world – which is a Christian gift – are 
regarded as unnatural, against creation, alienation from and even enmity with the world and 
humankind. Radicalism hates the opposite of what compromise hates and the other way 
around. Whereas radicalism hates time, patience, wisdom, measure and the real, compromise 
hates eternity, decision, simplicity, immeasurable and the word. Therefore, Bonhoeffer 
(2005a:157) rejects both, as he believes they both stand in opposition to Christ, because in 
Christ the things which oppose each other in radicalism and compromise, inherently stand in 
unity. He argues that both leads to separation from Christ, as well as to the annihilation of 
humanness, which is sinful.   
As previously stated, Bonhoeffer (2005a:246-248) regards being good superior to acts of 
goodness, and the only way that humans in their being or essence can be good is if they are in 
unity with God. As such, he rejects the idea of a static moral ethic that absolutises principles 
of what is good and evil. Instead, he believes that ethics should always be relative to the 
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particular situation. This is because the “absolute criterion of what is good and of itself ... 
turns what is good into a dead law”. Bonhoeffer (2005a:247-248) sees human understanding 
as pivotal in ethical decision-making. A static moral ethic, which disregards human 
understanding, in itself is sinful as it “cuts people off from the historicity of their existence in 
order to place them into the vacuum of a purely private and purely ideal sphere.” Bonhoeffer 
(2005a:299-300) maintains that the purpose of ethical reflection is the desire to gain 
knowledge of good evil. However, this is sinful – “a falling away from the origin” – as it 
establishes disunity and alienation between God and his creation.    
Bonhoeffer (2005a:300-303) describes the state of those in disunity with God, who know 
good and evil, who have become sicut deus, in detail: 
[They] understand themselves not within the reality of being defined by the 
origin, but from their own possibilities, namely, to be either good or evil. They 
know themselves beside and outside God ... The knowledge of good and evil is 
thus disunion with God ... Instead of knowing themselves within God, who is 
their origin, they now must know themselves as the origin. By understanding 
themselves according to their own possibilities ... human beings come to see 
themselves as the origin of good and evil ...[H]aving become equal with God, 
however, they have misappropriated the origin and made themselves their own 
creator and judge ... In usurping the origin, human beings have absorbed a secret 
of God into themselves, which causes them to perish ... the secret of 
predestination, the secret of an eternal disunion ... They have become like God – 
but opposed to God ... Their life is now divided, estranged from God, other 
human beings, material things and themselves. Instead of seeing God, human 
beings see themselves.  
Two important concepts which come to mind considering this disunity are shame and 
conscience. Bonhoeffer (2005a:303-308) argues that shame arises when humans recognise 
their disunity with God and other beings. They acknowledge what they have lost and thereby 
feel ashamed. On the one hand, shame masks their estrangement and on the other hand, it 
asserts the estrangement and is thus not able to repair the inflicted damage. Humans thus use 
their shame to cover themselves and to hide from God and their fellow human beings. 
Because they fail in doing so, they now have to bear life living as alienated beings. Shame is 
therefore “the memory of disunion from the Creator, and of robbery of the Creator”. 
Conscience, however, “is the sign of human beings‟ disunion within themselves ... it is the 
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voice of fallen life that seeks to preserve unity at least within itself” (2005a:307). It becomes 
the norm whereby humans in their disunity seek to restore their relationship with God and 
others. However, conscience is not an authentic comfort. In reality, conscience is not 
concerned with God and others, but only with the self of those who bear it. Bonhoeffer 
(2005a:315) states that ultimately, humans who know good and evil develop a judgemental 
spirit which “produces especially poisonous flowers when it grows in the secret denial, 
desperate outrage, or resigned complacency toward one‟s own weakness”. Furthermore, this 
“judging is itself the apostasy from God”, which grows evil fruits in the hearts of human 
beings.  
5.4.5 Overcoming disunity through faith in Christ 
It is clear that disunity with God, which is established by the knowledge of good and evil, 
could never be overcome through human shame, conscience or judgement. A good being or 
essence can only be brought about through the opposite of that – unity with God. Bonhoeffer 
continuously reiterates this idea throughout his Ethics. He maintains that the judging and 
knowing that emanates from unity brings about reconciliation, which is only possible through 
faith in Christ. Humans who have been called into this unity, although they were sicut deus, 
“are filled with a new knowledge in which the knowledge of good and evil has been 
overcome. They are filled with the knowledge of God ... as those who bear the image of God” 
(2005a:316-317).    
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of the nature of sin in three of his 
major works. One can discern that he emphasises sinful being over and above sinful deeds. 
Although his arguments cover a diverse range, he holds firm to the idea that sin is a state of 
being in disunity, which is caused by human knowledge of good and evil. Bonhoeffer further 
holds that this alienation or estrangement filters down into human beings‟ relationships with 
themselves, fellow humans, as well as nature. In his opinion, the only solution to the problem 
of sin is unity with God, which is only possible though faith in Christ.    
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Chapter 6 
Critical assessment of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's view on the nature of 
sin 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it was seen how diversely the nature of sin is understood in Christian theology. 
In Chapter 3, such Christian discourses were interpreted by contemporary scholars in the 
context of ecotheology. Secondary scholarly works on Bonhoeffer as ecotheologian are 
included in Chapter 4, whereas Chapter 5 offered an analysis of this theologian‟s contribution 
to a Christian understanding of sin. This brings me to the question of how Bonhoeffer‟s 
position is related to contemporary Christian discourse on hamartology and ecology. 
Contemporary Christian discourse on hamartology and ecology was captured in relation to 
the rubrics of sin as pride, greed, moral failure, as “hydra” and as privation of the good, as the 
ecological sins of anthropocentrism, domination in the name of differences of species, 
consumerist greed and the alienation of human beings from the earth community.
104
 In this 
chapter, these notions will be placed in juxtaposition with Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of sin, 
allowing for a mutually critical correlation in terms of identifying and discussing any parallel 
or divergent views arising from such juxtaposition.  
The following question will thus be addressed here: What are the similarities and differences 
between Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of the nature of sin and current discourse on 
the nature of sin in available literature on ecology and hamartology? More specifically, the 
question is whether contemporary discourse on hamartology and ecology may illuminate 
aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s position previously not recognised. Are there perhaps depths of 
insight in Bonhoeffer‟s work or inadequacies that comes to the forefront when juxtaposed 
with contemporary discourse on hamartology and ecology? Inversely, are there depths of 
insight in Bonhoeffer‟s position that are not recognised in contemporary discourse on 
hamartology and ecology?  
Each of the aforementioned ecological sins will be discussed individually in light of 
correlating the views of contemporary scholars with Bonhoeffer‟s interpretation, highlighting 
any emerging similarities and differences. Secondary material on Bonhoeffer as 
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ecotheologian will be integrated with these arguments. This chapter will then be brought to a 
close by means of a few concluding remarks.  
6.2 Anthropocentrism 
Anthropocentrism stems from the egocentric attitude, whereby human beings rebel against 
God and seek after their own self. As “superior” beings, they want to be their own centre and 
live by their own authority, principles and perceptions (Hart 2004:8-9; Hall 1986:53; Cafaro 
2004:144; Delio 2008:78). Hart (2004:16), McGrath (2002:56) and Hall (1986:56) explicitly 
link anthropocentrism with the sin of pride, whereby human beings consider themselves the 
centre of the world. Bonhoeffer (1996:137, 147; 2004:89-91, 115-117, 141-142; 2005:84, 
300-303) also argues along the same lines, stating that humans desire to be their own source 
of life, living from their own resources. Being egocentric, they live by their own knowledge 
and see the world as a place where they live by their own reign and justification.
105
 Hall 
(1986:56) adds that also connected to the sin of pride is sloth, whereby human beings shy 
away from their responsibility to care for creation. 
It is widely held that humankind is made in the likeness or the image of God. Hart (2004:8-9) 
and Conradie (2005:100) hold that it is precisely this belief that misleads humans to the idea 
that it is their right to be elevated above the rest of creation. This problematic view is referred 
to as teleological anthropocentrism, and emphasises humanity‟s central prominence in the 
redeemed creation. In contrasts, stands instrumental anthropocentrism, highlighting 
humankind‟s central place in the process of the redemption of creation as a whole (David 
Clough in Horrell 2010:131). Deane-Drummond (2000:143) argues that a distinction that is 
drawn too sharply between humans and the rest of creation leads to teleological 
anthropocentrism, but where no distinction is made, humans merely become passive 
observers in the created order. Similar to Berry (1988:202), Wallace (1996:162) and Brutea 
(1997:14-15), Bonhoeffer (2004:76-77) maintains that humans and non-humans share the 
same creaturely essence. They both receive life through the Spirit of God, yet humans are the 
only creatures endowed with God‟s Spirit. Bonhoeffer (1996:60-67) goes one step further and 
maintains that another feature that distinguishes humans from the rest of creation is that God 
also endows them with freedom. In his opinion, the rest of creation is conditioned and 
therefore not free – they are “torn away from, and alien to, the Creator”. Humankind‟s 
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freedom resembles that of the Creator, who appoints and empowers them to be “lord” of 
creation, to be free from creation in dominion over it. The earth is considered “their” earth. 
These statements certainly appear to be anthropocentric and open for criticism. It serves 
without a doubt as a justification for anthropocentric attitudes, which lead to human 
domination of the earth and its beings. It is interesting to note the exceptional argument that 
Bonhoeffer (2004:111-117) makes, however, distinguishing him from contemporary scholars 
(and also halting any criticism in its tracks): Although human beings are made in the image of 
God (imago dei), in unity with Him, they no longer carry this image because they have 
gained a knowledge of good and evil and has therefore become sicut deus (like God). As a 
result, they are dead and no longer in union with Him. They are fallen beings and therefore 
cannot claim the freedom and rights of humans in the image of God. Ultimately, Bonhoeffer 
is then indeed in agreement with contemporary scholars who believe that the notion of 
“humans in the likeness of God” does not mandate the elevation of humankind above the rest 
of creation.  
Bonhoeffer (1996:137-142, 146-147; 2004:66-67, 89, 99, 105-106, 132-135; 2005:300-303) 
generally sees all forms of disunity as the product of an attitude of pride. He believes that 
because of the inordinate love for the self, human beings sin by seeking to go beyond their 
creatureliness – behind God‟s Word – to gain knowledge of good and evil. Having done so, 
they are now in disunion with God, themselves, other human beings and nature – trapped in 
solitude – because they wanted to be lord, creator, redeemer and bearer of the world.106 
Haught (1993:42), on the other hand, explores anthropocentrism as a product of alienation. 
Because human beings are estranged from God and from the earth, their feeling of 
abandonment in a “foreign world” is countered by self-inflating and amplifying their own 
worth. They see the natural world as holding them in captivity and refute this perception by 
elevating themselves above it, treating it as their possession, undeserving of their care.  
Contributions to contemporary ecotheology are in agreement with Bonhoeffer that God‟s will 
for us is to be humans (see Deane-Drummond 2000:143; Bonhoeffer 2005:84). It is not His 
will that we be god; instead, for our sake, He became human. We sin when we desire to be 
more than human, break free from our creatureliness and replace God with human reason. We 
thereby reject His authority, wanting to make the rules ourselves (Cafaro 2004:144; McGrath 
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2002:54-56, 61-62; Bonhoeffer 1996:137; 2004:105-106, 127-128; 2005:134, 300-302). 
Bonhoeffer (2004:116-117) furthers this argument, stating that this is because we now live 
from our own knowledge. We have become God‟s master – the world‟s master – and can no 
longer be addressed by God as creaturely beings. McGrath (2002:62-64) adds to this, 
asserting that, based on our human knowledge, God becomes a human invention, not the 
other way around. We therefore play God and lord ourselves over everything that exists.  
Anthropocentrism implies an infringement of creation‟s intrinsic worth – the notion that 
creation is inherently good in itself. In contemporary circles, such a rejection of creation‟s 
intrinsic goodness is severely criticised (see Berry 1988:202; Haught 1993:41; King & 
Woodyard 1999:6; Gebara 1999:28). Bonhoeffer‟s notion of creation‟s goodness, on the 
other hand, may elicit criticism. He believes that creation can only be good in light of God‟s 
goodness (2005:59). From an environmental ethics point of view, this argument may appear 
to be problematic because it denies the natural world‟s intrinsic worth. Yet, Borrong 
(2005:74-75) suggests that environmental ethicists are often more concerned with nature‟s 
worth for humanity than nature‟s worth in itself, which is anthropocentric in itself.107 
Likewise, Bonhoeffer (2005:77-81) also critiques the sphere of ethics, as he believes that 
ethicists judge according to their own set of principles, their own knowledge of good and evil 
– the exact sin that separates us from God – and thereby fall into the very trap of evil which 
they seek to overcome.  
David Clough (in Horrell 2010:131) draws attention to the notion of instrumental 
anthropocentrism, which stands in opposition to teleological anthropocentrism. He believes 
that the former points out the centrality of humankind in the process of the redemption of 
creation as a whole. In the Christian tradition, redemption is often emphasised as something 
solely reserved for human beings, however, contemporary ecotheologians perceive this as an 
anthropocentric expression. Cooper (1990:69) and Haught (1993:65), for example, affirm that 
redemption should encompass the entire creation. Bonhoeffer (2005:53) also shares this 
view. Rasmussen (1996:299) comments as follows: “[F]or Bonhoeffer the whole is ... Jesus 
Christ ... the center of „nature, humanity and history‟. The drama of redemption for him ... is 
one in which the whole of creation is reconstituted in such a way that enslaved nature and 
broken humanity are redeemed together.” Rasmussen (2007:13) further notes that God 
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becoming human implies “a thorough „earth-ing‟ of God” in nature‟s joys, pleasures, 
delights, as well as its distress, sorrows and suffering. In Rasmussen‟s view, this was 
Bonhoeffer‟s alternative to German nationalism‟s “demonic earth faith and ethic” 
(1996:298): a cosmic understanding of Christ who reconciled all things – the earth and the 
whole of creation – to Himself, this reconciliation “realized in our own lives and throughout 
creation” (Rasmussen (1996:299). He suggests that Bonhoeffer‟s earth ethic could therefore 
also serve as appropriate alternative for us human beings at present, in the face of our current 
ecological predicament.   
6.3 Domination in the name of differences of species 
Human domination and exploitation of the earth and its resources follow from the attitude 
that humans are the highest form of life, the masters of creation and that the world has been 
created primarily for their benefit. Contemporary scholars, for example Conradie (2011:5), 
Martin-Schramm and Stivers (2003:21) and Wilkinson (1991:289-290), condemn this 
anthropocentric notion, which is generally believed to be warranted by the dominion given to 
human beings in the biblical creation narrative. “Dominion” is misinterpreted as 
“domination”, creating the idea that humankind has the right to freely exploit the earth and its 
resources. Nash (1991:79) and Conradie (2011:6) are of the opinion that the domination of 
the earth occurs once the idea of divine dominion is removed from caring for creation. In 
addition, Bonhoeffer (2005:66-67) also believes that dominion without God is problematic, 
as it is sinful. He maintains that when humans do not serve God, they do not accept dominion 
as God-given, but rather grab it for themselves. As a result, they do not accept the divine 
responsibility of exerting dominion over nature. Thus, they stand in disunity with those to 
whom they inseparably belong: God, their fellow humans and the earth.   
Bonhoeffer (2005:119-120) holds that humans, in their rebellion, want to be creator and lord 
of the world. Contemporary theologians such as McDaniel (1995:123), maintain that the 
implication of this for the natural world is human domination and exploitation. Contemporary 
theologians and Bonhoeffer agree that this is as a result of humankind refusing to accept and 
live within its God-ordained boundaries, seeking to go beyond them (see for example 
McGrath 2000:80-81; Northcott 1996:50; Rasmussen 1996:101; Bonhoeffer 2004:98-100). 
Bonhoeffer (2004:98-100, 113-114) adds that in our unlimitedness we humans no longer live 
as creatures, but as creator-creatures. The ordained limits are not accepted as grace, but 
become the groundwork for our rebelling against God and claiming for ourselves His gift of 
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nature. The other – nature – that we accepted in love becomes an object of our hatred, which 
only increases our hatred towards God. Because of our lovelessness we now seek to possess 
or destroy the other.  
The notion that the ground is cursed because of human sin is predominant in Christian 
theology. Bonhoeffer too upholds this view. However, Wilkinson (1991:289-290) strongly 
oppose the notion that weeds or plants of no human use, as well as the ruggedness of the 
earth, are not a part of the good creation but rather the effect of human sin. He suggests that 
the ground is cursed because humans are divided from it – a split which is actually within 
human beings themselves and that causes them to be separated from nature. Yet, 
Bonhoeffer‟s view should not be too hastily dismissed. He too suggests that through sin, the 
human essence is split into tob and ra, a divide manifested threefold: humankind‟s 
relationship with God, their relation with each other, as well as their relationship with the rest 
of creation. The enmity between human beings and nature is therefore a direct product of this 
split (2004:132-134).  
Bonhoeffer (2004:105-106) asserts that those who want to gain their own knowledge seek to 
go behind God‟s Word. Moltmann (1988:91), Wilkinson (1991:25, 27), McGrath (2002:78-
79, 83-84) and Conradie (2011:5; 2005:88) maintain that humans use knowledge to 
continually dominate nature in new and startling ways, believing in the slogan that 
“knowledge is power”. In his article entitled “Science and Religion in the Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer”, Rodney D. Holder (2009:121) comments on Bonhoeffer‟s account of 
the advancement of human knowledge in the field of science and technology, and turning to 
God where this knowledge is insufficient. God thereby becomes a mere “God-of-the-gaps” 
and not the centre of life (Holder 2009:117). Holder (2009:121) quotes Bonhoeffer on the 
scientific idea of an “infinite universe”: “It seems that in the natural sciences the process 
begins with Nicolas of Cusa and Giordana Bruno and the „heretical‟ doctrine of the infinity of 
the universe”.  Holder (2009:121) observes: 
The “process” to which Bonhoeffer refers is the movement of the world and 
humanity toward their own autonomy. This is also at work in other disciplines. In 
theology reason is sufficient for religious knowledge; in ethics “rules of life” 
replace the commandments and Hugo Grotius‟ “natural law” is set up as 
international law that is also valid etsi deus non daretur, “even if there were no 
God”; in philosophy the deistic view is of the world as a mechanism running by 
itself. 
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So while humans continuously employ knowledge to dominate and exploit, nature, on the 
other hand, counter-reacts by increasingly demonstrating its uncontrollable forces, terrifying 
humans in the process (Santmire 1985:77; Duchrow & Liedke 1987:66). Bonhoeffer 
(2004:134) insists that this is because of nature rebelling out of despair against humans who 
think they are self-sufficient and can live from their own resources; nature and its non-human 
creatures become uncontrollable, “mute, enigmatic and unfruitful”, exerting their power over 
humankind. It is generally held that human beings think that they can combat the 
uncontrollable forces of nature through science and technology, which leads to ever-
increasing domination (see, for example, Limouris 1990:5). Both contemporary scholars and 
Bonhoeffer maintains that we now fall victim to the very science and technology that we 
created (see Martin-Schramm & Stivers 2003:19; McGrath 2002:54; Bonhoeffer 2004:66-
67). Furthering this argument, Bonhoeffer (2004:66-67) states that our dominion becomes an 
illusion because we are no longer in control but are being controlled. We become slaves and 
prisoners to the exact thing through which we seek liberation – technology. As a result, we 
lose our unity with the ground and become estranged from it. Peter Scott (2000:382), as part 
of his attempt to reconstruct the meaning of humans in the image of God (imago dei) in a 
technological society, affirms that an appropriate response to Bonhoeffer‟s statement would 
be to emphasise the “spatial placing of humanity”. “Spatiality” in this context to refers to the 
place of human beings in the created cosmos. Scott (2000:382) explains: 
The natural conditions of human life are part of the givenness of the blessing of 
God to natural humanity. Nature remains God‟s blessing; thereby it is ordered 
toward the preservation of the creatures of God and is in itself that ordering ... 
The true exercise of our spatial “naturalness” must be contrasted with our 
(failing) attempts to rule the world.   
From an ecofeminist point of view, the interlocking dualisms linked to patriarchal Western 
cultures and knowledge systems have been used for the purpose of dominating and exploiting 
both women and nature (Karen Warren in Smith 1997:19; Nash 1991:219). These dualisms 
are personified by means of nature being associated with female connotations, such as 
“mother earth” or “virgin forests” (Gray 1981). Furthermore, it is suggested that domination 
in the name of gender and domination in the name of species mutually reinforce one another 
(Conradie 2011:54, 56). Bonhoeffer (2005:76-79) maintains that human bodies and the 
ground are essentially intertwined. He states that humans are “born” from the ground, from 
the “womb” of their “mother” – the earth. Could this perhaps indicate that this theologian is 
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falling in the very trap widely criticised by contemporary scholars, especially ecofeminists? 
Or could his connotation of the earth‟s “body” and human bodies possibly be a crucial means 
of illustrating the interconnectedness between the earth and “her offspring”?  
6.4 Consumerist greed 
The notion of sin as greed and desire are reinterpreted in an ecological context as consumerist 
greed. While Bonhoeffer (2004:122-124) does not focus primarily on greed in terms of 
material possessions, he is more concerned with unrestraint desire, whereby humans 
transgress ordained limits, seeking after pleasure. Contemporary scholars such as Birch and 
Rasmussen (1978:21), who also condemn this “no limit” mentality, extensively emphasise 
the issue of greed and its related quest for continually increasing material possessions. Both 
highlight the idea that humans in their boundedness become discontent (Conradie 2006:47; 
Watchel 1989:17; King & Woodyard 1999:16; Becker 1992:152; Bonhoeffer 1996:147; 
2005:99). With their hearts turned into the self, the notion of God is eliminated, his divine 
authority is rejected and the possibilities for humans in their unlimitedness become endless 
(McGrath 2002:61-64; Bonhoeffer 1996:137). King and Woodyard (1999:18), Northcott 
(1996:41, 79), and Conradie (2009:72) add that when God is removed from humanity‟s 
vision and faith in Him is renounced, focus is placed on the human self and material 
fulfilment as the ultimate goal of life. Greed and unrestrained desire is changed into virtues 
and money, superabundance and success become the order of the day, even at the cost of 
plundering the earth and its precious resources (Conradie 2011:34; Northcott 1996:55; Birch 
& Rasmussen 1978:53). Rasmussen‟s article entitled “Song of Songs” (1996:295-316) 
reflects Bonhoeffer‟s argument that loving God implies loving the earth throughout. To 
embrace the earth and be faithful to it, means embracing God and having faith in Him 
through Jesus Christ, who encompasses the whole of creation. Rasmussen (1996:299) 
comments: “[Bonhoeffer] never wavered from his loyalty to the earth and immersion in its 
agonies and ecstasies as the only place God is met, faith is lived, and eternity is glimpsed.”  
Contemporary scholars such as Ruether (1994:5), McGrath (2002:53), and Daneel (1998:245) 
believe that the secularisation of the Western world has to a large extent contributed to the 
sinful quest for money and material possessions. For Bonhoeffer (2005:126-128), the 
secularised West is in a state of godlessness because of its estrangement from God. Having 
lost their unity with the Creator, they are faced by nothingness – by death. Being rebellious 
and violent, these evil forces of nothingness stand completely in opposition to God and His 
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creatures. DeWitt (1996:61-62) holds that one of these forces is the economic market, which 
deprives us human beings of our God-assigned duty toward creation. Although it appears to 
be good, it is actually evil, as it changes stewards, who worship God, into consumers, who 
put their trust in the mechanisms of the market. In addition, it determines our human ethics. 
Bonhoeffer (2004:106-110; 2005:77-81) too emphasises evil that veils itself under good. He 
argues that although it lures us with its “goodness”, it is actually evil, causing us to submit to 
sin.   
Similar to Bonhoeffer, contemporary scholars deal with the notion of “success” at length. 
Birch and Rasmussen (1978:44-45), Bruteau (1997:12-13), Wachtel (1989:62) and DeWitt 
(1996:62) believe that in a culture fuelled by unbridled consumerism, a person‟s identity and 
worth are determined by personal and social success. Economic well-being, “progress” and 
“being number one” become the goals of those who venerate success – even at the cost of 
plundering the earth and its precious resources. In addition, Becker (1992:153) and Birch and 
Rasmussen (1978:52-53) hold that success is perceived as a symbol of God‟s blessing and 
favour and thereby becomes morally justifiable. In the view of Cooper (1990:75), the pursuit 
of success is a perversion of God‟s will. While these scholars only deal with one approach to 
success, generally those who idolise success, Bonhoeffer (2005:89-90) distinguishes between 
three views of success: those who idolise success, those who believe that only the good are 
successful and only the successful are good, and those who believe all success is evil. He 
maintains that all three types, whether in a positive or a negative sense, measure everything 
by success. Condemning all three views, he argues that success is sinful as it is a justification 
for injustice done. Furthermore, it is a denial of God‟s divine judgement.  
Like Bonhoeffer (2005:126-128), Berry (1991:46), DeWitt (1996:61) and Becker 1992:155) 
affirm the totalitarian character of these false assumptions of the secularised world. A culture 
of rampant consumerism infiltrates every sense of our being and every societal structure, 
leaving us with nothing to lead the way out of sin. Our religion, our morality, our faith, our 
language, our history – everything – are pervaded. All of these are deprived of goodness and 
therefore become unproductive. Bonhoeffer (2005:128) adds that our true essence is sucked 
out and replaced with nothingness. In addition, because “nothingness spares nothing”, 
everyone and everything is affected.  
6.5 Alienation of humans from the earth community 
Bonhoeffer (1996:137-141, 140-150; 2004:91, 96; 2005:84-90) and contemporary scholars 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
such as Wallace (2005:28), Snyder (2011:3), Bookless (2008:37-38) and Conradie 
(2005:184-185) are in agreement that being alienated from God implies being in a state of 
isolation and solitude. Our apostasy has caused us to fall away from Him, away from 
goodness, and we now stand as fallen creatures in disunity from those to whom we are 
essentially connected: to God, ourselves, other human beings and nature. Having fled from 
God‟s authority, we have lost the essence of our being.108 Bonhoeffer (2004:88-93, 113-114, 
133-140; 2005:300-303) ascribes our state of “falling-fallenness” to the act whereby we 
humans have gained knowledge of good and evil – having became sicut deus – and now stand 
in disunity with our Creator. Continually emphasising this point, it is therefore under-
standable why Bonhoeffer (1996:137; 2004:66-67; 2005:302-303) explicitly links all forms 
of sin with estrangement. In his view, sin has transformed us into alienated beings – alienated 
from everyone and everything.
109
 This state of estrangement, argues Bonhoeffer (1996:146-
147), is sinful in itself as much it is the effect of sin; it will therefore always lead to other 
sin.
110
   
Bonhoeffer (2004:127-128, 143) places significant emphasis on sinful being,
111
 stating that 
human beings, in their sin, are engaging in a continual flight from God. A number of 
contemporary scholars are of the opinion that it is this flight from the Creator that leads to the 
continual flight from creation. As a result, humans feel dislocated from the natural 
environment. A sense of homelessness is experienced whereby humans cannot feel at home 
on earth because they see themselves merely as “passing sojourners” (see Santmire 1985:130; 
Haught 1993:39-65; Maguire & Rasmussen 1998:42, 44; Conradie 2005:184-185). Because 
of this feeling of otherworldliness, the feeling that the earth is not their real home and that 
they actually belong somewhere else, humans think they can dominate and exploit the natural 
environment as they please (Merchant 1982:143; Horrell 2010:129-130; Wallace 2005:30). 
Like these contemporary scholars, Bonhoeffer (2004:76-77) firmly rejects this feeling of 
otherworldliness, arguing that as creatures formed out of the dust of the ground, “[h]uman 
beings have their existence as existence on earth”. The earth is therefore an innate part of 
                                                 
108
  Note that although specific references are used here for Bonhoeffer‟s views, he continually employs these 
ideas throughout his writings under discussion. 
109
  Note that although specific references are used here, Bonhoeffer continually employs these ideas throughout 
his writings under discussion. 
110
  Here, we perceive sin as “hydra”, the notion that sin is pervasive and always gives birth to new sin.  
111
  An idea reiterated throughout his writings in question.  
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human nature. Rasmussen (1996:303) shares Bonhoeffer‟s view that “[o]therworldliness is 
the temptation of those who cannot bear earth as it is”. He uses Bonhoeffers‟s arguments on 
the dysfunctionality and destructiveness of otherworldliness to construct the notion that 
“otherwordliness and world-weariness ... dumb[s] down a full sense of human responsibility 
for earth‟s distress and its cure” (Rasmussen 1996:307-309). In his article entitled “Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) – Jesus Christ and the Restoration, preservation and Reconciliation 
of Creation”, Stephen J. Plant (2012:95-96) commends Bonhoeffer for advocating an 
authentic “this-worldliness” based on the foundation of Christ‟s death and resurrection. He 
states: “This is not, to be sure, a developed constructive theology of creation, or anywhere 
close to it; but it is, perhaps, a more welcoming standpoint from which such a theology could 
be developed than many theologians in the Lutheran tradition had achieved.” It is therefore of 
no surprise that Rasmussen (2007:8-9) holds Bonhoeffer‟s theme of “Christian this-
worldliness and for the life of faith as drinking the earthly cup to the dregs” in high regard.  
There is general consensus that this lack of feeling of belonging to the created cosmos is 
intensified by two concepts –  the idea of Western dualism and a focus on salvation only for 
the soul (Conradie 2006:54; Nash 1991:73). Martin-Schramm and Stivers (2003:20), Snyder 
(2011:4), Deane-Drummond (2006:117) and Bouma-Prediger (1995:271), for example, reject 
the concept of dualism, whereby reality is separated into two distinct parts, for instance 
heaven and earth, spirit and matter, humans and nature. They believe that it deceives humans 
into accepting the idea that they exist apart from the rest of creation, which in turn sanctions 
exploitation of the natural world. Likewise, Bonhoeffer (2005:60-66) critiques the notion of 
realm thinking, especially a separation of the world into “God‟s kingdom” and „the devil‟s 
kingdom”, which he believes creates the impression that God has not reconciled the world to 
Himself. Nevertheless, unlike the aforementioned scholars, who only reject dualistic thinking 
because it is deemed as one of the roots of enmity between humans and creation, Bonhoeffer 
(2004:89-92, 113-114, 140) goes significantly further than this – he traces the roots of 
dualism. For him, the deepest split, the ultimate divide in human life, is tob and ra. Because 
humankind has gained knowledge of good and evil, they suffer from in inner split, a divide 
within themselves. As a result, all things in the external world are shaped by contradiction 
and antithesis.  
Horrell (2010:129-130), Conradie (2011:5, 7), Nash (1991:73) and Horrell (2010:129), for 
example, lament the idea that salvation is seen as something reserved only for the soul, and 
that as a result of this the soul is regarded as superior to the body. Wilkinson (1991:114-115, 
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119) believes that this causes humans to feel alienated from their physical bodies – not 
feeling at home in them – which in turn effects human alienation from the earth. This idea is 
extensively criticised, as they believe that a person‟s body and soul is essentially intertwined. 
In addition, argue Wallace (1996:162) and Murphy (1989:3), our bodies are formed out of the 
ground; we are made of the earth and are therefore an indispensable part of it. Haught 
(1993:40) and Ruether (1994:139) maintain that flight from the body and flight from nature is 
sinful and should be rejected. Bonhoeffer (2004:78) also condemns this body-earth-fleeing 
ethic, stating that we humans are born from the soil, yet his explanation of “body” and 
“earth” powerfully captures the idea why we humans should not feel estranged from our 
physical bodies and the natural environment. Bonhoeffer (2004:76-79) believes that the bond 
between humankind and the earth – the idea that we are derived from it – essentially belongs 
to our being (essence) as humans. Thus, we cannot be humans apart from the earth. Through 
the earth we have our bodies, filled with the essence of being human – being bound with the 
earth. Our bodies are a symbol of our relation to the earth, other bodies and moreover, to 
God. Through bodily existence humans find their fellow humans, the earth and their Creator, 
whom is glorified and celebrated in it. Bonhoeffer maintains that the idea that earthly bodies 
are the essence of human existence implies two things. Firstly, that human existence means 
existence on earth, not somewhere else. Secondly, that a body is not merely an exterior, but a 
person‟s essence. As a result, a person does not have a body and soul but is body and soul. 
Therefore, the soul should not be elevated above the body, as the one is essentially the other. 
Scott (2000:381) employs Bonhoeffer‟s idea of the significance of “embodied bodies”, 
“creatureliness”, “worldliness” and “earthliness” to illustrate, what he believes, the only 
analogy between God and humanity. He states:  
Bonhoeffer presents the concept of being in the image of God as “natural”, that is 
embodied. Human freedom is not the freedom of bodiless beings; freedom 
operates only in the context of humanity‟s “total empirical existence”. So 
“creatureliness”, “worldliness” and “earthliness” are affirmed in being a human 
creature before God (Scott 2000:381). 
Scott (2000:381) maintains that the only way in which humans can image the likeness of God 
in a technological society is through the analogous concept of freedom – “freedom of 
relation”. Human beings can only be in the Creator‟s image through what Bonhoeffer refers 
to as “freedom-for-the-other”, their freedom of relation – with God, fellow humans and 
nature – which images the Creator‟s freedom for humankind. Rasmussen (1996:309) 
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commends Bonhoeffer for illuminating the significance of the body. He also denounces the 
idea that we humans tend to have no vital connection to our bodies and the earth. He quotes 
Bonhoeffer in saying, “The person who ... abandon[s] the earth, loses the power which still 
holds [them] by eternal, mysterious forces. The earth remains our mother, just as God 
remains our Father, and our mother will only lay in the Father‟s arms those who remain true 
to her. Earth and its distress – that is the Christian‟s Song of Songs” (Rasmussen 1996:297). 
Rasmussen (1996:309) further makes the following remark:  
We soon forget that created life is, in Bonhoeffer‟s words ... “the community of 
men and creatures” that comprises an “indivisible whole” that “participation in 
[this] indivisible whole” is the very “sense and purpose of the Christian enquiry 
concerning good” and that “the good demands the whole”. 
Rasmussen (1996:295) observes that for Bonhoeffer “Earth” is a matter of “faith-matter” – 
“faith that endures in the world and loves and remains true to the world in spite of all the 
hardships it brings us”. He further quotes Bonhoeffer in saying: “I fear that Christians who 
venture to stand on earth on one leg will stand in heaven on only one leg too” (Rasmussen 
(1996:296). In Rasmussen‟s opinion, Bonhoeffer‟s earth-ethic is a “well-planted, two legged 
fidelity to earth” in the midst of our present ecological turmoil and distress (1996: 296).  
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the final results of this study were documented. Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s 
understanding of the nature of sin was placed in juxtaposition with current discourse on the 
nature of sin in available literature on hamartology and ecology. Secondary material on 
Bonhoeffer‟s writings was incorporated where appropriate. 
It is interesting to note how Bonhoeffer and contemporary scholars complement and build on 
each other‟s arguments. Thus, despite diverse contexts, mutually critical correlation is 
certainly possible on the grounds of the reconcilability of Bonhoeffer and contemporary 
ecotheologians. One may conclude that Bonhoeffer, although some of his statements are open 
to dispute, does in fact provide some insights that contemporary ecotheologians seem to 
disregard. Such insights provide a platform for constructing fresh ways of thinking and 
responding to present ecological concerns. In addition, considering the vast amount of 
available modern literature, contemporary discourse on hamartology and ecology offers an 
innovative framework in which Bonhoeffer‟s arguments can be placed and understood. The 
findings contained in this chapter could therefore enhance secondary scholarship on 
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Bonhoeffer‟s views on hamartology and ecology.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Various disciplines attempt to offer an appropriate response to contemporary ecological 
concerns. In this project, based on a Christian foundation, it was addressed from an 
ecotheological perspective. Constructed on the premise that the roots of the ecological crisis 
at hand may be explored within the context of the Christian notion of sin, the latter was 
revisited and the nature of sin reinterpreted in the light of ecological concerns. The aim of 
this task was to assess Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s position with regard to contemporary Christian 
discourse on hamartology and ecology by investigating his understanding of the nature of sin 
and contrasting it with such contemporary discourse.  
In this project we have seen the rich diversity of ways in which the nature of sin is interpreted 
in the Christian tradition. Compared to the vast amount of available literature on 
hamartology, this thesis offered a concise discussion on the nature of sin, drawing on 
contributions from a number of Christian traditions. Using this as a groundwork, these ways 
of thinking were reinterpreted in the light of ecological theology, resulting in a classification 
of ecological sins into four distinct, yet overlapping, categories, i.e. anthropocentrism, 
domination in the name of differences of species, consumerist greed and the alienation of 
humans from the earth community. Once again, this was based on the views of a diversity of 
Christian traditions. The history of Christian theology can significantly enrich current 
discourse on hamartology and ecology. In this study I retrieved insights from the renowned 
German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) by firstly introducing him in terms of 
his life, work and legacy, and then analysing his views on the nature of sin. Such views were 
juxtaposed with contemporary Christian discourse on hamartology and ecology, and parallel 
and divergent views were extracted. 
There is no doubt that Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟s views immensely enhance contemporary 
attempts to address existing ecological challenges. For him, sharing in the earth‟s suffering 
and distress is a matter of faith – faith that believes in the oneness of God, humans and the 
entire earth community. As creaturely beings, we are innately connected to the Creator and 
the whole of creation. Therefore, a retrieval of his insights provides us, in the present age, 
with a source of ecological wisdom that will enable us to understand the roots of, and to 
appropriately respond to, the contemporary ecological crisis. Like Bonhoeffer, we can stand 
our “ground” in the midst of pressing ecological challenges, and as suffering servants partake 
in the earth‟s distress, firmly rooted in the unity which is only possible through faith in 
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Christ.   
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